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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The objective of this document is to survey the main economic issues that arise in the 
management and regulation of passenger rail transport. The analytical framework we use is the 
standard Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm created by the discipline of Industrial Economics. 
We will proceed in five main steps: 
i) We begin with a definition of the product under scrutiny and a presentation of the 
characteristics of demand and supply of this product, drawing not just on general 
principles but on scientific research assessing the quantitative magnitudes of the various 
forces at work. 
ii) The next step is to analyze how conditions of competition work in the industry. We study 
the various factors that determine how rail operators function: vertical and horizontal 
concentration, the diversification of activities, the differentiation of products and barriers 
to entry (and to exit). 
iii) Next we consider the set of decision variables that matter for price and non price 
competition, in the short and in the long run, 
iv) Next we discuss indices of private and public performance relevant to assessing how well 
rail transport is meeting the demands placed upon it. 
v) Finally, we discuss regulation of the industry, including not just the rationale for 
regulation but evidence of the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes. 
 
This work is to be viewed as a catalogue aimed at identifying the main problems that should 
be analyzed in depth in the future, taking into account interactions with other industries and the 
potential consequences of any change in technology, structure, strategy, or regulation1. 
 
                                                          
1 For SCP “activists” like Bain (1959) and Scherer (1980), there exists a causal stable relation between the 
structure of an industry, the conduct of firms and market performance. Here we limit the use of the SCP 
paradigm to the list of items of interest, without any causality presumption. Indeed, there is a powerful body of 
work that takes structure, conduct and performance to be jointly determined by underlying (mainly 
technological) variables. 
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2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PASSENGER RAIL SERVICES 
 
2.1. Supply and demand – general principles 
 
 
Are railways a unique industry, or can they be analyzed with the standard tools of Industrial 
Organization? For Campos and Cantos2, “the rail industry poses a number of specific problems for 
transport economists and regulators that are only partially shared with other transport modes. These 
elements are the multi-product nature of the activity, the particular cost structure of railroad 
companies, the role of infrastructure and networks, the existence of indivisibilities in inputs and 
outputs, the organization of rail transport as a public service, and the existence of externalities in the 
transport system as a whole”. Some of the above characteristics refer to the product (or service) itself, 
such as “multi-production”, “indivisibilities” and “externalities”. Others refer to the conditions under 
which the service is supplied. In the following, we try to distinguish the intrinsic character of the 
service from its supply and demand. 
 
 
2.1.1. The basic characteristics of rail transport 
 
 
Transportation as such consists in displacing an object with given characteristics from one 
point to another, starting and arriving at given dates under specified conditions of quality and safety. 
The first obvious characteristic of the transport product, therefore, is its very high differentiation, 
mainly in terms of geographical heterogeneity: since every trip can be defined by its departure and 
arrival nodes, in any country one can define an infinite number of different potential products. For 
railways, because most networks are meshed, it is also true that for each "product" there exists some 
flexibility in terms of its path. Concerning the time dimension, note that the product is hardly storable 
so that there exists little time substitutability even if there occur frequent delays. 
 
Considering transport in such highly differentiated terms is not always helpful, however; 
sometimes aggregate categories of broadly similar services are more useful in practice. A standard 
distinction can be made between passengers and freight. For passengers, the main distinction is 
between long distance traffic and local traffic. In less developed countries, the former tends to shade 
into the latter, while in developed countries, the two types of products are clearly distinct. As regards 
freight, distinctions can be made in terms of dangerousness (implying the need for special wagons for 
inflammable and explosive materials), of the degree of care required (livestock vs inert material), and 
of speed (letters and newspapers vs bulk). Increasingly, too, there is a distinction between services that 
consist purely of transport between two rail depots, and those that consist of an integrated door-to-door 
service, with the potential for significant inter-modal cooperation. 
 
Rail services tend to give rise to significant externalities, which are examined in more detail in 
section 2.4 below. Some of the most important and interesting of these are of the kind known as 
“network externalities”, where the travel decisions of some individuals affect the costs or the benefits 
of other individuals elsewhere in the network and thereby the attractiveness of using the network as a 
whole. These can occur on the side of costs or on the side of demand, in sometimes complex ways we 
shall explore more fully below. For the time being we note merely that most rail services affect 
significant numbers of individuals in inter-related ways. 
 
 
                                                          
2 See Campos and Cantos (1999).  
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2.1.2. The demand for rail transport 
 
 
The demand for rail transport is essentially a derived demand – that is, one derived from the 
capacity of rail to satisfy a more fundamental demand for mobility. Usually each traveller has a 
demand for a specific service: from home to place of work and back, from home to vacation location 
and back, etc. Similarly, each parcel has a specific demand (though typically without a return); in what 
follows we shall consider mainly passenger demand. Such demand for a service translates into a 
demand for a mode of transport that supplies this service. Different modes can be thought of as 
supplying the service with different characteristics, which are substitutable for each other to varying 
degrees. The pioneering work of McFadden and collaborators since the 1970s has shown how we can 
estimate the extent to which users trade off the characteristics of different transport modes against 
each other. The insight they deploy is that different characteristics can be observed to influence the 
probability that a representative traveler will choose a given mode of transport, and the substitutability 
of these characteristics for each other is determined by the ratio of their effects on the choice 
probability. For instance, Table 1 reports regression results of a multinomial logit estimation of modal 
choice for work trips in the San Francisco Bay Area. To find the cost of time spent traveling in the 
vehicle as a proportion of the wage, for instance, the coefficient on the second regressor is divided by 
the coefficient on the first, yielding in this case that travelers on average find commuting time roughly 
half as costly as working time. Excess time (time waiting at the bus-stop, for instance) is considered 
more costly than working time, as is shown by dividing the coefficient on the third regressor by the 
coefficient on the first. This methodology has been extensively used to estimate elasticities of demand 
for rail transport with respect to changes in both price and travel time, and we survey the findings in 
section 2.2 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Effect of cost and travel time on modal choice 
 
Regressor Parameter estimate T-ratio 
Cost/post-tax wage -0.0412 -7.63 
On-vehicle time -0.0201 -2.78 
Excess time -0.0531 -7.54 
Auto-alone dummy -0.892 -3.38 
Bus with auto access -1.78 -7.52 
Carpool -2.15 -8.56 
Notes: auto, carpool, bus with auto access; omitted variable is bus with walk access 
Source: McFadden (1977). 
 
 
The different characteristics of passenger services include speed, comfort, reliability and 
flexibility (or adaptability to the traveller’s particular requirements). For instance, road congestion 
means that rail is often more reliable than road transport (in the sense that the arrival time is 
predictable to a greater degree of accuracy), while rail is less adaptable than road (in the sense that a 
car can take the passenger all the way to the final destination instead of only to a station along the 
way). Various intermediaries (such as travel agencies and logisticians) can increase the adaptability of 
rail transport by acting to bundle transport services (including rail services) more effectively than the 
individual customer acting alone.  
 
The extent to which travelers value different characteristics will depend typically not just on 
their own characteristics as individuals, but also on the purpose of the travel. For instance, travel for 
business purposes is likely to involve a great deal more sensitivity to time and reliability than are most 
forms of leisure travel (this is confirmed by many authors, as summarized in Oum et al., 1990). It is 
not easy to obtain information on the division of transport demand by purpose of travel, but Table 2 
provides such information for the United Kingdom based on survey data. Note that this table divides 
demand up according to the number of trips, without adjustment for the length or value of the trips 
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concerned (rail trips will typically be longer than car trips, so that the share of rail in total trips is well 
below its share in the market as a whole). What the table shows is that the purposes for which people 
travel are many and various, and it is unlikely that passengers will react in a homogeneous fashion to 
changes in prices, service characteristics or network configurations. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Trips per head of population per year by purpose 1998/2000 - United Kingdom 
 
 Surface rail All Modes 
Share of trips by 
purpose/all 
purposes 
Commuting 6 161 15.6% 
Business 1 36 3.5% 
Education 1 68 6.6% 
Escort Education   48 4.7% 
Shopping 1 216 21.0% 
Other Escort   80 7.8% 
Other Personal   103 10.0% 
Social 2 242 23.5% 
Holiday   29 2.8% 
Other   46 4.5% 
Total 11 1029   
Source: Department of Transport, Transport Statistics 2001 Edition. 
Note: The number of rail trips in this table should not be interpreted as indicating a market share of rail, since 
rail trips are on average much longer and yield higher revenue than trips using other modes (which include those 
made on foot, by bicycle and so on). 
 
 
 
 Finally, it is important to note that demand for transport services has some of the 
characteristics of demand for network goods – in particular that the demand by one user is related to 
the number of other users also demanding the service. For instance, demand for travel to a particular 
destination is related to the number of other users also visiting that destination, not just because it is 
less costly to meet such a demand (which is strictly speaking a supply-side network externality), but 
because the number of other travelers itself changes the characteristics of the good concerned (for 
instance because a particular destination is known for its important business contacts or its attractive 
nightlife). 
 
 
 
2.1.3. The supply of rail transport 
 
 
There exists a large number of alternative means of transport. For a given service (initial   
node – final node) one can construct a merit order in terms of speed. But most vehicles incur a strong 
discontinuity at the origin because of technical or legal reasons (registration) or because of the 
topological characteristics of the networks on which they operate, as we show in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Time and Distance Travelled using Different Transport Modes 
 
 
Rail transport can be a substitute for cars, buses or aircraft, or even for inland waterways 
depending on the distance and on the characteristics of the initial and final nodes. But although they 
may be to some extent comparable on the demand side (because they share desirable service 
characteristics to varying degrees), these different modes are very different in respect of both technical 
and economic properties. For instance, rail transport is highly capital intensive by comparison with 
most other modes. This arises from the high cost of acquisition, installation and maintenance of tracks 
and stations; as well as the cost of acquisition, operation and maintenance of the rolling stock. The 
result is that rail transport is characterized by strong economies of density, as well as some economies 
of network size. These economies of network size are the overall result of purely engineering 
considerations, which tend to favour scale, some economies of coordination, and some diseconomies 
of complexity in the management of large organizations (the overall balance between which can vary 
significantly between networks). There is also a strong need for coordination between infrastructure 
operation and service supply, though opinions have fluctuated over time as to whether such 
coordination requires vertical integration.  
 
Historically, all firms have been multi-product suppliers, that is, suppliers of all the rail 
services. This makes it difficult to estimate costs of providing particular services because of the 
arbitrariness of allocation of the common cost components (as well as because, historically speaking, 
infrastructure and operations were often not even distinguished). In modern times, there has been some 
degree of specialization in the transport of passengers, for instance in the UK.  
 
The function that describes the cost incurred by suppliers of rail transport is highly dependent 
on their degree of integration. For a train operator on a given line, the variable cost depends on the 
number of wagons3 (as a proxy for the number of passengers or for the volume of freight), and on the 
speed4. These two variables determine the fuel and maintenance expenditures for the given distance. 
All the other costs are fixed, including the crew’s wages and the company’s administration costs, but 
also the depreciation of the rolling stock (when it comes from a leasing company), and the 
infrastructure operation and maintenance costs which are billed to the train operator. If the company 
operates on several lines, the variable and fixed costs change from one line to the other, which in 
                                                          
3 Strictly speaking wagons are a fixed cost per journey, but on lines with fewer expected passengers journeys can 
be planned using fewer wagons. This example illustrates the familiar point that the difference between fixed and 
variable costs is not absolute but depends on the time frame under consideration: fixed costs are those that vary 
comparatively little with traffic within a given time frame. Wagons are more fixed than the catering costs, while 
track is more fixed than rolling stock. 
4 It also depends on how trains are organized: it is more costly in terms of fuel and crew to displace a given 
number of wagons with two locomotives (that is in two trains) than with only one. There are externalities 
between services too: removing one service typically means reschudling others. 
car 
distance 
plane 
walking 
duration 
1D  2D
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continuous terms can be modeled as a function of distance. As regards infrastructure management, the 
cost is mainly a function of the distance and of the number of trains (tracks and signaling costs), of the 
number of passengers (stations) and of the volume of freight (terminal nodes). Infrastructure 
management also involves major logistical problems, notably ensuring that the rolling stock and train 
crews are available at the right time and place. These problems are often easier with larger networks, 
though not always, and are also highly dependent on the details of network structure. In addition there 
are organizational challenges due to: 
 
- energy needs (connection to the power grid); 
- the connection between final nodes (railway stations) and intermediary nodes (marshalling 
yards and maintenance stations); 
- the operation of heterogeneous trains on the same line; 
- reservation and billing systems; 
- the organization of inter-modality (see section 3.4 below). 
 
We summarize in section 2.3 below what is known empirically about the way in which costs 
are affected by different characteristics of the services and the operators that supply them. 
 
 
 
2.2. What do we know empirically about demand? 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of studies estimating the elasticity of demand for passenger rail 
travel with respect to: 
- the price of the rail services themselves; 
- the price of competing modes of transport such as car and air; 
- the time of travel by rail; 
- the time of travel on competing modes. 
 
The values found by most studies are surprisingly low, at least for short-run elasticities 
(nevertheless such findings are in line with the earlier survey of studies reported in Oum et al., 1990). 
This suggests that many passengers have strong preferences for the mode of travel they use, perhaps 
because they have invested in vehicles, jobs or (more generally) lifestyles that make substitution 
between transport modes difficult. However, estimated long-run elasticities are significantly higher, 
and over a longer time period it is clear that rail has been losing market share rapidly to other modes, 
though how much of this is because of a growing preference for flexibility, and how much to changing 
relative prices and travel times, is less clear. This is illustrated by Table 4 
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Table 3: Summary of Rail Elasticity Estimates from Studies in BTRE Database 
 
   Price Elasticity Time Elasticity  
Author Year Country Own Cross Own Cross Type 
   Short Run Long Run Air Bus Car  Air Bus Car  
                      
Koppelman 1998 Canada -1.40 -2.04         -1.55 -1.81       IC (1) 
Mc carthy 1997 USA -0.28 -0.61    0.04  0.01  0.07 -0.06 -0.61  0.01  0.00  0.05 IC 
Taplin et al. 1997 Australia 
Sydney 
 -0.16      0.03  0.04         Comm 
Wardman e.a. 1996 Britain  -0.59        0.25  -0.87      0.73 IC (2) 
Brown et al. 1996 Ex URSS     0.13 0.36 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.35   0.13 0.34 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.35 IC 
Gillen 1994  -0.22 -0.33                 Urban 
Industry comision 1993 Austr. UK Canada -0.23 -0.62  -1.59       -0.16 -0.70      0.32  
Goodwin et al. 1992 Britain  -0.79                 I.C. 
Goodwin et al 1992 Britain  -0.65  -1.08               IC 
Macket & Nash 1991 Britain           -0.58 -0.68   0.14 0.21 0.10 0.24 IC 
Anrikopoulos e.a 1990 Canada  -0.22    0.15  0.01  0.06         IC 
Luk & Hepburn 1993 Australia  -0.35                 IC 
De rus 1990 Spain -0.18 -0.41                 Urban 
Ben-Akiva & 
Morikawa 
1990 Netherland -0.15 -1.50         -0.04 -0.34        
Chu 1989 USA Chicago  -0.37         -2.14 -3.00       Comm 
Owen-Phillips 1987 Britain  -0.69  -1.08               IC 
Pickarel 1987 USA  -1.18         -0.38 -0.97       IC 
Lubulwa 1986 Australia  -0.43    1.12  0.40  0.02  -2.25  0.06  0.30  0.04 IC L.D 
Morrison & 
Whinston 
1985 USA -0.57 -1.20                  
Winston 1985 USA  -1.20          -1.58       IC 
Winston 1985 USA  -0.86          -0.60       Urban 
BTRE : Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics. Australia (2002). 
Notes  (1) Correspond to Toronto-Montreal Travel 
           (2) Leisure travel only 
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Table 4: Modal Shares in the Eu-15 1970-99 by passenger-kilometres 
 
  Car Buses & coaches Air Tram & Metro Railways Total 
1970 73.9% 12.6% 1.5% 1.8% 10.1% 100% 
1980 76.2% 11.6% 2.5% 1.4% 8.4% 100% 
1990 79.1% 9.2% 3.9% 1.2% 6.7% 100% 
1995 79.5% 8.7% 4.6% 1.1% 6.1% 100% 
1999 79.0% 8.4% 5.4% 1.1% 6.1% 100% 
Source: European Commission, D.G. Energy and Transport (2002). 
 
 
 Table 5 indicates that market shares of rail within the EU vary from country to country, from a 
high of 8.3% in Austria to a low of 1.4% in Greece. And there have been some strikingly different 
developments over the last decade, with market shares holding steady in Germany and collapsing in 
Portugal. Nevertheless, for most countries within the EU market shares are within the range of 4.5-8%. 
Table 6, by contrast, shows that passenger rail has obtained much smaller shares in the USA and very 
much larger shares in Japan: even in the late 1990s rail in Japan had a market share of nearly 30%, 
although that was significantly lower than the nearly 50% achieved in 1970. While it is clear that 
circumstances in Japan may be rather different from those in Europe, such figures do at least suggest 
that modal shares below 10% for rail are not fated to be a permanent feature of modern industrial 
societies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Railroad market shares by country 
 
 1990 1995 1999 
Austria 10.3% 10.4% 8.3% 
Belgium 6.4% 5.9% 5.9% 
Denmark 7.8% 6.7% 6.1% 
Finland 4.9% 4.9% 4.7% 
France 8.9% 7.2% 7.9% 
Germany 7.3% 7.6% 7.7% 
Greece 2.5% 1.6% 1.4% 
Ireland 4.8% 4.0% 3.3% 
Italy 6.7% 5.7% 5.0% 
Luxembourg 3.7% 4.8% 4.5% 
Netherland 6.7% 7.7% 7.5% 
Portugal 9.1% 5.6% 4.0% 
Spain 5.4% 4.6% 4.2% 
Sweden 5.2% 5.8% 6.4% 
United Kingdom 4.7% 4.2% 5.0% 
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2002). 
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Table 6: Modal split in US and Japan 
 
United States Passenger Transport 
Mode split in % 
 Car Buses & coaches Air Tram & Metro Railways 
Total travel 
billion p-km 
1970 91.3 2.3 5.4 0.5 0.5 3486 
1980 89.1 2.4 7.7 0.4 0.4 4575 
1990 86.6 3.2 9.5 0.3 0.3 6094 
1998 85.5 3.3 10.6 0.3 0.3 7266 
Source: US Department of Transport, Bureau of Transport Statistics (2002). 
 
 
JAPAN Passenger Transport 
Mode split in % 
 Car Buses & coaches Air Tram & Metro Railways 
Total travel billion 
p-km 
1970 31.1 17.7 1.6  49.6 582 
1980 41.5 14.2 3.8  40.5 776 
1990 50.1 10.0 4.7  35.2 1102 
1998 58.2 6.9 5.4  29.5 1341 
Source: Transport Fact Book (2002). 
 
 
Table 7 shows the growing share of high-speed rail travel in all rail travel in Europe. Here the 
message is that while high-speed rail has clearly tapped a source of demand it has not on its own 
provided the answer to reversing the decline in the market share of rail.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: High Speed Travel in Europe 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Belgium         0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Finland         0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
France 14.9 17.9 19.0 18.9 20.5 21.4 24.8 27.6 30.6 32.2 34.7 
Germany   2.0 5.2 7 8.2 8.7 8.9 10.1 10.2 11.6 13.9 
Italy 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 2.4 3.6 4.5 5.1 
Netherland          0.1 0.1 0.1 
Spain    0.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 
Sweden   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 
Total 15.2 20.4 25.2 27.6 30.7 32.9 37.2 43.4 48.5 52.8 58.7 
% of Rail travel 5.6%         12.3%       18.1%   
Note: Values in 1000 million Pass-km 
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2002). 
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Overall, the principal messages coming from the empirical studies of demand seem to be 
twofold: 
 
i) Demand for travel services is highly differentiated, and there is no single source of 
demand which is likely on its own to reverse the falling market share of rail in overall 
travel. 
ii) Changes in relative prices, like changes in relative speeds, of rail and other transport 
modes, have very small short-run effects. It is only over a significant period of years that 
policies affecting these parameters are likely to have a large effect. 
 
 
2.3. What do we know empirically about costs? 
 
 
One of the most robust findings in the empirical literature concerns the nature of economies of 
scale. The literature distinguishes two measures of economies of scale: economies of density and 
economies of size. The first refers to the increase in cost with respect to the increase in traffic, keeping 
the size of the network constant. The second measures the change in cost with respect to the change in 
the size of the network, keeping density constant. This distinction is extremely important in transport 
studies, because in most transport modes there is evidence of significant economies of density. As the 
level of traffic rises on a given network (at least up to the point where the network becomes seriously 
congested), the cost per passenger-kilometre falls, since the greater traffic allows the costs of the 
network to be spread across the greater number of travellers. By contrast, the evidence is much less 
clear as to whether an increase in traffic lowers costs per passenger-kilometre when that increase 
comes about because of an expansion in overall network size. 
 
Breautigam (1999) reports several studies accomplished in U.S. and Europe, in the period 
1974 –1997, indicating that rail network presents significant economies of density but – on average - 
slight or non-existent economies of size. For the European Rail Operators, Shires and Preston (1999b) 
have computed the average value of both indicators for the period 1971 –1994 using a translog cost 
specification. Their results are in line with those reported by Braeutigam. Most of the firms show 
increasing returns to density but some evidence of decreasing returns to size, indicating that their 
networks may have been larger than was cost efficient. Both returns to density and returns to size were 
greater (not surprisingly) for small rather than large operators. They also calculate an optimal network 
length of around 3000 km, which if accurate would indicate that many of the European networks are 
oversized. However, such estimates are purely indicative and subject to large margins of error; they 
also take no account of technological change, or differences in network structure across operators 
(such as the difference between star networks as in France and polycentric networks as in Germany).  
They are also unable to take into account organizational improvements that may themselves influence 
optimal network size. They are also influenced by existing public service obligations which make 
many existing networks differ from optimal configuration, and they are subject to the statistical 
problem that size and density are themselves correlated. Nevertheless, they do at least suggest that 
simple “bigger is better” arguments find no support in the data. 
 
In a more recent study, Cantos (2001) found that for the main European carriers returns to 
density range from 1.42 to 2.04 while returns to scale vary from 0.45 to 1.4, the average of the 
operators included in the sample being 1.73 and 0.83 respectively. In Table 8, ED refers to the 
estimated economies of density for each of the carriers studied. A value of 1 would indicate no returns 
to density – namely that a doubling of traffic on the network would leave costs per passenger 
unchanged. A value of 2 would indicate that a doubling of traffic on the network would halve costs per 
passenger (thereby showing that total costs were unchanged). Unsurprisingly most carriers have 
estimates of returns to density lying somewhere between 1 and 2. The standard error is a measure of 
the reliability of the estimate – roughly speaking, the true value has a 95% probability of lying within 
two standard errors on either side of the reported estimate. 
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Table 8: Returns to density and scale for European carriers 
 
 ED Standard Error ES Standard Error 
BR 1.48 0.020 0.53 0.008 
DB 1.44 0.014 0.47 0.002 
DSB 1.97 0.071 2.06 0.344 
FS 1.45 0.001 0.65 0.041 
NS 1.90 0.088 1.40 0.030 
NSB 2.04 0.040 1.00* 0.014 
ÖBB 1.73 0.073 0.85 0.007 
RENFE 1.60 0.015 0.60 0.005 
SJ-BV 1.87 0.064 0.63 0.003 
SNCB 1.83 0.067 1.08* 0.080 
SNCF 1.42 0.030 0.45 0.003 
VR 2.02 0.039 0.96 0.007 
Average 1.73 0.238 0.83 0.473 
Note: See Table 2: Economies of density and scale in Cantos (2001). 
A star * indicates a result non-statistically different from 1 at 5%. 
ED means Economies of density and ES means Economies of scale. 
 
 
Some studies have addressed the issue of optimal network size for varying levels of traffic 
density. Preston (1996) found an optimal size of 4000 Km for traffic of 120 million train-km per 
annum. Mizutani (2001) performed a study for the Japanese urban private network finding estimates 
of traffic for 120 million train-km and an optimal size of 75 km (the fact that his study is based on an 
urban network appears to be what explains the dramatic difference between his findings and those of 
Preston, though the discrepancy also indicates the need for caution before relying too heavily on any 
particular estimates). 
 
There are no studies looking at the effect of ownership and competitive conditions on costs in 
rail, in the manner of Ng and Seabright (2001) for air transport. It seems reasonable to suppose, 
though, that private ownership and the need to respond to commercial challenges would tend to reduce 
costs in a similar way to that found in airlines. This is in line with overall findings in the literature on 
privatisation in market economies, as summarised in Megginson and Netter (2001), who conclude that 
“research now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more 
profitable than otherwise comparable state-owned firms” (p. 380). Much depends of course on what is 
meant by “otherwise comparable” – in particular, there is not enough evidence for us to be able to say 
with confidence whether and to what extent commercialisation of state owned firms is able to act as a 
substitute for privatisation.  
 
We consider the empirical evidence on the cost implications of different network 
configurations (integration versus non-integration, for example) in section 3.1 below. Here we 
conclude with the main messages of the literature on rail costs: 
 
i) The unambiguous pattern of economies of density shown by all the empirical studies 
indicates that firms may decrease their average cost by making a more intensive use of their 
existent infrastructure, namely by attracting more traffic.  
ii) Reductions in costs from increases in overall network size are of a much smaller order of 
magnitude, or even negligible. 
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2.4. Measuring externalities in rail transport 
 
 
Externalities are an important feature of the economics of transport and especially of the rail 
industry. Much effort has been devoted to estimating these externalities and especially to translate 
them into monetary values. Here we aim to synthesize the research and studies in this field. 
 
We begin by recalling some economic definitions. An externality is defined as an effect by which 
an agent is affected by another agent, the effect being not channelled through the market. Examples 
include: 
 
- I make a noise and disturb my neighbour. 
- I play a Beethoven symphony on my CD set and my neighbour enjoys it.  
- I enjoy freely – or to a price below cost - the use of a motorway. It is a positive externality for 
me, and a negative one for the tax-payers who pay the difference. 
 
These examples allow us to draw a typology:  
 
- There are positive externalities (second case) and negative externalities (first case). 
- There are technical externalities (the two first cases, due to a “physical” fact) and pecuniary 
externalities (the third case), related to transfers and imperfect pricing. 
 
Box 1: Technological Externalities and Pecuniary Externalities 
 
Technological externalities lie outside the price mechanism; they arise when one agent or firm directly 
affects the utility of another agent or the profits of another firm by its actions; for example, by 
depositing waste material in a river a firm reduces the quality of fish in the river and reduces the 
satisfaction of fishermen, or raises the costs of production of another firm by making it purify the 
water which it needs to use. 
 
Pecuniary externalities correspond to the idea that one agent benefits (or suffers) from the action of 
another without paying the cost (or being compensated), bust where the cost or the benefit is reflected 
in the price. For example, the hairdresser in a large urban area may see her wages increase, not 
because her productivity has increased, but because other wages have increased; or the rent for a given 
property may rise and benefit its owner due to the provision of some public services in the area.  
 
 
 
Rail services are the source of many externalities, the list of which is somewhat arbitrary. We 
take into account the following ones:  
 
- Pecuniary externalities due to imperfect pricing; 
- Public service obligations; 
- Environmental externalities; 
- Congestion and safety; 
- Impact on economic development. 
 
We shall not dwell much on the first two points: pecuniary externalities due to imperfect 
pricing, and public service obligations. They depend on legal and institutional arrangements and are 
closely linked to history and political choices. Furthermore, they raise no particular conceptual 
problems, though they raise many statistical ones. 
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2.4.1. Pecuniary externalities due to imperfect pricing 
 
 
Imperfect pricing is a kind of pecuniary externality. The main imperfection in transport pricing 
is due to infrastructure charges. The doctrine of the European Commission is that, in order to reach 
efficiency, charges should be set equal to the short run marginal social cost, including:  
 
- the marginal cost of infrastructure damage; 
- the marginal external cost of congestion; 
- the marginal external cost of pollution; 
- the marginal external cost of accidents. 
 
Note that these do not include the fixed costs of infrastructure provision. Economic principles 
would suggest that, to the extent that infrastructure is congested, long-run marginal cost pricing is the 
appropriate concept. At all events, calculation of externalities suggests that actual infrastructure 
charges are rarely in line with even short-run marginal costs, sometimes lying above but more often 
significantly below. 
 
 
2.4.2. Public service obligations 
 
 
A second kind of pecuniary externality is due to public service obligations. Under this 
category can be listed:  
 
- The obligation to keep extra staff for employment reasons;  
- Retirement conditions; 
- The construction of unprofitable tracks; 
- The operation of unprofitable services; 
- Low tariffs for some categories of users (unemployed, elderly…)5. 
 
Some of these PSOs are subsidized (in France items 2, partly 3 and 5), while others are hidden 
and not subsidized. The calculation of subsidies is very controversial and manipulable. 
 
 
 
2.4.3. Environmental externalities 
 
 
The impacts of transport on the environment are as many and various as the idea of the 
environment is vast and elastic. We have adopted a fairly wide perspective, including in the analysis 
the effects listed in Table 9. 
 
 
                                                          
5 By this must be understood lower tariffs than those that would be set in any case by a profit-maximising firm, 
that would find it profitable to set different tariffs for different categories of user. 
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Table 9: A taxonomy of the impacts according to their sources and their targets 
 
Targets  
Type of impact Landscapes Fauna, flora, 
ecosystems 
Material goods Human beings 
Aesthetic effects Mainly visual 
effect of 
existence of 
infrastructure  
   
Impact on 
ecosystems 
 Infrastructure 
impact on soil, 
underground water 
& habitats 
  
Noise and 
vibration 
 Health damage to 
animals  
Damage to 
buildings  
Damages to health 
(stress, cardio-vascular 
disease) and loss of 
amenity 
Local and 
regional air 
pollution 
Atmosphere 
appearence 
Damage to crops 
and fauna (acid 
rains) due to Nox, 
Sox, VOC and 
particulates from 
motor exhausts 
Damages to 
buildings due to 
dusts deposit and 
chemical effects 
Damage to human 
health due to Nox, 
Sox, VOC cardio-
vascuclar diseases, 
pulmonary diseases) 
and particulates 
(cancer) from motor 
exhausts 
Global air 
pollution 
Green House 
Effects (mainly 
CO²) leading to 
higher sea level  
Changes in faunas 
and flora biotopes 
due to increase in 
temperature 
 Changes in the level of 
wealth and income, 
various from a country 
to another 
Spatial Impacts    Changes in location 
(eg urban sprawl due 
to car use) 
Non-renewable 
natural resources 
  Decreased stocks 
of some non-
renewable 
resources: mainly 
petrol and some 
water 
 
 
 
 
2.4.4. Ascribing monetary values to externalities 
 
 
In order to inform economic decisions, the measurement of externalities needs to go beyond a 
taxonomy of possible effects. There are several levels of information required. The first is an accurate 
description of the phenomenon. For certain impacts (such as effects on the landscape) it would seem 
difficult to go beyond this, though we shall see later that techniques exist that can help us to do so. 
  
Where it is possible to quantify, we obtain greater comparability and thus better guidance for 
decision-making. A further step is taken by creating a hierarchy of impacts, and the most 
comprehensive way to do this is to attribute monetary values. It is clear that quantification, and 
furthermore any weighting of a monetary kind, imply a subjective hierarchy, different from one person 
to another, of the relative importance of these various effects.  
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The most important techniques for ascribing monetary values to environmental effects (see 
Quinet, 1994) are: 
 
Surrogate markets, notably: 
 
- The cost of trips necessary to benefit from some amenities can be used to value these 
amenities; this method is used, for example, for the evaluation of leisure parks. 
- The method of hedonic prices: the price of some marketed goods depends on the 
characteristics such as air pollution or noise exposure. Variations in the prices of these goods 
with respect to variations in the environmental factor can thus be used to estimate the implicit 
value that individuals attach to the environmental quality. 
- The estimation of the cost of environmental protection. Observing the amount which 
individuals are prepared to pay to reduce or eliminate negative environmental effects provides 
an estimate of their implicit valuation. 
 
These methods present several difficulties. For instance, hedonic relations are not true demand 
functions: the residents of the most exposed houses may have chosen them partly because they are less 
sensitive to the environmental factor, e.g. noise, in which case the value of dwellings would decrease 
less than if the sensitivity were the same for everybody. Furthermore, there is the problem of 
distinguishing the individual impacts of each of the environmental variables, which are often closely 
linked to each other. Moreover, we have to assume for accurate hedonic valuations that people are 
well informed and aware of the damage caused by the nuisance at stake. 
 
Contingent valuations 
 
These consist in asking people what they are willing to pay to avoid the nuisance, or what they 
are willing to receive in order to continue suffering from it. Difficulties of implementation are, 
however, numerous: 
 
- In order to get reliable answers, it is necessary to devote a lot of care to devising the 
questionnaire, and to administer it through very sophisticated procedures. 
- Psychological biases lead to the result that willingness to pay to avoid a nuisance is 
consistently lower than the willingness to accept compensation to continue to suffer it. 
- As with other methods, the results can be biased by poor knowledge of the actual damage.
   
 
Indirect methods, notably:  
 
- estimation of avoidance cost; 
- estimation of damage cost. 
 
These are implemented in two stages. The first is technical and aims at estimating the 
consequences of the nuisance in physical units; for instance, in the case of air pollution, the frequency 
and importance of any impacts on health, or the damage to buildings. The second stage is the 
monetisation of these damages, either through market prices for the damaged goods, or through the 
cost of repairing the damage, the health care costs of injured or sick people, or through more 
subjective valuations (e.g. the value of human life). This method gets round the problem of the lack of 
information, but monetary valuation of environmental damage is hazardous. For example, the cost of 
repair overestimates the willingness to pay when the repair is not actually carried out, and the repair 
implies the definition of a zero level for the nuisance, and this definition is often arbitrary (in the case 
of noise for instance). 
 
As can easily be seen, the methods of surrogate markets and contingent valuations estimate the 
willingness to pay of those who bear the nuisance; they deal with demand. Avoidance or repair costs 
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deal with supply. If the decisions were optimal, these methods would produce the same result and the 
double equality would hold:  
 
Price = marginal cost = marginal willingness to pay 
 
However, in practice these methods do not provide equal values.  Thus we have to take the 
decision as to which one to choose. The answer will typically depend on the nature of the problem to 
be solved (Quinet, 1994, Mauch and Rottengather, 1996).  
 
Moreover, both cost and willingness to pay methods imply several different actors. In the case 
of noise, the willingness to pay comprises the willingness to pay of any of the agents who suffer from 
the noise. Similarly, the function of protection costs includes both the cost of a noise barrier, paid for 
by the public authorities, and the costs of double glazed windows paid by the residents.   
 
When the effect is permanent (in the case of the global warming for instance), its valuation 
needs to include the effects on future generations, a point which raises two problems: how to estimate 
the value for these future generations and what discount rate to choose. It is often argued that three 
categories of values need to be taken into account, the sum of which is the total value of the good:  
 
- the value in use, which corresponds to the actual revealed consumption of the good; 
- the option value, which corresponds to the possibility of a future consumption of the good; 
- the existence value: which corresponds to the value obtained by an individual who never 
consumes the good, appreciates its existence so that other people can use it, or simply just as a 
resource. 
 
These three values also exist for marketed goods, but it is often thought that option value and 
existence value are pre-eminent in the case of environmental goods, especially for the case of 
depletable goods. Cost of travel or hedonic prices provide use values only; for contingent valuations 
the point depends on how the questions are asked. 
 
 We now consider how these techniques are applied in the analysis of rail transport 
externalities. 
 
 
2.4.5. Time externalities and their various forms: the “congestion” complex  
 
 
Congestion is an imprecise term, which covers two different phenomena. The first occurs in 
operations, when the delay of a service induces delays in adjacent services that are close to the first; 
this effect will be termed pure congestion in what follows. The second takes place when a service 
cannot be scheduled at a proper place, and induces a gap between the desired and the effective arrival 
time. We first present the situation for road and air transport, then for rail. 
 
Transport users spend time on making journeys, which can be expressed in money terms, 
through the concept of value of time. The externality stems from the fact that travel time is not fixed, 
but depends on traffic levels. This point is often expressed by saying that transport is a variable quality 
good (Levy-Lambert, 1968) or subject to congestion (Kolm, 1968). This variability varies according to 
the mode. It is important, however, to appreciate that congestion operates in quite different ways in the 
different modes of travel. 
 
Road congestion 
 
Road congestion depends on the laws of traffic flow. Limiting ourselves to macroscopic 
analysis (as opposed to microscopic analysis which tries to model the behaviour of each vehicle in the 
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flow), and taking into account just the situation of the flow of a given number of vehicles along an 
infinite road, the following relation holds:  
 
 
VD
Q
=  
where:  
 
- speed (distance covered by the vehicles in one unit of time): V; 
- flow (number of vehicles passing through a given section of the road within one unit of time): Q; 
- density (number of vehicles on a unit length of road at a point in time): D. 
 
 
V
Q , D
V ( Q )
V ( D )
Q 0
V 0
 
Figure 2: Relation between the flow Q and the speed V 
 
 
Experience shows that speed V decreases with density D. It follows that the flow Q is related 
to speed according to the curve V(Q) which has the shape indicated in Figure 2. The upper part of this 
curve corresponds to a stable flow, the lower part to an unstable flow, where there is a low average 
speed and a lot of stop and go, which happens in a situation of high density. Q0 is the capacity of the 
road.  
 
 
Air congestion 
 
Air congestion is quite different from road congestion in that it is not simply expressed 
through an increase in the travel time. Its main effect is a gap between the desired and the effective 
arrival time. When total traffic exceeds the capacity of the runways or of the air control system, flights 
have to be postponed or brought forward; the scarce resource constituted by the slots can be 
distributed arbitrarily by the public authorities, or allocated through procedures such as auctions, or 
through “grandfather rights” procedures which give priority to the existing users. Congestion is 
planned, it is not directly visible to the user, except in terms of an inconvenient timetable, and flight 
times are not increased as long as there is no unexpected incident. 
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There is another type of air congestion, when an incident delays a flight, and the immediately 
following flights have to be delayed in consequence. 
 
Rail congestion 
 
In rail travel, scarcity is manifested in the gap between desired and effective arrival time.  But 
the speeds of all trains are not the same and their stopping patterns can differ. Unlike planes, faster 
trains can only overtake slower trains according to a pre-determined pattern according to the 
configuration of the tracks. This point clearly appears on a graph of time paths, as shown in Figure 3 
which presents the example of trains between station A and station B.  Each train is represented by 
broken lines, the slopes of which are proportional to the speed of the train on each section, the stops 
are represented by the steps in the line. This graph shows several features of rail scarcity. 
 
When trains have the same speed (as in the case of trains 3, 4 and 5), capacity is high. A slow 
train requires much more capacity (case of train 6). In order to allow fast trains not to be penalized, it 
is necessary to stop a slower train in order to allow the faster train to overtake (case of train 1). The 
characteristics of rail scarcity are then clear: it does not occur with intercity links where dedicated 
tracks exist as in the case of HST, or where passenger intercity trains are run during daytime and 
freight trains are run during night. But congestion can be serious around large cities, especially at peak 
hours when the traffic is composed of a mix of trains with different speeds: slow commuting trains, 
fast intercity trains, and slower freight trains (especially for combined transport), all having strict 
arrival times, or on intercity routes where different trains have different stopping patterns to meet 
different traffic objectives. 
 
As for air traffic, congestion may arise when an incident on a train delays the following trains. 
distances
Station A
Station B Time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
Figure 3: Railway Paths 
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Box 2: The Mohring effect (drawn from Small (1992)) 
 
Assume an urban public transport line, the flow on which is q; the operating cost of the buses is 
Cv, each having a capacity of N, and the time interval between them is e. The travel time is 
assumed to be θ, and the value of time is unity. 
 
The operator has to solve the following program : 
*
2
V
e
ceMinC q q C
e
θ= + + =   with: eq N≤  
There are two cases to consider: 
 
1) eq N>  
The optimal interval between two buses is  
2 Vce
q
=  
 
The cost for the operator is: 
2
v vC qC
e
=  
which is an increasing returns to scale cost function, and the total social cost is: 
 
* 2 vC q qCθ= +  
 
2) eq N=  
the total social cost is: *
2
vCNC q q
N
θ= + +  
 
The cost for the operator is : 
VCq
N
 
which is a decreasing returns to scale cost function: 
The move from the first process to the second one occurs for a flow such that: 
2 VCN
q q
=  
or 
2
2 v
Nq
C
=  
 
In this limit situation, the waiting cost is equal to the operation cost. 
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Table 10: Values of Time (VOT) Based on Recent Studies 
 
Relevant VOT studies 
 
HCG 
1994 
HCG 
1998 
HCG 
1998 
SNRA 
1997 
EUNET 
1998 
UNITE 
Values 
 
Transport Segment   Euro 1998   Euro 1998 
Inflation to 1998 
Transfer to Euro 
     Normal 
Travel 
Passenger transport – VOT per person-hour 
Car/motorcycle  6.70  9.31   
Business 21.33 21.00  11.95  21.00 
Commuting/private 5.53 6.37  3.91  6.00 
Leisure/holiday 3.79 5.08  3.10  4.00 
Coach (Inter-urban)       
Business 21.23     21.00 
Commuting/private 5.95   5.40  6.00 
Leisure/holiday 3.08   4.37  4.00 
Urban bus/tramway       
Business 21.23     21.00 
Commuting/private 5.95   4.94  6.00 
Leisure/holiday 3.08   3.22  3.20 
Inter-urban rail  4.97  8.50   
Business  18.43  11.95  21.00 
Commuting/private  6.48  6.21  6.40 
Leisure/holiday  4.41  4.94  4.70 
Air traffic     40.60  
Business    16.20  28.50 
Commuting/private    10.11  10.00 
Leisure/holiday    10.11  10.00 
Freight VOT       
Road transport       
LGV 39.68 30.75 40.76   40.00 
HGV 39.68 30.75 43.47   43.00 
Rail transport       
Full trainload  645.37 725.45   725.00 
Wagon load  26.16 28.98   30.00 
Average per tonne   0.76   0.76 
Inland navigation       
Full ship load  178.55 201.06   200.00 
Average per tonne   0.18   0.18 
Maritime shipping       
Full ship load  178.55 201.06   200.00 
Average per tonne   0.18   0.18 
Air transport       
Average per tonne      4.00 
Source:  
- Hague Consulting Group (1994), UK Value Time Study. 
- Hague Consulting Group (1998), The 1985-1996 dutch VOT Studies. Paper presented at the PTRC 
Seminar on the Value of Time, Wokingham, UK. 
- EUNET 1998: Socio-Economic and Spatial Impacts of Transport Measurement and Valuation of the 
Impacts of Transport Initiatives (John Nellthorp, Peter Mackie, Abigail Bristow, ITS Leeds) 
- Swedish National Road Administration, guidelines for project appraisal (1997). 
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The Mohring effect 
 
In public transport, there is another external effect stemming from the increase of traffic. This 
effect lead to a positive externality, not to a negative one: when traffic increases, the operator is led to 
increase the frequency of the services, thus by reducing the waiting time total travel time of the users.  
There is an externality, but it is a positive one. Box 2 models this phenomenon according to a 
process analyzed in Small (1992). 
 
Values of time 
 
 The monetization of congestion uses values of time, which act as multipliers of time losses 
expressed in hours. Many studies have been undertaken to measure values of time. Table 10 shows the 
results of various such studies, including the most recent comprehensive study of infrastructure 
charging and transport accounting, the UNITE program. The main message to come out of the table is 
the significant difference between the value of time for business travel and that for leisure travel. 
 
Accident costs 
 
The valuation of the cost of accidents is the multiple of the number of fatalities and injuries by 
the monetary value placed on a human life or on an injury. The value of human life is a statistical 
concept, representing the value of an unidentified life, not one known to the decision-maker. It also 
represents a marginal value, corresponding to the valuation of a small risk to the life of that person.  
 
Two methods are currently used. The human capital method is the oldest, based on the 
calculation of the discounted loss of production caused by the death. The loss of production can be 
calculated on either a net basis (excluding the discounted consumption which will not take place) or a 
gross basis, not excluding this consumption. The implementation of the calculation faces several 
difficulties: the choice of discount rate, to which the result is very sensitive; uncertainty over future 
levels of production, over a long period; and ethical considerations, since the values associated with 
several groups of people, pensioners or the unemployed, are zero. In addition, this method does not 
take into account the value of pain and suffering. 
 
The second method is based on willingness to pay, which can be implemented through two 
different procedures. The first is based on revealed preference, such as the extra wage for risky jobs; 
the second is based on contingent valuation, through interview techniques. Contingent valuation is 
open to the difficulties previously identified, plus the problem that people are not aware of the actual 
risks from transport, and are not able to identify and evaluate the consequences arising from the very 
small risk levels implied by safety in transport. This is clear form the differences in the two possible 
values: what individuals are prepared to pay to reduce an already very small personal risk of death or 
what they are prepared to pay to reduce the risk of a fatal accident in the community at large.  
 
Results are again widespread, the values given by human capital methodology being generally 
lower. Here are the values of statistical life used in the European program of Transport Accounting 
Methodology UNITE, these values being drawn mainly from contingent valuations. 
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Table 11: Proposed UNITE Values Of Statistical Life (VOSL) by Country and compared to 
official values  
 
Country Official values in use A) UNITE VOSL (Official-UNITE)/Official 
 million €, 1998 million € Percentage 
Austria 1.52 1.68 10 
Belgium 0.40 1.67 312 
Denmark(B) 0.52*) 1.79 244 
Finland 0.89*) 1.54 73 
France 0.62 1.49 141 
Germany 0.87 1.62 87 
Greece (B) 0.14 1.00 588 
Ireland 1.04 1.63 57 
Italy n.a. 1.51 - 
Luxembourg n.a. 2.64 - 
Netherlands 0.12 1.70 1269 
Norway (B) 1.49 1.93 29 
Portugal 0.04 1.12 2896 
Spain 0.07 1.21 1625 
Sweden (B) 1.48*) 1.53 4 
Switzerland (B) n.a. 1.91 - 
United Kingdom (B) 1.53*) 1.52 1 
Hungary (B) n.a. 0.74 - 
Estonia (B) n.a. 0.65 - 
Note: A) Based on Nellthorp, Mackie and Bristow (1998). HICPs (Harmonized Indexes for Consumers Prices)  
issued by Eurostat for Eurozone has been used to adjust price level to 1998.  
*) Latest available values from Tervonen (1999) has been used (For Sweden SIKA(2000)). Corresponding 
EUNET values are; DK 0.79; FIN 1.33; N n.a. ; S 1.80; UK 1.11. 
B) Not in Eurozone, Exchange rate of 24 November 2000 used. 
 
 
A further question is whether altruism influences the value derived from willingness to pay 
methodologies. Jones-Lee (1989) suggests that the value of human life procured by this method should 
not be modified in order to take altruism into account, provided that altruism is not influenced by the 
kind of good at stake (i.e. there is no paternalism). 
 
Another question is whether the value of human life should be the same in all transport modes. 
Let us explore this point, taking as a basis the value of human life in road transport, and considering 
the reasons why there should be any difference with other modes. The first, and simplest, reason is the 
difference in the socio-economic characteristics of the users of each mode.  Of these, income is 
probably the most important factor; for this reason, the value of human life should be lower in urban 
public transport than for car users, and higher in interurban public transport, less so for standard or 
coach class passengers on trains or planes, more so for first or business class users.  Note that this does 
not imply anything about the “absolute” or objective value of the lives of different individuals: instead, 
it is a reflection of the fact that some people are more willing than others to choose safer modes, in 
much the same way as those with a higher value of time will choose faster modes. Though this point is 
logically sound, it has never been introduced in transport modelling, which means at least that its size 
has not been important in estimates. Another reason why this effect does not appear is that people are 
not aware of the real conditions of safety in transport. Viscusi (1993) has shown that people 
underestimate risks in private transport, and overestimate them in public transport.   
 
Another reason for a discrepancy between road and other modes as far as value of life is 
concerned is the correlation between the effort to reduce the risk and the willingness to pay for safety. 
According to Kolm (1968), an improvement of a road implies a reduction of risk (for example through 
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more prudent driving behaviour) which is greater for those who have a high value of life than for the 
others who trade off the possibility of increased safety which is offered to them against the possibility 
of higher speed on the improved road. The consequence is that public decisions should be taken with 
an average value of life lower than the average willingness to pay for safety of the users. 
 
Jones-Lee (1989) has suggested two more reasons for the difference between road and other 
modes: first the context effect, which means, for example, that people have a higher cost dying in a 
tunnel than dying in the open air. The difference between modes could be up to 50%. A second cause 
is the mass effect: when a large number of people die together, the value of life of each of the fatalities 
is higher. This point is made clear by the impact on the media, but contingent analysis surveys of this 
issue do not show any clear statistical result.  
 
These reasons support the idea of a value of life which is higher in public transport than in 
road transport. Jones-Lee and Loomes (1994) suggest a ratio of 1,5 to 2. Two main considerations 
seem to be at work here. First, as public transport users have no direct responsibility for safety, they 
need to be more protected (it is possible to justify this position through a model of imperfect 
information of the operator about the value of life of the users, coupled with decreasing returns in the 
technical function of safety procurement). Secondly, the mechanism of legal responsibility induces the 
managers of a public transport operator to spend more money than would an agent working with his 
own money. 
 
Other accident costs 
 
In order to calculate the costs of accidents, it is necessary to take into account, not only the 
value of human life, but also the cost of injuries and damage to property. The valuation of damage to 
property is of course based on the monetary cost of the damage. The value of injuries adds direct costs 
(medical care, transport of the injured people…), indirect costs (loss of production) and an estimation, 
very subjective, of the pain and grief. 
 
Impact on economic development 
 
The classical economic analysis of the effects of transport on economic development, as used 
for instance in project appraisal, makes the assumption of perfect market competition, a condition 
which implies, inter alia, that: 
 
- there are constant returns to scale and no monopoly; 
- there are no external effects; 
- space as such is unimportant. 
 
These assumptions evidently do not hold in practice: 
 
First, the existence of agglomerations implies that some forces are at work which fight against 
dispersion, the type of organization which would be predominant if all activities experienced constant 
returns to scale: then an even repartition of activities would minimize the total production and 
transport costs.  
 
Secondly, historical evidence indicates that growth rates of poor regions show no systematic 
tendency to converge to those of rich regions, as would occur if there were constant returns to scale. 
 
Several explanations have been advanced to explain these discrepancies: 
 
i) The role of public capital and especially of transport facilities in the process of economic 
growth has been emphasized since the 90s (in stream of work initiated by Aschauer). In this 
line of thought, not only labor and private capital are factors of growth, but also public 
capital, for instance transport infrastructure capital. The magnitude of this factor has been 
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assessed through statistical analysis of production – or cost - functions at the macro-
economic level or at the level of economic sectors. The results are very scattered and show 
that there is a positive effect of public capital, but that it is difficult to assess its magnitude; 
the first studies showed that the effect was very high, but more refined studies tend to show 
that in fact the effect is rather low. A consequence of this effect would be that the social rate 
of return of infrastructure investments as reckoned by the usual methods would be 
underestimated, but there are doubts on the level of this underestimation, and no country has 
introduced this factor in its official manuals of project appraisal. 
 
ii) Increasing returns to scale are more frequent than assumed in the classical economic text-
books. For instance, increasing returns to scale exist in specialized services to industrial 
firms or sophisticated consumption goods. 
 
iii) Space induces many peculiarities in economics, and it is often thought that spatial 
interactions are one of the main possible causes of public capital productivity. For instance, 
proximity may induce communication externalities (better spill-over of productivity 
improvement), or agglomeration externalities (better matching of demand and supply, an 
increase in diversity of available goods or production factors). 
 
 There are many possible mechanisms and models associating these features (public capital 
productivity, increasing return to scale, positive externalities). The main results of theoretical models 
implementing these mechanisms are that, usually, a decrease of transport costs induces: 
 
- an increase in market areas and in competition between firms (efficiency effects); 
- changes in locations of activities (distributional effects), marked either by agglomeration and 
polarisation in order to benefit from larger markets and more varied services, or less 
frequently by dispersion in order to avoid competition; 
- location effects can be observed around new infrastructure through ex ante-ex post analysis. 
These analyses have been systematically done in France for High Speed Trains and 
Motorways, and provide conclusions that are confirmed by observations in other countries; 
- motorways have effects on tourism and service activities. There is an increase of economic 
activity around the lay-out (about 20 km), and an increase of market areas of firms. 
Urbanization experiences developments around the interchanges; 
- TGVs have effects on high level services, provoke changes in the internal organization of 
firms, and urban development located around the stations. 
 
 It is not possible to provide a magnitude of these effects, even less possible to distinguish 
between the effects of the various kinds of public capital, even less between the effects of the various 
transport mode infrastructures. Experts speak of a rough magnitude of 10 to 30% of the level of direct 
effects of transport improvements, but they are not unanimous on these figures. 
 
Numerical results 
 
No general estimates have been calculated for Public Service Obligations nor for impact on 
Economic Development. The literature has concentrated on environment, congestion and accident 
costs. We begin with the most comprehensive European study, Infras-IWW (2000). Here is a selection 
of findings, with comments on the methodology as appropriate: costs (per traffic-unit*km) are 
calculated. Table 12 shows some results of the study, along with methodological comments as 
appropriate. Figures 4 and 5 give a graphical representation of total costs and average costs per 
passenger, by transport mode. Figure 6 gives freight figures for comparison purposes.  
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Table 12: Various externalities as percentage of total transport costs 
 
Type of 
effect 
% Share of 
total costs 
(EUR17.95) 
Cost components Most important assumptions 
Accidents 29% - Additional costs 
of medical care 
- opportunity 
costs to society 
- suffering, grief. 
- A value of human life of 1.5 million Euro is considered. 
- Average costs are equal to marginal costs. There is no specific 
relation between vehicle-km and accident rates assumed. 
-  Insurance payments are considered in order to estimate 
external cost components.  
Noise 7% Damages 
(opportunity costs 
of land value) and 
human health. 
- The valuation approach is based on a willingness to pay for 
silent space above 55 dB(A). 
- Average costs are estimated by a top-down approach based on 
ECMT data. 
- Marginal costs are estimated by a modelling approach. 
Air 
pollution 
 
25% Damages 
(opportunity 
costs) of 
- human health  
- material 
- biosphere. 
- The results are based on a new and consistent data basis for 
emissions for all countries (TRENDS/Eurostat). 
- Health costs are based on a WHO study estimating health 
costs for France, Austria and Switzerland. 
- Building damages, crop losses and forest damages are based 
on results of Swiss expert studies. 
- Marginal costs are computed by the ExternE model. In order 
to be compatible with the top-down approach for total and 
average costs, building damages are adjusted. 
Climate 
change 
 
23% Damages 
(opportunity 
costs) of global 
warming.  
- The data basis is TRENDS. 
- Unit cost of 135 Euro per tonne of CO2 assumed. 
- Marginal costs assumed equal to average variable costs. 
- The unit costs of air transport are doubled in order to consider 
the specific risks of emissions in higher altitudes. 
Nature and 
landscape 
3% Additional costs 
to repair damages, 
compensation 
costs. 
- A repair cost is used, estimating the desealing costs for 
different types of infrastructure. 
- A reference level (unspoilt nature) of 1950 is assumed. 
- Effects not relevant for social marginal costs, since these costs 
are infrastructure related. 
Separation 
in urban 
areas 
1% Time losses of 
pedestrians. 
According to the methodology used in Germany (EWS), time 
losses are estimated based on random samples of different type 
of cities. 
Space 
scarcity in 
urban areas 
1% Space 
compensation for 
bicycles. 
- According to the methodology used in Germany (EWS), time 
losses are estimated based on random samples of different types 
of cities.  
- The effects are not relevant for social marginal costs, since 
these costs are infrastructure related. 
Additional 
costs from 
up- and 
downstream 
processes 
11% Additional 
environmental 
costs (air 
pollution, climate 
change and risks). 
- Based on the energy consumption, additional costs for   
precombustion, production and maintenance of rolling stock 
and infrastructure is estimated. 
- For nuclear risks, a shadow price of 0.035 Euro per kWh is 
assumed, based on willingness-to-pay studies for risk aversion. 
Congestion not taken  
into 
account for 
% 
External 
additional time 
and operating 
costs.  
- Use of a traffic model to compute marginal and average costs; 
time values derived from EU research (PETS).
Three approaches: 
- Net welfare loss for road transport facing an optimal 
congestion tax; 
- Revenues of an optimal tax; 
- Time losses relative to a better level of service. 
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Source:  
- PETS 1997: Pricing European Transport Systems-Internalisation of Externalities (deliverable D7); 
project of the European Commission, Brussels. 
- TRENDS 1999: Development of a Database System for the Calculation of Indicators of Environmental 
Pressure Caused by Transport, Final report of phase 1 and interim report of phase 2, Thessaloniki. 
- WHO 1999: Health Costs Due to Road Traffic-Related Air Pollution, an Impact Assessment Project of 
Austria, France and Switzerland, economic evaluation, technical report, London. 
- ExternE/IER et al. 1997: External Costs of Transport in ExternE, EU Joule III. 
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Source: Infras-IWW (2000). 
 
Figure 4: Total external costs of transport 1995 (EUR 17) by transport means and cost category   
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Source: Infras-IWW (2000). 
 
Figure 5: Average external costs 1995 (EUR 17) by means of transport and cost category for 
passenger transport (without congestion costs) 
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Average External Costs: Freight 1995
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Source: Infras-IWW (2000). 
 
Figure 6: Average external costs 1995 (EUR 17) by means of transport and cost category for 
freight transport (without congestion costs) 
 
 
 Other significant European studies include Amici della terra, Ferrovie dello Stato (2002). One 
of the most comprehensive American studies is by Litman (1999). For reasons of space we omit a 
detailed discussion of such findings here, but they are qualitatively consistent with those we have 
discussed above.   
 
What can we conclude from this massive scientific research effort? It is difficult to summarize 
the previous numerical results in a unique comprehensive table: the items calculated are not similar, 
the years are different, the break-down according to modes and the vehicles are not the same, nor are 
the geographical areas. It is clear, however, that the range of estimates is wide. This is for several 
reasons: 
 
- There is a high level of uncertainty in some exposure-response functions, such as for global 
warming, or for air pollution (we do not know well the long term consequences of air 
pollution, for instance the degree to which it induces cancers). 
- There is much uncertainty in monetary values, for instance in the value of human life. 
- Many impacts are specific to the situation, especially for noise, congestion, landscape, and 
ecosystems.  
 
Nevertheless, several broad conclusions can be drawn: 
 
i) Rail externalities are much lower than road externalities, and to a lesser extent, than air 
transport externalities. 
ii) Local air pollution and global warming have roughly the same magnitude, and are a bit 
higher than noise (except for countries using a high proportion of nuclear power). 
iii) Congestion and accident costs, though sensitive to the method of calculation, are 
generally more important than environmental costs. Environmental costs are significantly 
lower than private monetary costs. 
iv) Total travel time costs are roughly of the same magnitude as private monetary costs. 
 We turn now to consideration of the conditions of competition in the industry.  
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3. CONDITIONS OF COMPETITION IN THE INDUSTRY 
 
 
3.1. Vertical and horizontal integration 
 
 
3.1.1. Vertical integration 
 
 
In all network industries, vertical disintegration is a key tool for reforming old utilities. In 
railways, vertical disintegration is to be viewed as the separation of infrastructure from operational 
services6. As compared with the traditional model of railway organization where a single firm is in 
charge of both the fixed infrastructure and the rolling stock management, in vertical disintegration 
competitors are allowed to propose rail services. The infrastructure remains under the control of a 
public or private monopolist (which requires some public regulation), but market forces are supposed 
to be strong enough to generate efficiency in services provision. As in other network industries, the 
dilemma lies in the organization of the interface between the two separated layers. There exists a 
strong need for coordination between the infrastructure manager and the users of the infrastructure; 
this is in favor of integration. And conversely, there is a strong need for competition in services which 
pleads for disintegration. This probably explains why in most countries where competition has been 
introduced into rail transport, the solution is “partial disintegration” (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Alternative vertical organizations 
 
 
When vertical separation is complete, the main problem is to be sure that the monopolist does 
not abuse its position: it must be regulated. The partial disintegration case is more tricky, since the 
entity in charge of the infrastructure is simultaneously a provider and a competitor to its challenger. 
Consequently, it may have some incentives to distort competition in rail services (see Rey et al., 2001) 
and the public authority faces a complex problem of combined sectoral and competition regulation.  
 
Depending on the nature and the closeness of the integration between upstream and 
downstream activities, it may also be more difficult for the authorities to have access to the 
                                                          
6 Note that it is not the only type of vertical disintegration. When a trip form A to C necessitates a stop at the 
intermediary node B, the segment AB can be viewed by the BC operator as a necessary input to provide AC and 
similarly, the segment BC is essential for the AB operator to provide AC. For this reason, the separation of AC 
into two products (namely AB and BC) can be considered as vertical disintegration.  
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information required for effective regulation than in the disintegrated case – information about costs, 
for example. However, a well-known advantage of vertical integration is its diminished incentives for 
double marginalization, so it may be that some kinds of anti-competitive behaviour become less likely 
under integration even though the authorities’ ability to monitor them is diminished. 
 
What does the empirical evidence show about the effects of vertical disintegration on 
operating costs? Ivaldi and McCullough (2001) test for cost complementarity in freight transport 
between Infrastructure and operations for USA railroads using a translog specification. According to 
the estimates shown in Table 13 below, the marginal cost of inter-modal and bulk operation increases 
with infrastructure output. The negative result for general freight is not statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 13: Cross elasticity of Marginal Cost 
 
Freight Activity Infrastructure (t-ratio) 
Intermodal  0.31 (1.33) 
Bulk   0.52 ( 2.62) 
General -0.04 (-0.55) 
Source: Table 8, Ivaldi and McCullough (2001). 
 
 
A later article by Ivaldi and McCullough (2002) tests for sub-additivity in the cost function for 
infrastructure and freight operations. The results indicate that firms running each activity separately 
have 2.42% higher operational costs than a vertically integrated firm. A study by Cantos (2001) 
undertakes a similar approach to Ivaldi and McCullough (2001) for European services. Using a 
translog cost function, the author analyzes economies of scope between infrastructure output7 and 
transport operations (passenger and freight) for 12 major European railways along the 1973 –1990 
period. The main finding is that the marginal cost of passenger output is increasing with the level of 
infrastructure value. The opposite result is obtained for freight operations. As Table 14 shows, the cost 
anti-complementarity in passenger transport holds for all firms, being more severe for the smaller 
networks. 
 
 Other evidence comes from Mizutani and Shoji (2001), who studied the case of Kobe-Kosoku 
Railway in Japan. They found that vertically separated firms cost 5.6% more than an integrated 
system8. Shires et al. (1999a) compared the cost of the Swedish operator after a reform involving 
vertical separation, and found that operating costs had been reduced by 10%. However, it is difficult to 
know to what extent such reductions were due to vertical separation per se rather than to other aspects 
of the reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The monetary value of all infrastructure facilities (track, buildings, stations, etc) is employed as a variable for 
measuring “Infrastructure Output”. 
8  As reported in Mizutani and Nakamura (2001). 
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Table 14: Cross-Elasticities of Marginal Operating Costs with respect to Infrastructure 
 
   
CROSS ELASTICITIES 
Firm Passenger Marginal Cost 
Respect to Infrastructure 
Freight Marginal Cost 
Respect to Infrastructure 
BR  
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ-BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
VR 
(UK)  
(Germany) 
(Denmark) 
(Italia) 
(Holland) 
(Norway) 
(Austria) 
(Spain) 
(Sweden) 
(Belgium) 
(France) 
(Finland) 
0.119 
0.076 
0.132 
0.905 
0.156 
0.133 
0.063 
0.082 
0.145 
0.106 
0.070 
0.118 
-0.052 
-0.143 
-0.053 
-0.081 
-0.027 
-0.076 
-0.116 
-0.099 
-0.065 
-0.073 
-0.138 
-0.091 
  
Average 
 
0.108 
 
-0.085 
Note: All values are statistically significant at 5% 
Source: Table 5 in Cantos (2001). 
 
 
 In general the evidence, such as it is, is mixed and inconclusive. All studies except one (the 
Shires et al. study of Sweden) estimate cost complementarities using data from currently integrated 
firms, which leaves the studies vulnerable to bias due to internal cost-allocation rules, and which 
means they are unable to take account of what may be the most important effects of vertical 
disintegration, namely transactions and coordination costs. The UK case study in Appendix 1 below 
suggests these costs may be large, though it is difficult to generalize from a single (and rather unusual) 
case. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that existing cost studies do not show that vertical 
disintegration of infrastructure from operations imposes an important cost penalty. However, given 
that such separation has occurred very rarely to date, the value of such studies in predicting the future 
consequences of such separations would appear to be very limited. 
 
 One important issue on which such studies cannot realistically shed light concerns the role of 
vertical coordination in influencing the evolution of network structures. In airline networks (unlike in 
rail networks), market entry can create new routes without the need for prior infrastructure investment. 
To be more precise, provided airport infrastructure exists at the cities at either end of a route, any 
entrant to the industry can create a direct flight link between two cities where none existed before. 
However, this cannot happen in railways, where tracks need to be laid before trains can pass. Such 
entry by airlines has proved of immense importance in shaping the evolution of structures towards 
hub-and-spoke models in the US, and has begun to be important in allowing new entrants to offer 
competitive services in the European market. Furthermore, although airport infrastructure can become 
congested and thereby impose a constraint on network development, the creation of new routes is an 
important mechanism whereby signals of the need for airport infrastructure investment are perceived. 
In railways, though, network investment will always need to lead rather than lag new route entry by 
service operators. That implies that the infrastructure operators will need to have much closer 
coordination (concerning future operation intentions) with service operators than is necessary in the air 
transport industry. Vertical integration and vertical disintegration with close investment and 
operational coordination are both feasible options; vertical disintegration with an arms-length 
relationship between infrastructure and service operators is not. 
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 The literature on “transactions costs” (see Williamson, 1985) has provided some important 
insights on the role of vertical integration in industries with high sunk costs of investment (as in 
railways). For obvious reasons, it is important to ensure that productive investment does not fail to 
take place because of a lack of coordination of the upstream and downstream parties’ intentions, due 
to their lack of integration. Williamson’s insight is that such failure may not occur simply because of a 
breakdown of communications but for a much more fundamental reason, which he terms the “hold-up 
problem”. Suppose that one party invests prior to the other, and that the investment creates a “specific 
asset” – one that is worth much less outside the relationship between the two parties. For instance, the 
asset may be a stretch of railway track that is adapted for high speed trains, which only one operator 
can run (other operators can run normal trains which do not make full use of the valuable track). Then, 
as soon as the investment has been irrevocably committed, the HST operator has an incentive to 
toughen its bargaining position, threatening not to make its own share of the relevant investment. The 
track operator would have, in effect, to bribe it to invest by lowering the access price to the track, and 
it might have to lower the price all the way to the price it could charge other, non HST operators. 
Naturally, the fear that this might be the outcome would be a disincentive to investing in the track in 
the first place. 
 
 Various possible solutions to the hold-up problem have been proposed, including long-term 
contracts (which in this example would set the access price at an agreed level even before the track 
investment had been committed). Long-term contracts can be difficult to write, however, especially 
when future circumstances may change in unforeseen ways. Instead, vertical integration between track 
and service operators may resolve the problem by ensuring that neither has the incentive to bargain 
with the other after the commitment of the investment. Integration does not have to be complete; joint 
ventures on specific projects by partners that otherwise remain separate are an alternative that may 
work when the projects are sufficiently distinct. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that ill-
considered vertical disintegration by regulatory fiat may cause difficulties of investment coordination 
that are not just “communications problems” but go to the heart of negotiation incentives. 
 
 To summarize, vertical integration has some disadvantages in a transport network, due to the 
potentially greater opacity of costs and other operating information that makes effective regulation 
more difficult, and leads to a risk of anti-competitive discrimination by the network operator against 
services supplied by a downstream competitor. However, the list of potential advantages of vertical 
integration is long. It includes some aspects on which empirical evidence is available (notably the 
extent of vertical economies of scope), and others (notably transactions costs and the risk of hold-up 
problems) on which evidence is scarce but which may plausibly be extremely important. The overall 
balance of advantages in vertical network integration is therefore a subject on which further 
information and research is very much required. 
 
 
3.1.2. Horizontal integration 
 
 
Passenger rail transport involves a number of distinct activities, some of which may be more 
open to horizontal disintegration than others. We distinguish them as follows: 
 
Provision of services on existing infrastructure linking a given city-pair 
 
Competition in this activity is sometimes known as “competition on the tracks”, and it is rare, 
though one or two instances of it have been seen in Germany in recent years. It is interesting to note 
that the Prussian rail system in the first half of the nineteenth century allowed for the possibility of 
competition on the tracks, although this possibility was not taken up (see Millward, 2002). After the 
nationalization of the industry in 1879 such possibilities were abandoned. 
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Provision of services on existing infrastructure in adjacent regional markets 
 
 As footnote 6 noted, it is far from clear that such a structure deserves to be called vertical 
disintegration at all, since services between adjacent regional markets are complements, not substitutes 
for one another. This implies that it is unlikely that the presence of rail services in adjacent markets 
will exert much competitive pressure on prices or service quality, except in so far as the terms of 
renewal of franchises takes comparative performance into account. This is the model that has been 
adopted in the UK (see Appendix 1) through the use of franchising contracts.  
 
Leasing of rolling-stock 
 
In principle there seems no reason by there should not be effective competition in the 
ownership and leasing of rolling-stock. The UK rail reforms of the 1990 were designed to bring about 
such competition by creating three ROSCOs (Rolling Stock Operating Companies). However, there 
has not been effective entry into this market, and it is likely that barriers to entry are significant, due to 
the long lead times for investment and the difficulties in transferring rolling-stock between countries 
(which gives investment costs a significantly sunk character). 
 
Timetabling and reservation services 
 
In the past such services have been considered as something of a natural monopoly, though 
with the development of the internet this may be changing. At all events, low-cost entrants in the 
airline industry have thrived in spite of not sharing the distribution and booking systems (such as 
Amadeus) belonging to the major flag carriers. 
 
Infrastructure provision on a given city-pair 
 
Historically there were a number of instances in the 19th century where rival companies would 
build routes linking two important cities, and such competition has continued to take place in Japan to 
this day. In all such cases the infrastructure provider was also the provider of services on the 
infrastructure concerned, and no cases are known where there was competing infrastructure on a city-
pair without vertical integration. 
 
Infrastructure and service provision in adjacent regional markets 
 
For the reasons given above, this is best characterized as a system of parallel monopoly rather 
than horizontal competition. Where it appears to have worked well it has either been accompanied by 
strict yardstick competition (as in Japan, see Appendix 1), or by strong inter-modal competition (as 
with trucking for the US freight transport networks).  
 
 The main message seems to be that horizontal competition in the strict sense is extremely rare 
in railways, and it is very hard therefore to judge what would be the likely consequences of mandating 
it on a large scale. Parallel monopoly, which is what has been tried in different ways in the UK, the US 
and Japan, is not at all the same thing.  
 
 
3.2. Service diversification and economies of scope 
 
 
Diversification is important for the analysis of competition for two reasons. First, it may affect 
costs if there are significant economies of scope between the activities. Secondly, diversified firms 
may be able to cross-subsidize their markets. This may distort competition since single product firms 
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cannot divert resources from other markets9. Diversification is hard to quantify. There exist some well-
known cases of train operators who are also sellers of air transport, disks and colas. There is also the 
possibility of using the infrastructure for other activities, such as high-voltage electricity cables or 
broadband communications. But it is risky to diversify too much: the positive portfolio effect can be 
overcompensated by negative fuzziness effects (loss of control, diseconomies of scope). Similarly, 
attempting to differentiate services very precisely by customer may risk increasing costs because of 
the loss of opportunities for pooling; for instance the distinction between first and business class travel 
has not proved economic to implement in Europe, and the number of classes of rail travel has declined 
since the nineteenth century.  
 
We are not aware of any studies directly estimating such economies of scope in railways. 
However, one implication of the findings on economies of density reported in section 2.3 above is that 
operators offering only point-to-point services are likely to be at a cost disadvantage compared to 
rivals that can offer at least a small network of routes as “feeders” (producing what is called 
“intraline” traffic). To put the point another way, point-to-point entrants may need to have a 
substantial advantage in direct operating costs to be able operate profitably against a network operator. 
The extent to which such competition is possible will depend on the characteristics of the routes in 
question: for instance, low-cost airlines in Europe such as EasyJet and Ryanair have overwhelmingly 
concentrated their entry strategies on routes where there is substantial point-to-point traffic and they 
are unlikely to be disadvantaged by their inability to intra-line. It seems likely that any low-cost 
competition on the tracks in European rail services in future will similarly concentrate on routes with 
high point-to-point traffic, which tend to be profitable for incumbent operators not so much because of 
high prices as because of their ability to benefit from economies of density.  
 
In order to prevent cross subsidization, governments promulgate rules that oblige some 
regulated firms to publish separate accounts. This obligation has the advantage of transparency. But it 
does not prevent multi-product firms from allocating common costs to activities where competition is 
weak. The purpose of such cost allocations can be to commit the firm to a very aggressive price policy 
(though one still above cost) in markets where competition is tough. If such a policy is effective it may 
not even need to implement aggressive pricing provided competitors get the message and themselves 
use an accommodating strategy, or even stay out of the market altogether. 
 
Almost certainly the presence of potential cross-subsidy will be as important as the presence 
of point-to-point demand in influencing the evolution of competition on the tracks if and when it 
becomes more common in Europe. Carriers that can reduce their costs on one route by sharing rolling 
stock or marketing services with other routes (including routes in other countries) may be at a 
considerable advantage compared to carriers that cannot, whatever regulators may do to try and level 
the playing field. Similarly, firms that can obtain subsidies for the use of rolling stock on some routes 
may be able to benefit from such subsidy to compete more aggressively on other routes. 
 
 
3.3. Inter-modal competition 
 
 
For the transport of passengers, train companies compete mainly with buses and cars (taxis or 
private cars) on short and medium distances, and with airline companies for long distance, in 
particular for interstate trips. 
 
For the economic analysis of this inter-modal competition, it is useful to observe that: 
  
- on the supply side, it is competition between heterogeneous technologies; 
                                                          
9 Rey et al. (2001) emphasize that even if such cross-subsidization is possible it may not be in the interest of the 
firm to do so. 
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- on the demand side, the competing products are more or less differentiated; 
- the competing modes are regulated following different rules. 
 
When firms compete with very different technologies, it is rare from them to provide exactly 
the same product. The electricity industry is an exception - the consumer of 1kW is totally unable to 
say if it has been produced by a gas plant, or a nuclear plant, or a hydro plant. 
 
We provisionally suppose that the product is simply defined in terms of a trip between two 
given nodes, starting and arriving at given times. There are obviously numerous different possibilities 
to be considered, but here we limit the analysis to the case of starting and arriving points in the center 
of two towns since this is the interesting case for the train companies. 
 
What are the advantages of a bus company for the same service?  
 
- more flexibility in terms of time departure and arrival; 
- more flexibility in terms of path; 
- lower fixed costs; 
- the optional possibility to “collect” and to “distribute” passengers around the nodes instead of 
at the nodes. 
 
What are the comparative drawbacks of the bus solution? 
 
- lower comfort; 
- possibly lower safety (depending on the kind of route); 
- air pollution and road congestion. 
 
 
If passengers are mainly interested in being transported from one town to the other, the 
products supplied by the train company and the bus company are merely differentiated vertically by 
the duration of the travel: the shorter, the better. In this case, the train can be seen as a high-quality 
good and the bus as a low-quality good. From this point of view, on medium distances (Paris-Lyon, 
Paris Marseille), the train has long been viewed as of low quality with respect to plane but thanks to 
high-speed trains, the “quality gap” has vanished. It has even switched to the advantage of train 
companies for the shortest segments (Paris-Lyon). 
 
Vertical differentiation can also be defined in terms of safety, reliability and comfort. Unlike 
buses, trains and aircraft can propose different classes in order to discriminate between passengers on 
the basis of their willingness to pay. 
 
The main difference between trains and cars or buses is in terms of horizontal differentiation10. 
Because the demand is extremely differentiated in geographical terms, road transport can propose 
products that are “closer” to the individual needs. Indeed, unlike road transport, trains need 
complementary modes between the individual departure and arrival nodes on one hand and the stations 
on the other hand (see Figure 8). The same applies to airlines. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation is that vertical differentiation is with respect to 
properties of the service that all consumers can be presumed to value (such as speed), even if they value them to 
different degrees. Horizontal differentiation, however, is with respect to properties of the service which are 
ordered differently in the preferences of consumers, such as physical location (where one consumer prefers 
location A to location B, another the reverse). 
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Figure 8: Multi-modal transport links 
 
 
 
The regulation of competing modes of transport is not subject to symmetric rules. Different 
technical and economic agencies are involved in controlling the operation and the development of the 
different types of transport.11 For example, when fatal accidents occur in rail transport, the demand for 
increased security is much stronger than if the same number of people is killed in car crashes. 
Similarly, pollution by trucks and the damage they create on roads may not be calculated in a way that 
is comparable between rail transport and road transport. 
 
The intensity of inter-modal competition can be measured using cross-elasticities of demand 
when these are available. For passenger rail travel as a whole, the findings reported in section 2.2 
implied that these were low in the short term. However, in the longer term, as well as for particular 
markets such as large cities less than 250 km apart, competition may be stronger. For instance, inter-
modal competition between rail and air is quite strong for such cities, as the experience of the Paris-
Lyon, Paris-Marseille and Madrid-Seville high-speed train services indicates.  
 
However, it is useful to remember that rail travel can be complementary to other modes 
(indeed it typically depends on other modes to allow rail travelers to complete their journeys). To put 
matters another way, for train operators, the other modes of transport can be their best allies as well as 
their fiercest competitors.  
 
 To illustrate this question, we present now a model of regulated inter-modal competition. 
 
The model of Brauetigam (1979) can be readily adapted to passenger transport. We consider 
the market for transporting passengers between two towns. There are m  modes competing in this 
market. Trains are mode 1. They are characterized by economies of scale with the consequence that 
marginal pricing would create financial losses. The other modes (private cars, taxis, buses …) exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale and there is free entry in these modes. Consequently, one natural monopoly 
(mode 1) is competing with 1m −  competitive modes. 
  
 There are 1, ,j n= K  different types of passengers. The number of passengers of type j  
transported by mode i  is denoted jix . Intra-modal services are perfectly homogeneous for one class of 
passengers (for example, all taxis are the same). The aggregate utility of type-j passengers is: 
 
1( , , ) 1, ,
j j j
mu x x j n=K K  
 
                                                          
11 Brauetigam (1979) examines “how second best prices might be set if one of the modes has scale economies 
(and railroads appear to be the most likely candidate) and the other modes (water and motor) do not.”  
train 
taxi 
taxi 
final destination 
home 
rail station 
rail station 
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 This formulation presumes that each additional type-j passenger on a given mode has a 
positive utility, that this positive utility is larger than the disutility created to former type-j passengers, 
and also that there is no positive or negative externality between different groups of passengers. Some 
“discomfort” parameter could be added to the model. 
 
Passengers have no market power. One can derive the set of marginal conditions for the 
demand of transport by type-j passengers: 
 
1( , , ) 1,...,
j j j
jn
ij
i
u x x p i m
x
∂ = =∂
K
 
 
There is intermodal service differentiation since trains and competing modes differ in terms of 
speed, comfort, reliability etc. This assumption can be modeled by  
'
0 '
j j
i i
j j
i i
p p i i
x x
∂ ∂≤ < ≠∂ ∂  
In other words, for type-j passengers, modes i  and 'i  are weak gross substitutes. 
 
Starting from these assumptions, one can determine: 
 
- Second Best allocation, i.e., how inter-modal competition distorts the optimal activity of 
the train company that has to balance its budget. It appears that even the “competitive” 
(but regulated) modes need to depart from marginal cost pricing. 
- Partially Regulated Second Best, i.e., what is the second-best number of passengers by 
train when the social planner does not control the use of the other modes of transport. 
 
This model is rather old-fashioned, but it gives a good introduction to the problem of “unfair” 
competition between heterogeneous technologies with the intervention of public decision-makers that 
interfere with market mechanisms. 
 
 
3.4. Access to infrastructure and barriers to entry 
 
 
Infrastructure refers to what are sometimes called “essential facilities” - those aspects of a 
network that would be seriously costly for other rail service operators to duplicate. In practice in rail 
transport this includes track, signalling, stations and possibly some maintenance facilities (note that 
the maintenance labour force is not, properly speaking, a part of infrastructure). It may also consist of 
some ticketing and distribution facilities, though the costs of duplicating these have been drastically 
reduced in recent years by the internet. 
 
As long as the industry remains completely vertically integrated, barriers to entry are 
“natural”, in the sense that entry is limited by the huge fixed costs necessary to install new tracks, 
stations and all the software to operate them. The greater the vertical disintegration, the easier is entry 
likely to be. This consideration even prompted the UK authorities to negotiate artificial barriers to 
entry with franchisees in order to ensure that on-track competition did not lead to increased demands  
for subsidies (see Box 4). However, such entry is likely to be limited to routes where existing 
infrastructure is in place.  
 
Lowering economic barriers to entry should not mean decreasing quality and safety. For this 
reason, governments define severe institutional barriers. Entry is subordinated to obtaining a license or 
to signing a contract that describes in detail the technical, economic and financial requirements of the 
deal. 
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With this type of barrier in place, the risk is that governments inefficiently protect domestic 
firms, mainly the incumbent, advocating safety reasons as a means of denying entry to foreign firms.  
 
Finally, barriers to entry can be strategic, that is voluntarily erected by one or several 
incumbents in order to blockade access to the market by newcomers. Such strategic barriers may take 
many forms, from marketing expenditure to investment that lowers marginal costs and commits 
incumbent firms to aggressive pricing behaviour. 
 
 
Box 3: Barriers to entry in the UK railways  
 
The original privatisation plan envisaged two types of access agreements for passenger services: 
franchised passenger services access agreements; and open access agreements where operators would 
be able to negotiate open access agreements with Railtrack. It soon became clear that encouraging on-
track competition would conflict with the government’s objective to reduce subsidies. 
 
Thus the Rail Regulator has devised a regime of ‘moderation of competition’ for the passenger 
franchises. This regime determines in advance the degree of exposure to competition which each 
franchisee could face, ensuring that the adverse impact on the franchising process would be 
minimised. New entry is restricted through contractual control over Railtrack’s ability to sell access 
rights to any operator in addition to those contained in their initial access agreements. The mechanism 
was intended to allow the market to determine as far as possible where competitive entry should occur. 
The protection given was to be over the markets which operators serve rather than the track on which 
they operate. 
 
The mechanism operates in two stages. The first started when the last British Rail TOC has its long-
term track access agreement approved and was originally planned to expire on 31st March 1999. The 
second was planned to expire on 31st March 2002.   
First stage of open access: 
In the first stage, franchise holders can nominate a list of substantial point-to-point flows on which no 
new entry for scheduled passenger services will be permitted without the franchisee’s agreement.  
Franchise operators can nominate additional flows, not conforming to this rule, subject to the approval 
of the regulator. This is designed to allow passenger operators additional rights where there is no 
conflict with the protection given to other operators. 
Second stage of open access: 
In the second stage, some new competition via open access is intended to be introduced. As with stage 
1, the key building block is the station to station flow and franchisees will be expected to re-nominate 
flows, but in stage 2, franchisees will only be allowed a partial protection from new entrants. Up to a 
threshold level set by the Regulator, new entry can then occur, and compete for the operator’s 
business. In stage 2, the competition mechanism is designed to limit the amount of the operator’s 
passenger revenue that is open to competition from another operator. 
 
 
 Since the most important barriers to entry arise from the long-term nature of investment, both 
in infrastructure and in rolling stock, we consider this issue separately in section 3.5. 
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3.5. Infrastructure investment and financing 
 
 
As in other parts of rail activity, a distinction has to be made in investment issues, between 
infrastructures and rolling stock. This distinction is important for several reasons:  
 
- The life of investments is very different: from ten to thirty years for rolling stocks, several 
centuries for infrastructure if it is properly maintained. 
- The concern of public authorities for infrastructure: for instance strategic and geopolitical 
concerns, as well as the need of public intervention to obtain the right of ways to achieve a 
new infrastructure (however, it should be noted that much rail infrastructure was privately 
built as well as operated during the 19th century in Europe). 
- The fact that infrastructure has many characteristics of indivisibility: a new rail link needs 
large amounts of money in order to be useful, while a new car alone may be useful. 
- The sunk cost characteristics of infrastructure: when the investment has been made, it 
cannot be given another use, while rolling stock can be resold (through the second hand 
market). 
- The fact that the Commission of the European Union has launched a policy towards a 
separation of infrastructure and rolling stock operation. In all European countries there is 
at least an accounting separation, and in most countries an organisational one. This 
organisational feature is specific to Europe; in no other part of the world has railway 
reform endorsed such a separation (in most countries, the separation has been a horizontal, 
not a vertical one). After this separation, it appears that infrastructures remain in the hands 
of the public authorities, while rolling stocks are operated by firms that are more and more 
privately managed. 
 
 
Let us examine successively the economics of rolling stock and of infrastructure. 
 
 
3.5.1. Rolling Stock  
 
 
The economics of rolling stock is largely independent from the public authorities and belongs 
to the market economy. But this market is different in the various parts of the world and it is 
interesting to relate the features of the North American markets and the features of the European 
market. 
 
In North America, there are a large number of rail operators, both for freight (long distance 
transport) and for passengers (short distance transport). There are also a rather large number of rolling 
stock providers, apart from the two big firms, General Motors and General Electric. So the market is 
fairly close to a competitive market, with a large number of suppliers and of customers and a rather 
vivid competition, with a tendency to outsourcing. For instance the two big makers subcontract about 
80% of their turnover.  
 
The picture is quite different in Europe, or more precisely was quite different, because things 
are changing and the situation is moving closer to the American one. Around 10 years ago, the 
railways operators of the main European countries had no link between them, were state monopolies, 
and had no obligation to use international competition for the provision of rolling stock. In each 
country, there was a bilateral monopoly between the rail operator (DB in Germany, SNCF in France, 
FS in Italy) and the rolling stock provider (Siemens in Germany, Alsthom in France, Ansaldo in Italy). 
The connection between the rail operator and the rolling stock provider was very tight in each country, 
without any link between one country and another. The technical staff cooperated closely, and the 
results were:  
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- Fast technical progress, which led to the various HST of each country (ICE in Germany, 
TGV in France, Pendolino in Italy – the last being strictly a tilting rather than a high 
speed train), which needed close cooperation between the future operator and the maker. 
- Small production runs, leading to high costs. 
- Standards different from one country to another. Although the width of rails is the same, 
except for Spain and Portugal, the loading gauges, the power and the signalling systems 
(including the official language in use between the drivers and the controllers, which is 
the domestic language) are different from one country to another, and there are even 
significant intra-country differences. 
 
In contrast, the outcome of the American market structure was quite the reverse: rather low 
technical progress, long production runs, widely used standards, interoperability of rolling stock over 
the whole continent. 
 
Things are changing in Europe: under the pressure of the liberalisation and the Commission 
efforts to widen competition, tendering procedures are becoming international, the opening of the 
market to international competition has induced American providers (such as Bombardier) to enter the 
market through direct sales to European rail operators or through mergers and absorption of European 
firms. Foreign makers are becoming active in each domestic market. EWS, the UK freight train 
operator, buys rolling stock from a Chicago firm, Thrall. Many European rail operators pay more 
attention to the buying strategy and to the prices they pay. They induce competition, and do not 
hesitate to buy foreign materials such as SNCF, or DB. There are also vehicle leasing companies, 
notably in the UK, though this is also beginning in Germany. 
 
An interesting features is the kind of competition which is evolving in the HST market: we see 
that in the overseas markets, each of the three main providers (Siemens, Alstom, Fiat) are acting as 
competitors (case of Korea), while on the European markets they act cooperatively, as can be seen 
from the international links such as Paris-Bruxelles-Cologne or the Eurostar. 
 
There has been little systematic study of the economics of rolling stock manufacture or 
investment, nor much precise and detailed statistical information. In particular, there is no official 
comprehensive record of rail rolling stock investment and no general figures can be given concerning 
its evolution. Nevertheless, Affuso and Newbery (2000) note that the immediate aftermath of 
privatization in the UK was a collapse in rolling stock investment (though it had been on a downward 
trend beforehand), though their econometric study does not find grounds for attributing this to 
insufficient length of franchising contracts. 
 
 
3.5.2. Infrastructure 
 
 
In contrast to rolling stock, the economics of infrastructure is not much driven by market 
forces, but much more by the policies of public authorities. This is probably the reason why so many 
econometric studies have been made on this subject. 
 
These studies are related to: 
  
- infrastructure costs and the level of economies of scale and scope; 
- the decision process for the implementation of new infrastructures;  
- financing issues and especially the role of private financing. 
 
Infrastructure costs in a broad sense can be listed as follows: 
 
- building costs; 
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- maintenance and operation costs; 
- external costs, and especially environmental costs, congestion costs, and unsafety costs. 
 
Building costs are rather well known through various project studies in many countries. Table 
15 provide some average values for France, comparing rail costs and those for other modes. These 
costs are averages, and the real cost depends on specificities such as the climate, the topography, the 
density of inhabitants (the more dense is the population, the more expensive are rights of ways and 
constructions such as tunnels and bridges). 
 
Maintenance costs have been the subject of many studies estimating returns to scale. It 
appears that maintenance and operations of infrastructure exhibit highly increasing returns to scale, or, 
put in another way, that the fixed costs of maintenance and operations are high. A simple measure of 
the degree of returns to scale is the ratio of average costs to marginal costs. When this ratio is higher 
than one, there are increasing returns to scale. In industries such as telecoms and air transport these 
ratios have been estimated to lie between about 1.5 and 2.0. The ratio in rail infrastructure activity is 
around 3 to 4 according to study and country. 
 
Overall, it appears that these marginal costs are a long way below average infrastructure costs: 
this is true even if externalities are included among the marginal costs. This implies clearly that 
marginal cost pricing cannot cover infrastructure fixed costs, so the need for public subsidies remains 
even in when externalities are taken into account.   
 
 
Table 15: Infrastructure costs for various links, millions of Euros 1995 
 
Mode of transport Nature of link Mean cost 
Road 1 km expressway 2X2  3.1 
 1 km route nationale 3-lane  1.4 
 1 km route dptale 2-lane  0.5 
 1 km route communale  0.26 
 1 km autoroute 6.5 
Rail 1 km double electrified  4.3 
 1 km single electrified  2.3 
 Electrification of 1 km single  1.5 
 Quadruplication of double  2.7 
 1 km high-speed track 6.5 
Source: Quinet (1994). 
 
 One of the features emerging from the table is that rail links are somewhat more expensive per 
kilometre of track than road links. Allied to the fact that road links are capable in principle of 
supporting a more or less continuous flow of traffic, while rail links may remain empty for significant 
periods between the passage of trains, this underlines the need for rail links to generate significant 
traffic levels before they can attain a reasonable social rate of return in competition with road. It 
should also be noted that all these costs are increasing in real terms over time due to environmental 
constraints. 
 
 
3.5.3. Decision-making for infrastructure investment 
 
 
Public authorities are highly involved in decisions about infrastructure. In all European 
countries, the infrastructure manager (IM) is either the state or a public firm, and public authorities 
subsidize the investments.  
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In Sweden, the IM (Banverket, initials BV) is a part of the administration; investment 
decisions are taken in accordance with and under the control of the Parliament, which decides the 
budgetary funds to be granted to BV and has greatly increased the funds since the beginning of the 
reform process. 
 
In France, the IM is a public firm, with the same status as SNCF, the rail operator. Its funds 
come from infrastructure charges, which are far below the total expenses, and from borrowing and 
public subsidies. As in other countries, the debt of the IM is very large. 
In Switzerland, the IM is a branch of the CFF and benefits from funds coming from the special 
tax on road haulage. 
 
In Germany, DB Netz is a branch of the holding DB AG and is still closely linked to the rail 
operators. 
 
The case of the UK is interesting in that, at the beginning of the reform, Railtrack was 
established as a private firm under the control of a regulator. However, the system proved to have 
many drawbacks coming from the difficulties of regulating the system. Recently the status of Railtrack 
was changed to an organisation equivalent to a public firm.  
 
The involvement of public authorities in infrastructure influences the technical aspects of the 
decision process. Choices are generally screened by cost-benefit analysis. The main difference 
between cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and current procedures in private management is that CBA aims 
at reckoning the whole social profitability and not only the profitability of the IM. This implies 
inclusion of certain external effects:  
 
- the effects on environment; 
- the effects on user’s surplus, which are mainly the gains in travel time that cannot be 
captured by the IM through a sufficiently differentiated charging system; 
- the effects on the profits of the other infrastructure managers. 
 
These calculations are performed in Germany, Sweden, France, but not in Switzerland. In the 
UK, the procedure up to now did not include these external effects, as the investments were decided 
more or less by the private firm Railtrack, but things will probably change since the nationalization of 
the IM. 
 
Where they are attempted, these calculations prove to be difficult, uncertain, and easily 
manipulable: information about future traffic is quite asymmetric between the IM and the regulator, 
the calculation of users’ surplus is uncertain, as is the calculation of the external effects, due to the 
specificities of each investment and to the difficulty for the regulator in controlling the accuracy of 
both the data and the calculation process. The result is that there is often a substantial difference 
between the recommendations of the CBA and the subsequent decisions. 
 
Fragmentation has raised a new problem, by splitting the infrastructure builder and the 
infrastructure user: a problem of commitment arises, the IM being cautious to build a new 
infrastructure the cost of which is totally sunk, and becoming a hostage of the rail operators. Long 
term contracts between the rail operators and the IM are one possible solution, though one that may 
conflict with the competition process that the European Commission is trying to implement. 
 
The involvement of the public authorities is not due solely or even mainly to the need to take 
externalities into account, but also by the poor private profitability of most infrastructure investments. 
In France for instance, the HST from Paris to the East of France and onwards to Germany has a rate of 
return of only about 2%, and the rate of return of the Alpine tunnels in Switzerland has roughly a 
similar value. The Betuwe line, which will be built in Netherlands to link Rotterdam and the Rhine 
mouth to Germany, was originally intended to be privately funded, but this now seems unlikely. 
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The support from public authorities for rail investments is increasingly driven by the general 
policy orientations of the Commission and of many countries: they intend to develop rail traffic in 
order to cope with road traffic growth and negative congestion and environmental externalities. The 
result, coupled with the macro-economic constraints of short run oscillations, is a substantial degree of 
fluctuation in infrastructure investments from one year to another.  
 
 
3.5.4. Use of and Access to Infrastructure 
 
 
The use of infrastructure is determined first by infrastructure charges and secondly by slot 
allocation procedures. Infrastructure charges are very different from one country to another in Europe. 
Their structure is rather similar. Each country has issued regulations about infrastructure pricing. 
These tariffs (NERA 1998) generally take into account: 
 
- a fixed term per km; 
- a term related to the size of the train (tons, number of passengers) and/or to the type of train   
(passenger, freight), to the type of track (HST, other) and to the time (day, night...); 
- a reservation term, depending on the same parameters as the term related to the size of the 
train. 
 
These principles have taken various forms in each country, and things are changing rapidly. In 
the UK for instance, infrastructure pricing is presently composed of a lump-sum negotiated term with 
each RO for the base service and a marginal term for each additional train. In Germany, up to recently 
there was a menu of two tariffs: a proportional one, fit for small ROs, and a two part tariff, fit for big 
ones. Recently a change has suppressed this two-part tariff, which was judged by the new entrants as 
discriminatory.  
The infrastructure charges cover different proportions of infrastructure costs in different 
countries, these proportions being very low in Sweden and France, and significantly higher in 
Germany and in the UK. 
 
Infrastructure charges do not completely solve short-term adjustment problems. Contrarily to 
the case of road, there are still applications for incompatible paths, coming from different operators. 
These problems require path allocation procedures. Little attention has been paid to path allocation 
issues, probably because it is not a new problem, having already occurred as a problem for the 
historical incumbents. The European Union has recently mentioned it in some directives, and the 
recent Directive (European Commission, 2001), which aims at dealing with this question, just fixes the 
procedures to be applied: no discrimination between the applicants; a precise time-table for the 
applications; and the allocation should be made by an independent body. The algorithm for solving 
conflicts is not detailed; in fact all countries have established priority rules which are in the line of the 
procedures used by the historical incumbents. 
 
These priority rules generally follow the hierarchical order: 
 
- International and intercity passengers 
- Local passengers 
- Goods trains, among which: first combined transport, second other goods trains 
 
 They are implemented through a large use of ‘grand-father rights’ and incremental changes 
from year to year. There are of course country peculiarities. In the UK and Denmark, some subsidies 
can be granted to combined trains. In Germany and Switzerland, the regulation implies that, within 
equal priority rank for conflicting applications, the higher bidder is chosen. In Sweden, priority rules 
take into account the social value of the service. In all countries path allocation is made by the 
infrastructure manager, under the control of the rail regulator. Besides these dispositions related to the 
planning procedures of services, real time operations are generally achieved by the IMs through 
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hierarchical relations. In the UK, a performance regime is set up, implying bonuses and penalties for 
delays and on-time services to be paid between the ROs and the IM. 
 
 
3.6. Are all facilities natural monopolies?  
 
 
Network industries are commonly viewed as a combination of activities with different 
characteristics: for example, in railways we have the management of infrastructure on one side, and 
the operation of rolling stock on the other. Liberalization consists in opening to competitors the layers 
of the industry where costs do not exhibit strong economies of scale. Other layers may be better 
managed as a monopoly (typically to avoid duplication of fixed costs). And competition can be fair 
only if access to the essential facility is guaranteed to all competitors. 
 
 But are all fixed equipment and immaterial assets essential facilities? The answer depends on:  
 
a) the cost characteristics of the isolated piece of equipment; 
b) the cost characteristics of equipment in the industry as a whole; 
c) the benefits or damages to competition of access opening. 
 
a) If the equipment under scrutiny currently displays decreasing average costs of operation, and if this 
remains true after the entry of new users, opening access is potentially beneficial for everybody: for 
the entrant who is not obliged to invest in a new equipment, for the incumbent who benefits from 
additional decrease in average cost and for society since duplication would be inefficient (Figure 8). 
 
When there are decreasing returns to scale, the access of competitors will increase the average 
cost of the incumbent (as in Figure 9). The entrants benefit from the investment of the incumbent since 
the average cost they incur is less than if they had to install their own equipment ( )eAC . In terms of 
the welfare of society as a whole, it depends on a comparison of the total costs incurred by the firms 
when equipment is duplicated and when it is shared.  
 
Decisions about sharing of facilities will therefore be quite sensitive to details of the costs 
involved. For example, some repair and maintenance facilities may have the characteristics of a local 
natural monopoly and should be made available to competitors. Others may be replicable by 
competitors with little disadvantage in terms of costs (this is more likely to be true when there are no 
large indivisibilities involved in the construction of such facilities, and when the likely traffic on the 
competitors’ services is large enough to ensure the facilities are reasonably fully utilized). 
 
Similarly, technology may influence the nature of such comparisons over time. For instance, 
recent developments in information technology make it much easier than it used to be for competitors 
to replicate the ticketing and distribution facilities of incumbents with little or no cost disadvantage – 
either through internet booking (as low-cost airlines have discovered) or through small portable 
facilities on board trains. This implies, that in these activities sharing of facilities needs not to be 
enforced. 
 
b) Access is likely to be optimal if the facilities in question can be clearly isolated from the rest of the 
infrastructure. However, some inputs do not perform in the same way when they are operated in 
isolation as when they are connected to others. To open access to one facility without taking into 
account the effects on linked facilities can be damaging for the incumbent and for passengers. For 
instance, granting open access to a repair station because there remains some idle capacity (see 
argument a) above) can create congestion on surrounding lines and stations with the effect of increase 
the total costs of the incumbent and the welfare of passengers. 
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Figure 9: Increasing returns: Opening is beneficial 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Decreasing returns: Opening benefits only the entrant 
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c) The promotion of competition should not be a per se objective but simply a means to promote 
efficiency and fairness. In particular, it should not go against the common rules of fair trade, which 
seek to protect investments of all firms in specific assets, especially intangible assets such as know-
how and employee skills. Even when such assets possess the characteristics of a public good (with 
decreasing average cost of use), it is important to ensure that opening them to competitors does not 
undermine the incentives for all firms (not just the incumbent) to invest in such assets in the first 
place).  
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4. ENTRY AND COMPETITION 
 
4.1. Price competition 
 
 
Prices are but one of a wide array of business tools that rail firms can use to compete for 
passengers. In fact competitive strategies concern not just the terms on which a given service is made 
available to customers, but also the choice of the kinds of service to supply, a choice which has a large 
number of collateral implications for investment, employment policy, and policy towards acquisitions, 
outsourcing and joint ventures.  
 
Two features of rail travel make consideration of price competition somewhat different from 
many other industries. The first is that short-run cross-elasticities between transport modes are rather 
low, suggesting that for rail to compete purely on price against cars or air travel is not likely to yield 
rapid profits; at any rate, low price strategies would have to be maintained, and seen to be maintained, 
over a significant period of years before significant traffic could be gained from other transport modes. 
 
The second is that, because of economies of density, price competition that significantly 
increases traffic can be an extremely profitable strategy for the firm that undertakes it: the true 
marginal cost of additional traffic lies some way below the average cost. Thus where on-track 
competition is feasible, or where the characteristics of a given route suggest inter-modal competition 
may be unusually keen, the incentives to cut prices can be very strong. This has three important 
implications. First, stable on-track competition may often not be viable: either it is infeasible, or it is 
feasible and the result is such fierce price competition that unless the competitors have precisely 
similar cost structures one of them may be forced to withdraw. This may make it quite difficult to 
support an industry structure with significant amounts of on-track competition, a fact that should be 
borne in mind in considering regulatory appraisals of the results of introducing competition. We 
consider this issue further in section 4.4 below.  
 
Secondly, both entrants and incumbents will seek for ways to soften the impact of competition 
by differentiating their products. For instance, non-interchangeability of tickets, non-cooperation over 
scheduling connecting services, different approaches towards discounting and the targeting of different 
customer groups, may be tempting strategies for all competitors even if their effect on overall 
customer welfare is negative. Note that this is quite different from similar strategies used with 
predatory intent, in order to drive competitors out of the market. When there is (successful) predation 
it is the exiting firm that suffers as well as consumers; when the strategies aim merely at softening 
competition, the firms benefit and consumers lose. 
 
Thirdly, where inter-modal competition can work (such as on inter-city routes between 200 
and 400 km for competition with road and 500km to 1000km for competition with air travel) its effect 
on prices may be important, and may make price regulation unnecessary in circumstances where it 
might otherwise have been desirable. 
 
For this to be possible, of course, it is necessary that rail services develop characteristics that 
make inter-modal competition realistic. High-speed trains have done this with some success (though at 
high cost) in recent years, and it remains to be considered whether and to what extent other kinds of 
rail service can provide a significant challenge to other modes, notably the car. We consider this in the 
next section. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that developments in communications and information technology, 
notably of course the spread of the internet, are making an important difference to the sophistication of 
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the pricing strategies that firms can adopt. This is particularly true in the realm of price discrimination. 
Economists distinguish three types of price discrimination: 
 
i) First-degree price discrimination is charging individual customers according to their own 
willingness to pay for the good or service. Since this is almost never known to the seller, first-
degree price discrimination is typically infeasible, and remains of purely text-book interest. 
ii) Second-degree price discrimination, or non-linear pricing, allows customers to select different 
patterns of payment (usually with a choice between a fixed element and a variable element) in a 
way that sorts them into groups with different willingness to pay.  
iii) Third-degree price discrimination charges different prices to consumers with different 
observable characteristics, these latter being effectively outside the customer’s control, either 
absolutely (such as age) or for the purposes of the transaction (such as physical location when 
transport costs are high relative to the value of the good). 
 
Both second-and third-degree price discrimination have long featured in rail pricing, notably 
through season tickets and discounts for the young and the elderly. However, the internet, and 
information technology more generally, are making sophisticated second-degree price discrimination 
easier, notably because customers can be shown, quickly and intuitively, the effect of different pricing 
packages in a way that allows for an informed choice between them. The effect on third-degree price 
discrimination is more ambiguous. In some respects such discrimination is becoming harder, because 
customers can shop around, and it is no longer possible to discriminate between customers according 
to where they are physically located when they make the transaction. However, this is substantially 
offset by two other considerations. The first, which is particularly relevant to transport, is that when 
the product is a service that must be consumed at a certain place and/or time, it remains possible to 
discriminate between customers according to location or time of consumption rather than location of 
transaction. Airlines have discovered this in a big way through their computer reservation systems, 
which can charge very different prices for flights of the same length according to the origin or 
destination, as well as according to the time of travel12. The second reason is that firms can now use 
sophisticated databases of consumer travel behaviour to target special offers to the individual’s 
presumed preferences. Such targeting has not so far been much exploited in the travel market (unlike 
in the market for, say, books), but it will not be long in coming. 
 
Overall the increased sophistication of price discrimination is likely to make price competition 
a more tempting prospect, but also to allow competing firms to segment markets in terms of customer 
types more effectively than has been possible to date. 
 
 
4.2. Competition on speed, punctuality and other services  
 
 
It is evident that the attractiveness of the car lies in its extreme flexibility and therefore its 
ability to get the traveler to his/her final destination more rapidly than other modes, many of which 
require changes of carrier or even of mode in the course of a single journey. The dependence of rail on 
fixed tracks, as well as the economic need to carry passengers in large numbers for average costs to be 
brought down, makes it implausible that rail could ever reproduce the advantages of the car at all 
closely. Nevertheless, there are clearly some customers for whom flexibility can be traded off against 
both speed and price, particularly given the fact that rail can cooperate with other modes. A fall in the 
price of a train journey allows the passenger more easily to afford a taxi for transit to the final 
destination. In addition, the growing severity of traffic and parking restrictions in major city centers 
means that the convenience of the car is diminishing, at least for urban journeys. Similarly, growing 
security restrictions at airports mean that the advantage of air travel in terms of speed is not as great as 
                                                          
12 Actually time of transaction (unlike location of transaction) remains a very effective tool of discrimination, 
because individuals cannot travel freely in time. Tickets booked at the last minute may be very different in price 
from those booked long in advance. 
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it was a few years ago. This enlarges significantly the ability of rail travel to approach some of the 
advantages of its two most important inter-modal competitors. Although some of this development is 
due to events outside the control of rail companies, their own strategy choices will clearly play an 
important role here. Some choices are very expensive: on a medium-haul intercity route the 
investment needed to cut ten minutes from a journey time may be so great that it is not worth making. 
But other choices – streamlined luggage transfer or portering facilities, smooth connections with buses 
or with other trains – may make as much different to overall travel times as do improvements in the 
speed of the trains themselves. 
 
It is worth noting that the same developments in communications and information technology 
that were noted in the last section make it possible substantially to improve the flexibility of rail 
services. The container revolution in the freight industry has been of great benefit to the competitivity 
of rail services. While physical containerization of passengers is not realistically in prospect, virtual 
containerization may well be. “Total journey” services (see Box 5), in which a traveler uses the 
internet to book a full through service from origin to destination, using preference parameters stored in 
a database to choose between multiple modes, may well make rail a central part of future travel 
demand even if it is rarely the sole mode chosen by the consumer. 
 
 
Box 4: A “total journey” 
 
I tell the website that I wish to be at DB headquarters in Frankfurt for a meeting at 10 am on the 12th of 
September, and by default it assumes I shall be leaving from my home (whose parameters it knows). 
The site has to devise a plan for travel, from the initial alarm call to my mobile telephone, through the 
taxi reservation and automated check-in for the flight, to the various means of traveling from Frankfurt 
airport to my destination. It has to ensure that the taxis are waiting and that if there are delays at any 
stage alternative arrangements are made. If I have not made the journey before, the site may offer me 
choices of different journey times, levels of comfort, etc., though from my stored parameters it knows 
how to reduce the set of possible choices to a manageable size. It also knows enough about my 
preferences to know what complementary services to propose (newspaper, breakfast, haircut…), and 
enough about my weaknesses to surprise me with the occasional special offer (“Armagnac, sir?”). 
Though as a traveler I am unaware of this, the site is operated by amazon.com under contract to DB. 
 
 
 
One of the unexpected consequences of the privatization and deregulation of the telecoms 
industry in the 1980s was the vigour with which telecoms operators embraced many dimensions of 
service competition - telephone handsets stopped being a clunky embarrassment and became a design 
item, for instance. There is every reason to think that complementary services are likely to become an 
increasing feature of competition in rail. 
 
 
4.3. Predation 
 
 
Naturally the more sophisticated pricing strategies become, and the greater the rewards of 
effective pricing through the presence of economies of density, the more reasonable it is to fear either 
that incumbent firms will use predatory pricing, or that firms will claim the presence of predation as a 
defence against legitimate but vigorous competition. Particularly in network industries, with huge 
fixed costs and some features of natural monopoly, predation can be a tempting practice for powerful 
firms (typically though not always incumbents) in order to induce the exit of rivals. 
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Briefly, the position of the authorities on these matters is as follows. In the USA the standard 
for decision in these cases (after the Brooke case, resolved by the Supreme Court in 1993) is to prove 
that the defendant: 
 
- Has priced below some measure of cost; 
- Has a good prospect of recouping its losses from predation after the exit from the market of 
the victim against whom the predation was aimed.  
 
The latter is a much more stringent condition to apply than the former, and has been very 
difficult to demonstrate in practice.  
 
 
4.3.1. What is the relevant measure of cost? 
 
 
There are two relevant measure of cost, for predatory purpose, Average Total Cost (ATC) and 
Average Variable Cost (AVC); the courts have increasingly being more inclined to apply the second 
threshold for predation purposes13. The choice of the standard can make a big difference in the case of 
railroads, since the variable cost of an extra passenger can be almost zero. This is why the measure is 
denominated average variable cost (include the cost of providing the service for all passengers, not just 
the extra passenger). 
 
In airlines, which is an industry with similar costs structure to railroads, the allegation of 
predation has been a common feature of the sector14. However, to date no carrier has been found guilty 
of predation. 
 
 
4.3.2. Department of Transportation (DOT) Guidelines. 
 
 
These recent guidelines for airlines, issued in 1998, advance a broader interpretation of 
predation. This practice is deemed not only to relate to price strategies but also to capacity levels. 
Therefore an incumbent can be blamed for predation if it expands output to a level that makes entry 
unprofitable for a carrier. 
 
 
4.3.3. European Union 
 
 
The European Court of Justice decision on ECS/AKZO chemie BV (in the chemical products 
industry) case established the doctrine on predation in the EU. AKZO was accused by ECS of pricing 
very aggressively in the main business line of ECS after the entry of the latter into a new segment of 
the market. 
 
In 1991, the European Court of Justice resolved that AKZO abused its dominant position by 
using predatory pricing. The rule was based on the fact that AKZO applied prices below Average 
Variable Cost (similar to the criteria employed in the USA). 
 
In a more recent decision, (UPS/Deutsche Post 2001)15 the European Commission found 
Deutsche Post guilty of using predatory pricing in the segment of parcels distribution. The 
Commission used the rule of Average Incremental Cost, which is an approximation of Long Run 
                                                          
13 Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (1999). 
14 Peltzman and Winston (2000). 
15 NERA (2001). 
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Marginal Cost, to judge whether prices were predatory or not. The decision was made on the basis that 
with current prices the firm could not cover its incremental cost over the following five years. 
 
This decision, in an industry that has some similarities with railroads (in the sense of universal 
service requirements and a multi-product firm) may be indicative of the criteria and the standard of 
cost to be applied to future cases in the railroad sector. The AIC could turn out to be a more or less 
stringent standard for proving predation that AVC (depending on the level of economies of scale), but 
the former measure, which is more looking forward, has been used also in natural monopoly pricing 
(especially in telecommunications). 
 
 
4.4. What is the likely outcome of on-track competition? 
 
 
 Here we try to draw together some of the threads of the preceding discussion by posing the 
question: what can be expected to happen to market shares under on-track competition, assuming 
equal access to any infrastructural facilities that have natural monopoly characteristics? In particular, 
does equal access imply that there are likely to be reasonably equal outcomes as measured by market 
share? And conversely, if outcomes are not equal will this imply a failure of equal access? The answer 
to these questions requires us to look at both the demand and the supply side of the industry.  
 
 
4.4.1. Demand 
 
 
The reaction of demand depends on the degree of differentiation between the services 
proposed by the incumbent and the entrants, and on any switching costs that may be incurred when 
moving from one provider to another. For occasional travelers, there is unlikely to be any switching 
cost and competition with newcomers will be tough. For frequent travelers, switching costs may be 
high and the incumbent will probably keep a large market share independently of cost considerations. 
An additional argument that implies increased switching costs comes from the network characteristics 
of passenger rail. Only few people would be able to travel point-to-point with a competitor. The 
majority of customers would have to change trains, partly using local transport as feed, partly using 
the incumbent.  
 
 Let iu  denote the utility of a passenger when travelling in a train operated by the incumbent 
and let ip  denote the fare. Absent any competitor, the incumbent can charge a price such that 
i iu p u− ≥  where u  is the net utility from alternative nodes. When there is an entry, to keep its 
clients the incumbent has to fix a price such that i i e eu p u p− ≥ −  where eu  and ep  are respectively 
the utility and the price of the service provided by the entrants (and assuming that entry is feasible, 
which means e eu p u− > ). The difference i eu u−  is the value of the incumbent’s advantages: the 
higher the switching costs, the larger this utility differential. For occasional travelers, i eu u=  so that 
i ep p≤  is necessary to keep these clients, which is feasible only if the incumbent has a cost 
advantage, that is when i ec c< .For frequent travelers, a tariff such that i i e ep u u c≤ − +  prevents any 
entry. Even if i ec c> , the switching cost i eu u− >0 allows the incumbent to cut the entrant 's price. 
  
Switching costs (natural or strategic) are a strong limitation to competition, as has been well 
documented in banking, telecommunications, electricity distribution, air transport and 
pharmaceuticals. As a consequence, incumbent firms will probably keep dominant market shares in 
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subsets of weakly flexible demand, and will lose shares in relatively contestable sub-markets (this may 
also be a consequence of natural utility advantages of remaining with incumbent suppliers). 
 
 
4.4.2. Supply 
 
 
 The nature of competition will also be determined by the nature of the costs faced by the 
entrant and the incumbent: this will affect how low a price each can afford to set in order to attract 
customers. Other things equal, the lower is the entrant’s cost of operations relative to that of the 
incumbent, the more intense will be the nature of price competition and therefore the higher the likely 
market share that the entrant can attract. 
 
 However, when the incumbent operates a network and the entrant competes only on point-to-
point routes, there is an important source of asymmetry induced by network effects. For the entrant, 
the marginal cost of an additional train full of passengers is the cost of running the train (including 
administrative costs), plus the access charge for the service. For the incumbent, the true marginal cost 
consists of the same elements as for the entrant16, plus an additional element (the opportunity cost), 
which is any additional net cost incurred on those connecting routes to which some of the passengers 
may subsequently transfer17. When transferring passengers in fact yield a profit on the connecting 
routes, this opportunity cost will be negative, and an incumbent’s true cost will lie below a 
conventionally-measured accounting measure of its costs of providing the service. Three consequences 
follow from this: 
 
i) First, in networks where connecting traffic is a comparatively large fraction of overall 
traffic (like Germany but unlike France, say), there will be fewer cherries for entrants to 
pick, i.e., there are relatively few connections with a high point-to-point demand. 
ii) Secondly, even when entrants appear to enjoy a cost advantage as normally measured, the 
opportunity-cost element will mean that the incumbent is a tougher competitor than this 
advantage would indicate (because it has an incentive to protect its connecting traffic). 
Where entrants do compete head-to head with incumbents their likely market share will be 
lower than conventional cost comparisons would lead us to predict. 
iii) Thirdly, it is likely that the Mohring effect (see Box 2 above) means that the opportunity 
cost element will become more important as the entrant’s market share increases, since the 
reduction in the value of frequency of service to passengers becomes progressively more 
important as the frequency itself declines. The cancellation of half the services is more 
costly to passengers if services previously ran every two hours than if they ran every 
fifteen minutes. This implies (see Figure 11) that not only will the incumbent’s true cost 
lie below its accounting cost, but it will be significantly more steeply sloped. Therefore 
even an entrant with a significant initial cost advantage will find that as it eats into the 
incumbent’s market share its cost advantage is progressively eroded. To put it another 
way, the eventual market share of the entrant is likely to be less sensitive to its initial cost 
advantage than if opportunity cost considerations did not play a role (in the figure 
equilibrium market shares are drawn where marginal costs of incumbent and entrant are 
equal). Without opportunity cost considerations, an entrant with an initial cost advantage 
could easily reach a large market share, but when opportunity costs matter its market share 
will be unlikely to become very large. 
                                                          
16 These same elements may of course have higher values for the incumbent, for instance if the incumbent faces 
diseconomies of complexity from running the network. 
17 This is similar in spirit to the opportunity cost calculation that underlies the Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
for access price regulation (sometimes called the Baumol-Willig rule). The difference here is that we are 
considering a complementarity between two services on both of which there is competition, rather than a 
complementarity between shared infrastructure with mandated access and a competitive downstream service. 
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(This argument assumes that an entrant’s services are not perceived by the passenger as 
contributing to the overall frequency of the service, perhaps because of non-transferability 
of tickets.). 
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Figure 11: Marginal passenger costs at different levels of entrant market share 
 
 
 The overall conclusions to be drawn from this line of reasoning are twofold. First, given the 
unavoidable asymmetry between a network operator and an entrant on point-to-point routes, it may be 
unlikely that effective competition will lead to large market shares for the entrant. This is not, 
however, to say that we can predict exactly how large such market shares will be, since circumstances 
will vary significantly from route to route. Secondly, the share of the incumbent will be larger the 
more polycentric the network and resulting effects are. Thirdly, this asymmetry is not a sign of a 
market regime failure. Fourthly, the opportunity costs of network traffic are genuine social costs, so 
that considering the “success” of competition purely in terms of the market shares gained by entrants 
on point-to-point routes would be seriously short-sighted. If these market shares come at the expense 
of disruptions in network connections they may well be symptoms of the failure of competition rather 
than its success. 
 
 Finally, an important point to note is that if the entrant has a significant cost advantage over 
the incumbent in providing the service, then the incumbent may have an interest in arranging 
interconnections so as to capture as much of the network traffic as it can. When the costs of 
interconnection can be avoided, so that passengers can easily switch operators to make through 
journeys, then the incumbent’s connecting services become complementary to the point-to-point 
services of the entrant. In these circumstances the incumbent may not only not be damaged, but may 
positively benefit from the cheap fares provided by the entrant, since these will increase demand for 
the through journey. 
 
 This leads naturally to the question how to judge the value of interconnections, which we take 
up in section 4.5. 
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4.5. The value of interconnections and its relevance for horizontal integration decisions 
 
 
 The advantages of joint production as compared with separated production are typically 
considered to arise in the presence of “economies of scope”. Specifically, if a quantity aq  of product 
a  and a quantity bq  of product b  are to be produced, it is less costly to produce them within the same 
firm, i.e., 
( , ) ( ,0) (0, )a b a bC q q C q C q< + . 
 
These economies of scope are explained in terms of 
 
- better organization and coordination; 
- simultaneous use of “public” inputs (e.g. data bases). 
 
It is certainly true, on the other hand, that too much diversification can impair the development 
of a firm and create some social inefficiencies. All synergies have their limits - as shown by the recent 
failure of the merger between AOL and Time Warner. Nevertheless, even if 
( , ) ( ,0) (0, )a b a bC q q C q C q> +  is a necessary condition for separation to be desirable, it is by no 
means a sufficient condition.  
 
The first reason is the way costs are evaluated in networks. Suppose an elementary transport 
network made of two segments as in Figure 12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Two-segment transportation network 
 
 
The infrastructure is made of three nodes and two lines, and there are six products:  
 
- transport from 1 to 2 and back; 
- transport from 2 to 3 and back; 
- transport from 1 to 3 and back. 
 
Suppose that the infrastructure cost is clearly evaluated and a fair fee is to be calculated for an 
entrant who wants to compete with the incumbent on line a . What is the accounting cost of using only 
line a ? Does it include all the costs of node 2 or only the costs of arriving at node 2? Are the costs of 
connecting arrival (from node 1) equipment and departure (to node 3) equipment to be included or 
not? If these interconnection costs (which include not just physical equipment costs but planning and 
organizational costs) are not included in the accounting cost of operating line a , there is no reason to 
include them in the accounting cost of operating lineb . Consequently, they are taken into account 
only if a firm provides the whole trip from 1 to 3 and, for this reason, even when there are economies 
of scope it can easily appear that 
 
( , ) ( ,0) (0, )a b a bC q q C q C q> + . 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3Line a Line b
qa qb 
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 So, we see that accounting rules badly adapted to the specificity of networks can result in a 
false interpretation in terms of efficiency. 
 
The second reason is that efficiency on the supply side is not the only relevant consideration. 
What about travellers’ utility? Interconnection, compatibility, “one-click” registering, etc. are highly 
valued by passengers. These extra services plus the indirect externalities due to the installation of 
interconnectors18 have the consequence that utility functions are super-additive: 
 
( , ) ( ,0) (0, )a b a bU q q U q U q> + . 
 
 Indeed, passengers are less tired and stressed when they can go through one single operator for 
a two-stage trip than if they have to wait and register two times, to handle their bagages at the 
intermediary node, etc. 
 
 For this reason, the true test for disintegration should be: 
 
[ ] [ ]( , ) ( , ) ( ,0) ( ,0) (0, ) (0, )a b a b a a b bU q q C q q U q C q U q C q>− − + −< . 
  
When the net utility from an integrated structure is higher than the net utility from a 
disintegrated structure, disentangling would be socially wasteful. 
 
 To a certain extent, on-track competition can allow the preferences of travellers to be revealed 
directly, since they may face a direct choice between a (possibly more expensive) through service and 
a (possibly cheaper) service that requires changing operators. But once again, this suggests a reason 
why on-track competition may lead to relatively low market shares for entrants, even when it is 
working well. 
                                                          
18 The more numerous the passengers who use the interconnectors are, the higher are the incentives for the 
operator to develop them and to upgrade their quality. 
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5. MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN THE INDUSTRY 
 
5.1. Ideal measures of performance 
 
 
Most economic analysis would begin from the assumption that the appropriate and 
theoretically rigorous measure of performance by which to judge railway reforms would be some 
measure of consumer and producer surplus, with room for argument over the appropriate weight to be 
placed on these two components. In principle, demand analysis should allow for the estimation of 
changes in consumer surplus after a change in prices and service quantities and other characteristics. 
There are certain well-known issues that arise in such contexts (such as index number problems, 
including the choice between so-called compensating and equivalent variation measures of welfare 
changes), but in principle the methodological issues as reasonably clear-cut. Such demand analysis 
essentially computes a money value for the changes in service characteristics, using data on past 
consumer choices to reveal how much consumers appear to have valued the characteristics in question. 
Such methods have been used in ex post analyses of reform in a number of industries (see Morrison 
and Winston, 1986, for the airline industry). 
 
In practice, however, data are often not available in sufficient detail to compute measures of 
surplus. And when they are available they are often available only with a lag, which means that 
policy-making, by regulators, politicians, or executives of the firms themselves, typically requires 
measures of performance that are rapidly available and intuitively comprehensible. Such measures 
typically fall into two main groups, as section 5.2 now describes. 
 
 
5.2. Practical measures of performance 
 
 
Practical evaluation of performance in the passenger transport industry typically uses one of 
two approaches: 
 
1) Various measures can be calculated of characteristics of the industry (output per person, 
profits, punctuality, reduction of public subsidy, for instance), and these can be presented 
without any explicit effort being made to aggregate or compare them. This then allows for 
a debate to occur as to the appropriate weight to be placed on any of these proposed 
measures. 
2) Measures can be aggregated into indices that are argued on theoretical grounds to capture 
the appropriate weights of different components in some suitable measure of social 
welfare. Often such aggregation is partial (total factor productivity indices, for instance, 
measure technical efficiency but not allocative efficiency). 
 
Table 16 presents some measures of the first kind, drawn from the European SORT IT project 
which has analysed data made available by the UIC (Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer). Note 
that the characterisation of the firms as state-controlled or commercial is due to SORT-IT and may not 
capture the most important governance characteristics. 
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Table 16: Comparison of European Rail Operators (1994 and 1997)  
 
State-Controlled 
Firms 
Operating Performance Commercial Performance Financial Performance 
 Vehicle Kms/ 
Number of Staff 
Traffic Units/ 
Vehicle Kms 
Total Revenue/ 
Total Cost 
 
VR Finland  
SNCF France 
DB Germany 
CH Greece 
CP Portugal 
RENFE Spain 
CFL Luxem. 
1994 
2.540 
2.747 
2.694 
1.060 
2.449 
3.746 
2.416 
 
1997 
 
(3.059) 
(3.120) 
(3.593) 
(1.722) 
(3.711) 
(4.536) 
(2.539) 
1994 
301 
224 
150 
144 
195 
151 
129 
 
1997 
(304) 
(225) 
(158) 
(119) 
(140) 
(167) 
(121) 
1994 
0.87 
0.50 
0.40** 
0.17 
0.37 
0.36 
0.29 
 
1997 
(0.81) 
(0.44) 
(0.74) 
(0.13) 
(0.38) 
(0.44) 
na 
Mean 2.522  (298)* 185  (23.1)* 0.42 (0.84)**** 
Commercial Firms 
 
OBB Austria 
SNCB Belgium 
DSB Denmark 
CIE Ireland 
FS Italy 
NS Netherland 
NSB Norway 
SJ  Sweden 
CFFSwitzerl. 
BR U.K. 
1994 
2.170 
2.355 
3.866 
2.773 
2.256 
4.435 
3.862 
4.926 
3.516 
3.017 
 
1997 
(2.505) 
(2.560) 
na 
na 
(2.876) 
(4.674) 
 (2.580) 
 (8.990) 
 (3.758) 
na 
1994 
163 
163 
132 
134 
222 
147 
137 
252 
165 
120 
 
1997 
(167) 
(159) 
(112) 
(89) 
(210) 
(147) 
(150) 
(237) 
(175) 
na 
1994 
0.38 
0.21 
0.45 
0.79 
0.44 
0.54 
0.39 
0.42 
0.46 
0.74*** 
 
1997 
(0.39) 
(0.30) 
(0.89) 
na 
(0.29) 
(0.41) 
(0.75) 
(0.51) 
(0.44) 
na 
Mean 3.318  (302)* 164 (13.3)* 0.48  (0.054)*** 
Notes: 
*   Standard deviation of the mean.     na – not available.  
** The DB figure is for 1993, since the financial statistics for the newly merged DB AG appear to be 
inconsistent with previous years. 
*** The BR figure is for 1993, since the statistics didn’t take into account the huge increases in track access 
charges levied by Railtrack in 1994. 
Source: Shires (1998). 
 
 
 However, closer investigation reveals that the distinction between these two types of measure 
is less sharp than it first appears. The measures in Table 16 are already aggregates to some degree – 
for instance, “traffic units” is the arithmetic sum of passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres using 
an arbitrary one-to-one weighting. In more explicit aggregation exercises19, we would expect the index 
of aggregation of different outputs to be weighted by the revenue share of each product. Such a 
measure would show more passenger-dedicated firms to have a higher commercial performance, since 
the average price of a passenger-km is between 40 to 419 times the average price of a ton-km (see 
Table 2). So, the index reported in the second column of Table 16 has an important distortion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Oum, Waters and Yu (1999). 
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Table 17: Sources of distortion in aggregation of traffic units 
 
Country Passenger-km as a percentage of 
total traffic units 
Ratio of average passenger tariff over 
average freight rate20 
Sweden 
Austria 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Netherlands 
Greece 
24 
40 
47 
48 
55 
61 
69 
69 
72 
84 
84 
419 
103 
224 
119 
126 
121 
157 
157 
82 
169 
40 
Source: See Thompson (1997).  
 
A second reason for caution is that factor productivity indices in network industries are highly 
dependent on exogenous network characteristics (such as length of track or network configuration). 
Scale and density factors have been highly significant as we noted in section 2.3. Therefore, the 
comparison of gross productivity measures like those in Table 16 omits important characteristics that 
should not be overlooked in assessing the performance of the firms in question.  
 
We therefore present some measures of the second kind, namely explicit aggregate indices. 
The report of the Australian Productivity Commission published indicators of total factor productivity 
(TFP) for combined freight and passenger services for rail systems in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, 
USA, Canada and Japan. TFP measures the global productivity of firms taking in account all the 
inputs and outputs. The methodology employed is DEA -Data Envelope Analysis (Charnes et al., 
1978)- which ranks the productivity of the different companies respect to the best practice case (to 
whom is given the value = 1.0). The indicators of productivity calculated are Global Productivity 
(which takes into account the entire factors affecting productivity) and Technical Efficiency (TFP 
adjusted for an output size effect). As we can observe in table 18, the values and the position in the 
ranking change when we change the estimator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Average rate =  passenger (freight)revenue/ passenger (Ton) - km 
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Table 18: Global productivity and technical efficiency measures for European operators 
 
 
Rank 
  
Global Productivity 
 
Rank 
 
Technical Efficiency 
     
1 Netherlands 0.52 1 Ireland 1.00 
2 Ireland 0.41 2 Luxembourg 1.00 
3 Sweden 0.38 3 Norway 0.74 
4 France 0.38 4 Netherlands 0.68 
5 Spain 0.38 5 Portugal 0.63 
6 Finland 0.35 6 Denmark 0.60 
7 U.K. (94) 0.34 7 Sweden 0.47 
8 Portugal 0.33 8 Finland 0.45 
9 Italy 0.32 9 Spain 0.43 
10 Switzerland 0.32 10 U.K. 0.43 
11 Germany 0.31 11 France 0.39 
12 Norway 0.31 12 Switzerland 0.38 
13 Denmark (95) 0.28 13 Italy 0.33 
14 Austria 0.25 14 Germany 0.32 
15 Belgium 0.20 15 Austria 0.27 
16 Luxembourg 0.20 16 Belgium 0.24 
Notes: Productivity Measure for Combined Passenger and Freight Services Using Data Envelopment Analysis 
Methodology (The base year is 1997 unless otherwise stated). 
Source: Productivity Commission Report 1999, Australia 
 
 
 Table 19, by contrast, presents results of an explicit econometric estimation of costs of rail 
operation, drawn from Cantos. These differ from those in Table 18 in two main ways. First, they use 
cost-minimization rather than output maximization (given inputs) as a criterion of technical efficiency, 
and although one implies the other when all firms face the same parametric prices, this last assumption 
may not characterize the effective environment for the rail operators under investigation. Secondly, 
they use parametric regression techniques which have the disadvantage of requiring explicit functional 
forms but the advantage of being less vulnerable to errors and omitted heterogeneity in the data. 
 
 The table shows by how much the cost of various operators exceed those of the SNCF once 
different output characteristics have been controlled for. The data are a panel of 12 countries and 17 
years (1974-1990). All the values are statistically significant at 5%. 
 
 
Table 19: Intercepts of cost function for different European operators 
 
Country  Dummy Estimation Standard Error t-statistic 
DB 0.522 0.099 5.273 
SJ-BJ 1.064 0.522 2.038 
RENFE 1.251 0.468 2.673 
BR 1.263 0.339 3.726 
FS 1.529 0.371 4.121 
NSB 1.666 0.742 2.245 
VR 1.709 0.684 2.499 
NS 1.970 0.758 2.599 
DSB 1.997 0.781 2.557 
OBB 2.263 0.673 3.363 
SNCB 2.302 0.738 3.119 
Source: Cantos (2001). 
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In principle, under reasonably competitive conditions, productivity measures (whether output 
or cost-based) should give a fairly reliable indication of likely benefits to consumers. However, when 
there is monopoly power, productivity gains may not be passed on to consumers but be taken as profit 
by the shareholders of the firms. Conversely, when there are public subsidies, variations in the level of 
public support may have an impact on consumer welfare independently of the evolution of 
productivity.  
 
 We now consider briefly the evidence linking performance to competition. 
 
 
5.3. How is performance related to competition? 
 
 
Identifying the possible influences of competition on firm performance is not easy. Even if the 
degree of competition it faces has no direct causal influence on the behaviour of any individual firm, it 
may be that more competitive market environments see a faster replacement of relatively inefficient by 
relatively efficient firms. In this case, a correlation emerges over time between a measure of 
competition at industry level and the average efficiency of those firms that survive. Even if survival as 
such is not differentially affected, the degree of competition may affect how large a share of output is 
occupied by the products of relatively efficient firms. In short, competition may work not just through 
incentives but also through selection (see Carlin, Haskel and Seabright, 2001). 
 
In fact it is quite likely that competition does have a direct influence on behaviour via 
incentives, but economic models show that the effect may be ambiguous. One example of ambiguity 
comes from Willig’s (1987) model, in which he demonstrates two offsetting effects of increased 
competition on the incentives for managers to exert effort. Whilst increased competition makes profits 
more sensitive to managerial effort, it also depresses demand for the firm’s output, which dampens 
profits and hence blunts the incentive.  
 
In the innovation literature, there are models that suggest that more competition is good for 
innovation and others that highlight a hump-shaped relationship, in which a moderate degree of 
competition is better than either monopoly or intense competition. For reasons first suggested by 
Schumpeter and recently analyzed more formally by others (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, for 
example), some degree of prior market power may be important in providing firms with sufficient 
retained earnings to finance investment. Moreover, the prospect of some future profits may be 
essential to ensure that current retained earnings are indeed invested instead of wasted. Other variants 
stress a monotonic relationship with greater competition inducing productivity growth. For example, 
the emergence of new competitors threatens the temporary monopoly profits from innovation and 
increases the incentive of the incumbents to shorten the innovation cycle (Aghion, Dewatripont and 
Rey, 1997). However, many models stress that at least some degree of competition is necessary to 
enable managers to be given adequate performance incentives (see Meyer and Vickers, 1997), though 
there may be one or two particular industries where the natural monopoly characteristics of the 
technology override incentive considerations. The controversy arises mainly over whether competition 
continues to be beneficial for incentives once a small number of competitors are already present. 
 
Empirical support for the role of competition as a spur to performance comes from recent 
econometric research using a variety of performance measures. For instance, Blundell et al. (1995) use 
numbers of innovations as a measure. The results are consistent with those of a quite different 
methodology (bench-marking using case studies) in which Baily and Gersbach (1995) found that 
“head-to-head” competition in the same market resulted in faster innovation in several manufacturing 
industries. Nickell (1996) controls for industry level concentration and import concentration and tests 
whether a firm-level measure of competition is correlated with performance. He finds that indicators 
of competitive pressure at firm level are significantly related to the level and growth of total factor 
productivity. In an empirical study of entry thresholds, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) found that most of 
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the competitive impact from entry comes from the first two entrants to challenge a monopolist, with 
the effect levelling out once the number of market participants is around five. Other results come from 
industry studies (Kwoka, 1996; Neven and Roeller, 1996; Ng and Seabright, 2001), from cross-
sectoral surveys (Carlin et al., 2002) or from economy-wide studies using indices to proxy for 
competitive effects across a range of sectors (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2002).   
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6. REGULATION 
 
6.1. Different regimes around the world 
 
 
The table in Appendix 6 provides a comprehensive description of regulatory regimes in a large 
number of countries. The main important dimensions along which regimes differ are the following: 
 
i) Ownership: Are operators privately or publicly owned (or both)? 
ii) Integration: Are operators vertically and/or horizontally disintegrated? 
iii) Price regulation: Are operators free to set some or all fares? 
iv) Yardstick regulation: to the extent that operators are regulated, is comparison between 
operators an explicit component of the regulatory contract? 
v) Competition for the market: Do operators compete for the exclusive right to operate 
services on infrastructure for a certain period of time? 
vi) Competition in the market: Do operators compete by sharing tracks? 
 
Broadly speaking five different kinds of regime appear to have evolved: 
 
i) A regime with privatization, vertical integration, regional disintegration and yardstick 
regulation (seen in Japan, where inter-modal competition is weak). 
ii) A regime with privatization, vertical integration, regional disintegration and no regulation 
(seen in the USA, Australia and New Zealand, in all of which inter-modal competition is 
strong). 
iii) A regime with privatization, vertical disintegration, regional disintegration, price 
regulation and competition for the market (the UK). 
iv) A regime with continued state ownership (to date), vertical and regional integration, no 
price regulation, the introduction of competition in the market for inter-city travel, and 
competition for the market in suburban travel (Sweden and Germany). 
v) A regime with continued state ownership (to date), vertical and regional integration, no 
price regulation but no attempts to introduce competition (France and Spain). 
 
It will be important to consider to what extent the different regimes represent alternative 
visions of the nature of rail transport, rather than adaptations to the different circumstances of each 
country. 
 
 
6.2. Messages from the case studies 
 
 
Bearing in mind the principles of competition in rail transport that were outlined earlier in this 
document, it seems reasonable to draw the following conclusions from the case studies: 
 
i) The comparatively light regulation seen in the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand appears to be due to the intensity of inter-modal competition. Rail has very 
small market share, and consequently no temptation for commercially-run railway 
operators simply to exploit short-run monopoly power. 
ii) The apparent effectiveness of rail reorganization in Japan is due in no small measure to 
the use of strict yardstick regulation of fare-setting, made necessary by the weak degree 
of inter-modal competition in Japan and the consequent temptations of monopoly 
power. 
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iii) In Europe where inter-modal competition is intermediate in strength, it is doubtful 
whether parallel monopoly with vertical integration as in Australia would be enough to 
ensure successful rail performance, since most estimates indicate that inter-modal 
demand elasticities are small, at least in the short run. However, significant uncertainty 
remains about the appropriate elements of a suitable regulatory framework. The 
alternatives to Japanese yardstick regulation appear to involve either partial vertical 
disintegration with on-track competition, or complete vertical disintegration with 
contractual franchising (otherwise known as “competition for the market”). 
iv) On-track competition may have a significant effect on increasing the incentives of 
incumbents to cut costs and improve services, though it is highly unlikely that entrants 
will succeed in establishing large market shares. Entrants will tend to be low-cost 
operators (necessarily so because of their lack of network advantages). As the German 
experiences have indicated, their presence will be seen on certain routes with high 
point-to-point traffic, not over the whole of the network. Nor, in view of the value of 
network connectivity, is it particularly desirable that it should. 
v) The UK experience illustrates the high importance of a clear and consistent regulatory 
framework, with a single regulatory responsibility and avoidance of frequent changes in 
the rules. The question whether it also indicates fundamental flaws in the franchising 
system is less clear since so many other changes have been simultaneously 
implemented. 
vi) The long-run coordination of investment and service provision is also essential if 
competition in railways is not to lead to a collapse in infrastructure investment (as in the 
UK example). This does not in itself imply that vertical disintegration should be 
avoided, but that mechanisms for achieving coordination (including possible long-term 
contracts) may need to be put in place. 
 
The question of whether a tendering system (as in the UK) is preferable to a system of open 
access or on-track competition (as in Germany) is difficult to answer on the basis of case-study 
evidence. The one country where tendering has been tried systematically for inter-city traffic (the UK) 
is also one where so many other regulatory changes took place at the same time that it is hard to judge 
whether the evident failures of the experiment (including the bankruptcy of railtrack) reveal anything 
about the merits or defect of tendering at all. Nevertheless, on the basis of some general considerations 
we can set out one or two likely advantages of tendering and open access, even if the precise 
magnitude of these advantages awaits further experience and research. 
 
 
6.2.1. Advantages of tendering 
 
 
i) Long term contracts are possible between the infrastructure operator and the service 
operators (up to the limit of the franchise length), including investment commitments. 
ii) Franchise contracts can specify characteristics of services (frequency, punctuality targets 
etc) – but: policy failure versus market failure. 
iii) Franchisees are able to provide services in whole geographical regions and thereby 
internalize more of the relevant network externalities than are open-access entrants on 
point-to-point services. 
 
 
6.2.2. Advantages of open access 
 
 
i) A single network operator can optimize network functioning as a whole in order to 
internalize the externalities due to flows of connecting traffic. 
ii) Competition is not influenced by arbitrary boundaries between franchise areas. 
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iii) Competition on the same track has a much more direct and immediate constraining effect 
upon market power than the prospect of losing a franchise at some point in the future. 
iv) Planning of services is based on entrepreneurial decisions with flexibility of entry and 
exit. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the precise degree to which these advantages matter in 
practice depends on the specificities of the case in ways that we still need to understand. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This survey has considered and summarized a large volume of both theoretical and empirical 
material on the nature of competition in rail transport. We conclude by emphasizing two key points.  
 
First, railways are not like any other industry, not even any other network industry. Their 
technology has changed much more slowly than in telecoms, they face much greater economies of 
density than electricity, their investment and operations decisions require much closer co-ordination 
than in air transport, the coordination of different operations is significantly more complex than in 
other networks, and they have more substitutes in the lives of consumers than the services of other 
network industries. 
 
Secondly, and in consequence, the fact that we still have limited evidence about the results of 
different regulatory reforms in the industry should make us double cautious. It is too early to be sure 
what works best – and mechanically applying solutions that appear to have worked elsewhere may be 
very ill-advised. The next few years will doubtless provide much fascinating evidence and experience 
to guide both policy and research. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE SWEDISH CASE 
 
The restructuring of Swedish Railroads began with the 1988 Transportation Act. The 
motivation of the reform was to increase productivity and address the lack of investment in the 
service. Additionally, the integrated publicly-owned monopolist was losing a lot of money.  
 
 
The New Industry Structure 
 
The new configuration of the market is characterized by the vertical separation between 
infrastructure provision and train services, and also by the horizontal disaggregation of the train 
business in trunk system (intercity services) and county areas (local services).  
 
 
Vertical Separation 
A state agency, Banverket (BV), owns the infrastructure and has the responsibility for 
investment and maintenance of the track as well as for service scheduling and safety regulation. This 
firm charges train companies an access fee equal to the marginal social cost of usage. There is no goal 
of full recovery cost of infrastructure. This policy, which is also used for road tolls in Sweden, is close 
to first best pricing, though not exactly equal to it since marginal social cost does not cover future 
infrastructure investment. 
 
The main train operator company (SJ) runs passenger and freight services. It has the 
exclusivity of service in the trunk system and is also present in the county areas. This company, 
though state owned, has to operate under commercial basis, receiving no subsides from the state. 
  
 
Horizontal Disaggregation 
The trunk system corresponds to the national network, which is served by the incumbent SJ in 
the profitable segments under exclusivity with no regulation of prices. In the non-profitable routes, the 
service is allocated through tendering process under lower subsidy criteria.  
 
The county areas are under the jurisdiction of the local authority. They franchise the service 
through competitive bids. In some cases local authorities own the rolling stock and franchise the 
operation and maintenance. This reduces the entry barriers to potential providers different from SJ. 
However, only few cases of successful entry have occurred. 
 
 
Competition 
 
At the time being, competition has occurred through franchising in the local services and non-
profitable trunk routes. For the rest of the trunk system, some form of competition is expected to occur 
in the near future.  
 
The experience has not led to much entry, with the incumbent operator winning almost all the 
franchises. One entrant, BK-Tag, has managed to obtain a contract in two cases. This may reveal the 
advantage of SJ in terms of economies of scope and scale, but also it may raise suspicions about anti-
competitive behavior from the part of the main operator. In 1993, BK- Tag complained of a predatory 
offer from the part of the incumbent in a franchise. The Swedish Competition Authority considered 
that the incumbent had abused its dominant position in the industry by making a predatory offer (under 
variable cost), thereby infringing article 19 of the Swedish Competition Act.  
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The decision was intended to be based on the criteria employed in the AKZO case (AKZO 
Chemie BV vs Commision July 3, 1991), where the price is deemed predatory if it is below average 
variable cost. Since it was not possible to define which costs were fixed and which variable, finally the 
judgment was based in the fact that the bid was too low to cover all the cost of providing the service. 
 
Quoting OECD (1998): 
 
“The authority concluded that the Swedish State Railways – due to its dominant position in the 
market with greater financial resources including the posibility of cross subsidiation and its previous 
legal monopoly – has a strong responsibility not to behave in a way detrimental to the competition on 
the market and thereby preventing potential competitors from entering this market”. 
 
The outcome of the investigation was an injunction against SJ with damages claim of 30 
Million Kronas (3 Million USD) for using predatory pricing. The affected firm appealed to the 
national court. 
 
 
 
Outcomes of the rail reform 
 
Decrease in Subsidies 
 
In the non-profitable inter-regional lines, allocated through competitive franchises, the 
subsidies required to operate have decreased by 20% to 30% with respect to the previous level (OECD 
1998). Franchises at the local level have also produced a decrease in subsidies of between 20% and 
40% (Shires et al. 1999a). 
 
 
Commercial and Operational Performance 
 
SJ, the main train operating company, turned the operating loss of US$ 122 million in 1988 
into a profit of US$ 72 million in 1995 (Anders Lundberg, 1996 JRTR). However, it should be borne 
in mind that in 1988 SJ was in charge of passenger and infrastructure operations, while in 1995 it ran 
only passenger and freight services.  
 
The SORT IT study (Shires et al. 1999b)., using a non-parametric index analysis, reported that 
operational costs had been reduced by 10% after vertical separation in Sweden. Fares declined from 11 
US cents per passenger km in 1990 to 7.9 cents in 1999. 
 
 
Market share  
 
Table A1 shows that Swedish railways have gained market share in the 1990s, in contrast to 
the European average case where rail continued to lose market share. 
 
For intercity travel (more than 100 km) railroads had a share of 13% in 2001 of which the 
incumbent, SJ, had 90% (SJ Annual Report 2001). In 1995 the rail market share was only 10% 
(OECD1998). 
 
After cars, railroads have the largest market share of domestic travel, with close competition 
from airlines. The latter mode dominates for trips over 500 km. On the busy route Stockolm – 
Gothenburg the market split is almost 50-50. 
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Table A1: Rail Passenger Traffic (Billion of pkm) in Sweden and Rail Market Share  
 
    1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
                  
Traffic 10E9 pkm 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.4
Sweden  % 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.4
Europe % 6.7 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.1
                  
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2002). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The restructuring of Swedish railroads appears successful when considered in terms of better 
productivity, lower cost and increasing market share achieved in the post reform period; though a 
rigorous ex post evaluation has yet to be conduted. The new structure of the industry has also 
accomplished a better allocation of public subsidies in the sector. This is a case where the success 
comes not from the change of ownership (privatization), but from a good design of market structure 
with clear objectives and incentives for the firms being created. 
 
It is not so clear, though, that the result has much to do with introducing competition in the 
traditional sense of the term. Although in long distance routes, railroads face non-regulated 
competition from other modes (bus, coach and airlines), within the rail sector there have been no clear 
challenges to the incumbent. If the authorities want to encourage competition, some actions like 
extending franchise periods or leasing rolling stock to entrants may need to be undertaken. Other more 
drastic measures may include restricting the incumbent from participating in licenses or the division of 
the incumbent into two or more train operating companies. However it is not clear that the existence of 
several providers in different routes will guarantee a better outcome in terms of prices and quality of 
service. 
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APPENDIX 2: THE JAPANESE CASE  
 
In 1987, the Japanese Railroads JNR was drastically reorganized. The nationwide, state owned 
enterprise was split into six regional passenger firms and one national freight company. Over the 
subsequent years a process of privatization was begun. It has still not been completed, though the last 
remaining government stake in the largest company, East Japan Railways, was sold in the summer of 
2002. The main goal pursued with this measure, as in other countries, was to reduce the state subsidies 
in the sector as well as to improve the productivity and efficiency of the service. 
 
In Japan, railroads have always played a relevant role in the passenger transportation sector 
(27.3% of the travel share in 1998)21 mainly due to the high population density of the country. Before 
the privatization, JNR already competed with several private railroads in urban travel and with airlines 
for medium distance travel (high-speed lines). 
 
 
The key aspects of the Japanese model 
 
Horizontal Separation  
A nation wide company was considered too big for being efficiently managed. Six regional 
firms were created, in basis of geographical as well as cost-minimizing and whole-network self-
financing criteria. With this subdivision the 95% of the trips are completed inside the network of each 
company. 
 
Vertical Integration 
The new firms own the track and provides the passenger transportation service. This allows 
economies of coordination between both activities and also entry into non-rail business (housing 
development, shopping, etc) which may allow internalization of the positive externalities created by 
the train service. The option of on-track competition was not considered as the best one since regional 
firms face already competition from private railways, which have their own track, and also from 
airlines for medium distance travel. 
 
Functional Separation 
Freight was considered a separate business with respect to passenger transportation. Freight 
companies utilize the regional firms’ track by paying marginal cost of usage. 
 
Yardstick Competition 
Although regional firms do not compete with each other in their respective areas, there is 
indirect competition through performance. Using the concept of yardstick competition the regulator 
uses performance indicators of the firms in order to set the appropriate rates. As it is shown below, 
since privatization, average fares have decreased for four of the firms. 
 
In the spirit of providing more management autonomy to new firms, the regulatory burden 
over firms was alleviated. Rail firms now count on more flexibility for setting investments, itineraries, 
frequencies, and other business decisions.  
 
Evaluation of the reform 
 
Based on the goals proposed by the authorities, the outcome of the restructuring can be 
considered as a success. Consumers have gained in terms of lower prices, better quality and safety. 
Rail firms have been able to match the increasing demand in terms of capacity and product 
                                                          
21 For Europe, the share of rail transport is around 7% 
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differentiation. The state has reduced the transfers and firms have also improved productivity, which 
has allowed them to have operating profits and also to reduce their heavy inherited debt levels. 
 
 
Table A2: Performance change between 1987 and 1998 (Values correspond to percentage change 
respect to 1987) 
 
Item 
 
Large Private 
Operator 
JR East JR 
Central 
JR 
West 
JR 
Hokkaio 
JR 
Shikoku 
JR 
Kyushu 
Average Fare 
 
29.3 -8.4 -2.0 -7.9 -3.1 6.1 2.6 
Demand 
 
1.8 20.7 18.0 16.9 15.8 8.5 8.0 
Labor  
Productivity. 
27.7 52.7 12.7 45.1 68.3 65.2 94.5 
Average  
Operating Cost 
-0.1 -3.5 -25.9 -11.1 -33.1 -22.0 -25.8 
Accident Rate 
 
-41.2 -68.2 -76.0 -43.0 -60.8 -60.8 -46.0 
Source: Mizutani and Nakamura (2001). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is not clear how much of the Japanese success is due to the change of ownership plus a 
better design of subsidies, or to the market organization chosen in term of vertical and horizontal 
industry structuring.  
The distinctive feature of this case is the choice of industrial organization. In the trade-off of vertical 
structure the loss of economies of coordination mattered more than the forgone gains of on-track 
competition. However competition is already present through the existence of private rail operators. 
Therefore, the high density of the network means the track is no longer considered an “essential 
facility”, and it is economically feasible to have competition among vertically integrated structures. 
Horizontal separation is an indirect way to channel competition via relative performance regulation 
(yardstick competition).  
 
Finally, it is not clear which elements of this experience are suitable for translation to other 
countries, whose conditions of demand and geography are not the same as in Japan. European 
countries have in general lower traffic density, as is shown in Table A3 below. However competition 
from other modes cannot be ignored.  
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Figure A1: Areas Served by the six regional companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Traffic density for European and Japanese carriers (1995) 
 
Firm Density 
Pass-train km/km per year 
 
BR (UK) 
SJ (Sweden) 
SNCF (France) 
NS (Holland) 
JR (Japan) 
 
 
24.855 
10.258 
14.108 
34.610 
38.801 
 
JR corresponds to the six regional networks. 
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APPENDIX 3:  THE NEW ZEALAND CASE  
 
The reform of the railroad industry in New Zealand was motivated by the poor commercial 
performance of the state-owned company. 
 
This reform was part of the global change in the freight transport industry in the country. The 
freight transport was deregulated in the mid-1980 in terms of eliminating price–fixing and exclusivity 
of operation for railroads in some routes. The rail company was then privatized in 1993 as a vertically 
integrated operator. The objective pursued was to make this integrated rail firm compete with road and 
ship transportation in a deregulated environment. 
 
There exist rights of access to the rail network but in a very restrictive way, in the sense that 
the access does not allow any interference with the normal operation of the rail company. There was 
no intention from the government to create or encourage on-track competition. 
 
The outcome of the reform appears strongly positive under most reasonable measures. The 
company has returned to profitability, there has been an increase in productivity and rail market share 
and also users have been benefited due to the decrease in freight tariffs. 
 
A Cost-Benefit study has estimated the welfare gains of the reform between 5.4 to 9.8 Billion 
USD. Taxpayers have been the main winner because they have not longer to provide public funds 
since 1993. Rail operators have not gained extra-normal profits compared with a diversified portfolio. 
 
The case is of less relevance to DB than the others because it was confined to freight transport. 
Nevertheless, it indicates that vertical integration may be compatible with an efficient performance by 
a privatized company even in the absence of on-track competition, provided intra-model competition 
is strong enough. 
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APPENDIX 4: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE  
 
The restructuring of Australian railroads is an on going process that started in 1990. Since 
then, several reforms in firms’ governance, industry structure and regulation have been accomplished. 
 
 
Characteristics of the Network 
 
The Australian network is 43100 km long. The intensity of use is not comparable with those of 
European countries, which have a much higher population and network density as well (France rail 
network is around 35.000 km long). These facts make the use of a private car the privileged mode of 
transport even for urban trips. 
 
The rail system can be divided into: 
- The Urban Network is extended around big cities in the South. This network faces strong 
competition from other modes, especially private cars. Rail urban transport counts for 
around 4.0% of the market. 
- The Non-urban Network includes Regional and Interstate lines. This system links the big 
cities with the inland areas. It is mostly used for freight. The market share of passenger 
travel has declined from 10% in 1970 to less than 2% in 1995. This transport market is 
dominated mostly by car travel (71%) and air (19%). 
 
 
First Steps in the Reform 
 
At the beginning of nineties, the railroads were state-owned and vertical and horizontally 
integrated at the level of geographical-political jurisdictions (States). The national government owned 
and operated the interstate line in passenger and freight and also some freight services within some 
jurisdictions. 
 
The reforms in terms of industry configuration and operation were dissimilar across the states. 
Figure A2 presents a summary of the new structure of Australian railroads in 1999. 
 
The more interesting cases are: 
 
In New South Wales (NSW) services were horizontal and vertically separated. Four entities 
were created: 
 
- Rail Access Corporation. Owns the track of the inter and intrastate network. 
- Freight Corp. For freight train operations. 
- Rail Services Authority. Provides Maintenance services. 
- SRA. Provides urban and inter-urban passenger services. 
 
In Victoria the service was horizontally separated. The freight business was separated from 
passenger service and privatized in 1999. The passenger transport remains vertically integrated, but it 
was separated in one non-urban and two urban services. These contracts were allocated to private 
operators through competitive tenders. The franchise terms include length of the license, investment 
commitment, maximum fare, and subsidy due by the authority among other things.  
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Figure A2: Australian railroad reform 
 
 
Table A4: Urban and non-urban passenger franchises in Victoria 
 
Franchise Contract 
Length 
Years 
Subsidy in 
2000-01 
M$ 
Investment 
 
M$ 
 
Bay side Trains 
Hillside Trains 
V/Line Passenger 
 
15 
15 
10 
 
 
83 
91 
78 
 
640 
490 
165 
 
 
Access to the Infrastructure 
There is no uniform access policy. The flexibility in decisions reflects a wish to grant access 
only when this is likely to increase welfare, which is not always the case.  
 
Firms seeking entry may either directly negotiate with the track owner (or administrator), or 
use the access regime established for the network or ask that the service be “declared”. This last 
regime means that the National Competition Authority (NCC) recommends to the Ministry whether 
access to the network should be granted; the parties must then negotiate the terms of the entry under 
legally binding arbitration. Most of the States and the national network have defined their access 
regime. In NSW state, for instance, there exist price thresholds (ceiling and floor); other states 
establish conditions on prices, scheduling allocation and other variables. At the date of this report four 
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companies (mostly freight operators) have applied for declaration. Access has been recommended in 
three of them. 
 
Competition  
So far, the reforms realized have employed mostly the concept of competition for the market 
as a way to provide competitive service in the passenger transport market (franchises in Victoria). The 
strong inter-modal competition that rail faces leaves no room for more than one feasible firm running 
the same service. 
 
The current access regime leaves an open door for providing entry and some degree of 
desirable competition in the case of services having some level of market power. 
 
 
Further Reforms Proposed 
 
The structural reform proposed by the PC (Productivity Commission) is not a single proposal 
but a set of different solutions that are suitable for the different types of existing networks.  
 
Urban Network 
- Horizontal Separation from other business such as long-distance and freight; 
- Vertical Integration infrastructure-operations; 
- Allocation of the subsidized service by competitive tendering. 
 
Interstate Network 22 
- Vertical Separation of infrastructure and train operations; 
- Horizontal Integration. The entire interstate infrastructure should be managed by a single 
entity. 
 
Passenger Regional Network 
- Horizontal Separation based on geographical criteria. 
- Vertical integration. 
 
 
The Productivity Commission’s Appraisal of the Australian experience 
 
The Productivity Commission of Australia23 has assessed the three main types of network 
(urban, interstate and regional) along the following dimensions:  
- Interface issues, which occur when there are competing demands for train schedules by trains 
from different networks, for example, freight trains traversing urban passenger networks; 
- Rail competition: 
- Competition ‘for’ the market: competition between bidders tendering to provide a 
given service; or 
- Competition ‘in’ the market: competition between train operators for the same 
customers.  
- Different forms of competition: 
- intermodal competition, particularly from road and shipping 
- Competition at different levels of viability: 
- loss making — requiring continual government funding to either the track or train 
operations; or 
- earning a reasonable rate of return that can support future investment and 
maintenance; or 
- achieving sustainable monopoly profits. 
                                                          
22 Nation-wide network connecting main areas. 
23 The Productivity Commission Report (1999). 
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The characteristics of the different networks are summarised in the following table and 
discussed briefly below. 
 
 
Table A5: Characteristics of Australian rail networks 
 
 
Network 
 
Interface issues 
 
Rail Competition 
  
  For the 
market 
Between train 
operators 
Intermodal 
competition 
Level of 
viability 
Urban Yes, especially 
Sydney 
Some No Yes No 
Interstate Yes Limited Yes Yes Uncertain 
Regional Yes Limited Limited Most freight Uncertain 
Main coal lines Yes No No No Yes 
 
 
Urban passenger networks 
 
Interface issues 
The potential for interface issues to arise varies considerably across states. Interface issues are 
of particular concern in Sydney where there is congestion on the urban passenger network restricting 
the passage of freight trains. This is due to the complexity of the network and the intensity of use by 
passenger trains at peak periods.  
 
Rail competition 
With the exception of Melbourne, there is no rail competition on urban passenger networks. In 
Melbourne, there is competition for the market in providing urban passenger services. National 
Express and Melbourne Transport Enterprise have secured the franchises to operate Melbourne’s 
Bayside and Hillside Trains respectively. However, the successful franchisees do not compete over the 
same tracks for passengers. Instead, the franchises are based on geographic service groups. 
 
Intermodal competition 
Urban passenger networks are subject to strong intermodal competition from the private car 
and other transport modes. The private car has been cited as the greatest threat to public transport, 
undertaking around 95 per cent of all urban trips24. 
 
Other public transport modes also provide strong intermodal competition. The majority of bus, 
tram and ferry services move people from the suburbs to the central business district, sometimes 
providing commuters with more than one public transport option. As noted by the Productivity 
Commission: 
 
“Aggregate figures [on private car and public transport mode shares for urban transport] do, 
however, conceal the importance of public transport for some types of journeys. For example, 52 per 
cent of commuter trips to Melbourne’s central area are by public transport and 80 per cent of workers 
in Sydney’s central city use public transport to get to work”. 
 
Level of viability 
Urban passenger networks in Australia are loss making, requiring continual government 
funding. In New South Wales, the Government allocated around $1 billion in recurrent and capital 
                                                          
24 Cox, J. (1997), Roads in the Community — Part I, Are They Doing Their Job?, published by AusRoads. 
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funding for SRA in 1997-98. In Queensland, the average government payment (subsidy) per urban rail 
passenger journey is over five times the average fare paid by passengers. 
 
The interstate network 
For the purposes of this inquiry, the Commission has defined the interstate network as that 
presented by National Rail Corporation: the standard gauge track linking all mainland State capital 
cities; the lines linking Sydney, Broken Hill and Crystal Brook; and the branches to Whyalla, Western 
Port, Port Kembla and Alice Springs. 
 
Interface issues 
As described earlier, with the exception of Sydney, interstate trains (freight and passenger) 
generally have limited interface with urban passenger networks. This situation is primarily due to the 
differences in track gauges. However, as described later, there are interfaces between the interstate and 
regional networks. 
 
Rail competition 
There is competition between train operators on the interstate network. In June 1995, SCT, 
commenced interstate rail freight operations in competition with NRC. TNT (now Toll Rail) followed 
one year later. There is only limited evidence of competition for the market on the interstate network. 
Rail Access Corporation (NRC) noted that competition for the market has occurred on the interstate 
network. 
 
Intermodal competition 
There is vigorous intermodal competition on the interstate network, especially from road 
transport. As argued by NRC, road transport is the most powerful competitor for rail general freight 
services. Apart from competition from road transport, coastal shipping also dominates the interstate 
transport of bulk commodities. 
 
Level of viability 
The Commission received no evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits from 
customers on the interstate network. Indeed, there is no conclusive evidence of the ability for railways 
to achieve viability, at least at this stage. In terms of train operations, NRC continues to run at a loss. 
The Australian Rail Track Corporation illustrated the challenges facing rail by reference to NRC: 
 
“NR’s financial profitability was stated at $4.8m (loss) in 1996-97. The most recent annual 
report, released late last year, shows that NR’s operating loss has deteriorated to $9m (after-tax) … 
This deterioration continues a trend starting in 1995-96 (with the introduction of private rail 
competitors) and starkly illustrates the challenge NR faces in a competitive interstate environment.” 
 
However, NRC argued: 
 
“As a corporation under the Corporations Law, National Rail can trade only while it remains 
solvent. Since it ceased to receive any financial support from its shareholders some 15 months ago, its 
Directors must have an expectation of commercial returns, backed by shareholder-approved strategic 
plans.” 
 
As noted earlier, there are now private sector operators on the interstate network. As private 
firms, SCT and Toll Rail would be expected to only remain in the market if they earn, or expect to 
earn, commercial returns (at least on train operations). Evidence on the viability of the interstate track 
is limited due to the multiple owners of the network. However, in New South Wales the Government 
provides subsidy payments to RAC towards track upkeep and maintenance. 
 
Regional networks 
The Draft Report identified two types of regional networks — high and low volume. This 
categorization tended to create some confusion over what tracks could be considered high or low 
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volume. This was especially evident in New South Wales where some tracks were used by trains 
carrying freight with different economic characteristics (coal, grain and containers), as well as non-
urban passenger trains. 
 
Nevertheless, most of the tracks within regional networks25 share similar economic 
characteristics. The freight transported is often subject to strong intermodal competition and there is 
no evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits. 
 
Only certain lines, namely the main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland, display 
distinctly different characteristics to the rest of the regional network.  
 
Tonnages of coal carried over the Hunter Valley coal lines exceed 50 million tonnes (Mt) per 
year (PC 1998a). In Queensland, the two main coal lines are those centred on the Oaky Creek and 
North Goonyella regions (around 49 Mt per year) and Gregory and South Blackwater regions (around 
24 Mt per year). 
 
The transport of coal and minerals in Australia (excluding the Pilbara) is not restricted to those 
lines identified above. However, the main coal lines are distinguished from the remainder of the 
regional network by the tonnages of freight that are transported over the lines and, as discussed later in 
this section, the ability of railways to extract monopoly rents from mining companies. 
 
Trains transporting grains, general freight and non-urban passengers also travel on the main 
coal lines. Despite this overlap, the main coal lines have different economic characteristics and 
specific issues not associated with the remainder of the regional networks in New South Wales and 
Queensland. Policies required improving the outcomes for users (primarily mining companies) on the 
main coal lines are therefore identified separately. 
 
Interface issues 
Trains commencing on a regional network carrying minerals, grain or general freight often 
traverse both the interstate and urban networks. There are also interfaces between the main coal lines 
and the remainder of the regional network. As noted by the NSW Minerals Council:  
“In hauling coal from Gunnedah or Ulan to Newcastle, the coal is first hauled on a low 
volume regional network, then on a high volume regional network, then on track that is used by and 
influenced by interstate freight and urban passenger traffic.” 
 
Rail competition 
With the exception of New South Wales, there is limited evidence of rail competition either 
for the market or between train operators on regional networks. An example of competition for the 
market in New South Wales is the contract won by NRC to carry coal to Macquarie Generation’s 
Bayswater and Liddell power stations. Another example of competition for the market (outside New 
South Wales) was the competitively tendered contract to haul coal from Leigh Creek to Port Augusta 
won by FreightCorp in November 1998. 
 
A number of participants argued that rail competition between operators was beginning to 
emerge under the vertical separation model adopted in New South Wales. RAC argued: 
“… approximately two-thirds of freight in New South Wales on a gross tonne-kilometre basis 
has been subject to competition between operators …” 
 
A similar view was shared by NRC: 
 
“It is not correct that “There is little or no competition either for the market or between train 
operators on low volume regional railways”. Instances of competition on low-volume lines are very 
                                                          
25 Regional networks are defined as those lines extending out from capital cities and regional ports to inland 
areas, excluding the defined interstate network and private railways in the Pilbara. 
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few as the possibility of competition on regional lines is very recent; the NSW Rail Access 
Corporation has provided successfully for genuine competition and in NSW there are several 
examples where real competition has occurred.” 
 
However, any competition between train operators in New South Wales will largely occur on 
subsidized track. 
 
Intermodal competition 
In Victoria, Western Australia (excluding the Pilbara region), South Australia and Tasmania, 
the majority of freight carried by rail on most regional networks is subject to strong intermodal 
competition. In terms of grain transport in Victoria, Vicgrain noted that it has: 
“... the option of increasing the road component of its grain movement operations. Vicgrain 
envisages that this would occur should freight rates increase or should there not be a suitable level of 
cooperation between the storage and rail sectors.” 
 
Westrail argued that the majority of the commodities it transported by rail was subject to 
competition from road transport, with the exception of bauxite, where road transport was a less 
feasible alternative. Both FreightCorp and Queensland Rail have indicated that they face significant 
competition from heavy road vehicles in the general freight market. However, RAC argued that the 
transport of a number of commodities by rail on the regional network in New South Wales was not 
subject to intermodal competition: 
 
“There are some traffics on low volume regional lines, particularly minerals and to a lesser 
extent grain, that are not subject to significant intermodal competition.” 
 
Similarly, the main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland face little or no intermodal 
competition in the transport of coal. 
 
Level of viability 
Excluding the main coal lines, the Commission received no evidence of railways extracting 
monopoly profits from customers on regional networks. 
 
In New South Wales and Queensland, the regional networks can be considered loss making, 
requiring subsidy payments in excess of $150 million per year. Despite the lack of intermodal 
competition highlighted by RAC, there is no evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits from 
customers in New South Wales. An important fact underpinning this position is the high level of 
competition in the final markets of these commodities. Commodities such as export grain face strong 
competition from alternative suppliers on international markets. Thus there are no monopoly profits to 
be earned by grain farmers in final markets to be extracted by the providers of inputs, including 
transport. 
 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the rail transport of commodities such as grain in 
New South Wales receives government subsidies. If grain farmers require government subsidies to 
cover transport costs, it is unlikely that monopoly profits are simultaneously being extracted by the 
railways. 
 
In Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania there is some evidence to 
suggest the regional networks can earn a reasonable rate of return. With the exception of Western 
Australia, new (vertically integrated) private sector railways have begun operation (Freight Victoria, 
Australia Southern Railroad and Tasrail). These private sector companies operate without government 
subsidies and would only enter and remain in the market if they earn, or expect to earn, a commercial 
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return.26 With regards to the viability of rail freight operations in Tasmania, the Australian Transport 
Network (owners of Tasrail) stated: 
 
“... since acquiring Tasrail, its revenue has increased by approximately 50 per cent and the 
company has been returned to profitability.” 
 
In Western Australia, Westrail receives no subsidies for freight operations. However, Westrail 
does require subsidy payments for non-urban rail passenger services (some $13.7 million 1997-98). 
 
The main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland are the most profitable components 
of each State’s network. The extraction of monopoly rents from the transport of coal by the 
government-owned railways provides indirect evidence of the profitability of these lines. 
 
 
Overall appraisal of Australia’s rail networks 
 
Australia’s railways provide transport services to a diverse range of passenger and freight 
markets. However, the discussion above has highlighted some distinct characteristics that exist 
between States with regard to urban and regional networks. No urban passenger service in Australia is 
viable. Participants highlighted the problem of congestion between freight and passenger trains on the 
urban passenger network in Sydney due to its complexity and the intensity of use by passenger trains 
at peak periods. On the other hand, in Western Australia and South Australia, the urban passenger 
networks have limited interface with other networks. 
 
Notwithstanding some possible exceptions, regional networks (excluding main coal lines) are 
characterised by strong intermodal competition, especially from road transport. Where intermodal 
competition is absent, there is usually competitive pressure in downstream markets limiting the ability 
of railways to extract monopoly profits. 
 
The regional networks in New South Wales and Queensland are distinguished from the other 
States by the considerable government subsidies required to ensure their continued viability. While 
some competition between train operators is emerging in New South Wales, these operators do not 
cover the full cost of providing track infrastructure. 
 
Yet the New South Wales and Queensland regional networks also contain the identified main 
coal lines that are distinguished by their profitability. 
 
                                                          
26 In Victoria the State Government provides some limited subsidy payments for the ‘Fast Track’ service (less 
than container load freight). 
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APPENDIX 5: THE UNITED KINGDOM CASE  
 
Railways have been an important network industry since their emergence in Britain early in 
the 19th Century. More recently, Britain can claim to have pioneered organisational reorganisation of 
its rail industry, as a result of the privatization that took place in the 1990s.   
 
 
Initial Conditions 
 
Railway services in Britain were nationalised in 1948 following the 1947 Transport Act, 
which created the British Transport Commission. The 1962 Transport Act saw the creation of a 
separate British Railways Board, which remained in public ownership. Criticisms of the British 
Railways Board began to emerge in the 1970s, highlighting low productivity, inappropriate 
investment, managerial inefficiency and spiralling subsidies. 
 
The commercialisation of BRB in the 1980s led to some marked improvements in   
productivity - however, these improvements took place against a backdrop of privatisations and 
deregulation in the rest of the economy. Thus, calls for the privatisation of British Rail as well were 
inevitable. The search for a privatisation formula gained momentum in the early 1990s as BR’s 
productivity and financial performance began to deteriorate again and the Conservative privatisation 
programme started to run out of steam.   
 
 
Structure 
 
In 1992, the Conservative government released a plan for privatisation of British Rail, in the 
form of a White Paper entitled ‘New Opportunities for the Railways. The 1993 Railways Act and 
subsequent Government directives largely implemented this plan. 
 
Following Labour’s victory in the 1997 election, the industry was partially re-organised. 
Specifically, the Strategic Rail Authority was set up, changing the regulatory structure of the industry. 
 
The UK Rail network was vertically and horizontally disintegrated, in a process which 
separated infrastructure from operations. The industry now consists of four main operational 
components: originally 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs); 5 freight operators; 3 Rolling Stock 
Leasing Companies (ROSCOs); and the Rail infrastructure operator, originally called Railtrack, which 
was privatised in 1996 but has now been taken back into public ownership and is called Network Rail. 
Regulation of the industry is achieved by a curious two-regulator model. 
 
The present structure of the UK Rail industry can be represented diagramatically: 
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Source: SRA website. 
 
Figure A3: Structure of UK Rail Industry 
 
 
Rail infrastructure was separated from rail operations and is now the responsibility of 
Railtrack, initially a separate government-owned company but subsequently floated on the stock 
market in April 1996. In 2001, following a train crash at Hatfield, it was discovered that the state of 
the rail infrastructure was considerably worse than had previously been thought. Railtrack set about a 
massive project of rail replacement, which was both extremely expensive and very disruptive to the 
operation of the rail network. The cost of financing its increased level of debt became too much for 
Railtrack in February 2002, and the Transport Secretary Stephen Buyers took the company into 
receivership.   
 
The passenger rail business of BR was split into 25 train operating units, broadly 
corresponding to existing profit centres. Following privatisation, the 25 passenger franchises were sold 
to 11 different parent companies. The duration of the first franchises was set at 7 years, so re-
franchising negotiations are currently in progress. So far only one franchise has been re-negotiated, 
with a new 20-year franchise being awarded to Chiltern Trains. 
 
Several freight operators were privatised: Trainload Freight, which specialises in the carriage 
of bulk raw materials, was divided into three geographically based companies; Railfreight 
Distribution, was privatised in two parts – Freightliner, its domestic container business, which 
transports containers to and from UK mainland ports, and the European intermodal and automotive 
freight business; Red Star, the express parcels service, was sold in 1995 as a MBO; Rail Express 
Systems Ltd., whose principal business is the carriage of mail for the Post Office was sold in 1995. 
 
Three rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) have been established: Angel Trains, 
Eversholt Leasing and Porterbrook Leasing. Each ROSCO owns between 3000 and 4500 vehicles, 
consisting of a mixed portfolio of different types and ages of rolling stock. The ROSCOs own and 
lease all of the domestic passenger rolling stock previously owned or leased directly by British Rail.  
 
The regulatory structure of the industry is as follows. The Office of the Rail Regulator is in 
charge of granting licences, which are required for the operation of certain railway assets. There are 
four main types of license: train operators’ licence (passenger or freight licence); station licence; depot 
licence and network licence. The basic position is that Railtrack awards safety certificates to train 
operators and the Rail Regulator certifies Railtrack. 
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The second tier of regulation was initially provided by the Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising (OPRAF). This was a non-ministerial government department, which awarded rail 
franchises to TOCs.  Its role was: to award franchises on the basis of competitive tendering; to provide 
for the delivery of specified assets at the end of the franchise; to minimise disruption of services; to 
ensure that fares charged by a franchise operator are reasonable and that operators participate in 
approved discount schemes for the young, elderly and disabled; to receive and give notice of proposals 
to discontinue passenger services; to approve the designation of certain services as experimental; to 
secure compliance with the terms of franchise agreements. 
 
The Strategic Rail Authority, set up by the incoming labour government, replaced the OPRAF, 
but took over most of its duties.  Its purpose is to provide a focus for the planning of passenger and 
freight railways. It supports integrated transport initiatives and for the first time provides a clear focus 
for the promotion of rail freight. The SRA has unspecified funds to support its activities – its potential 
sources of revenue include Railtrack, the TOCs, and the Treasury’s capital and revenue support.   
 
The SRA’s main role is consumer protection at the franchise level, with its secondary 
objectives being to: promote the use of rail within an integrated system; ensure it is planned as a 
coherent network; participate in regional and local land-use planning policies; ensure that rail options 
are assessed to achieve value for money and optimise social and environmental goals; take a view on 
the capacity of railways, assess investment needs and identify priorities; promote accessible transport 
for the disabled; review the role for rail in sustainable transport; produce criteria for competition 
between operators. 
 
Following the creation of the SRA, the Office of the Rail Regulator’s main role became the 
regulation of Railtrack, the ROSCOs and the implementation of competition policy.  
 
The original privatisation plan envisaged two types of access agreements for passenger 
services: franchised passenger services access agreements; and open access agreements where 
operators would be able to negotiate open access agreements with Railtrack. It soon became clear that 
encouraging on-track competition would conflict with the government’s objective to reduce subsidies. 
 
Thus the Rail Regulator has devised a regime of ‘moderation of competition’ for the passenger 
franchises. This regime determines in advance the degree of exposure to competition which each 
franchisee could face, ensuring that the adverse impact on the franchising process would be 
minimised. New entry is restricted through contractual control over Railtrack’s ability to sell access 
rights to any operator in addition to those contained in their initial access agreements. The mechanism 
was intended to allow the market to determine as far as possible where competitive entry should occur.  
The protection given was to be over the markets served by the operators rather than the track on which 
they operate. 
 
The mechanism operates in two stages. The first started when the last British Rail TOC has its 
long-term track access agreement approved and was originally planned to expire on 31st March 1999. 
The second was planned to expire on 31st March 2002.   
 
• First stage of open access 
In the first stage, franchise holders can nominate a list of substantial point-to-point flows on 
which no new entry for scheduled passenger services will be permitted without the franchisee’s 
agreement. Franchise operators can nominate additional flows, not conforming to this rule, subject to 
the approval of the regulator. This is designed to allow passenger operators additional rights where 
there is no conflict with the protection given to other operators. 
 
• Second stage of open access 
In the second stage, some new competition via open access is intended to be introduced. As 
with Stage 1, the key building block is the station to station flow and franchisees will be expected to 
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re-nominate flows, but in Stage 2, franchisees will only be allowed a partial protection from new 
entrants. Up to a threshold level set by the Regulator, new entry can then occur, and compete for the 
operator’s business. 
 
In stage 2, the competition mechanism is designed to limit the amount of the operator’s 
passenger revenue that is open to competition from another operator. 
 
 
Conduct 
 
The everyday interactions between Railtrack, the ROSCOs and the TOCs are extensively 
controlled by the regulatory regime. Thus, the conduct of the industry is inseparable from the question 
of regulation. Thus the regulation of Railtrack, the ROSCOs and the TOCs will be discussed in the 
following section. The regulatory framework set up during privatisation has been much criticised, 
essentially because the underlying incentives put in place were inappropriate. 
 
The conduct of the UK rail industry takes place in very many dimensions. Railtrack/Network 
Rail takes short run decisions on the amount of money to spend on track maintenance and who 
perform this maintenance. It also takes long run decisions on investment in replacement tracks, 
signalling and stations, as well as the provision of new routes. The TOCs choose the number of trains 
to run, the times to run these trains, the type of rolling stock to use, the prices to charge. They also 
plan new services, in conjunction with both Network Rail and the ROSCOs.  
 
 
Network Rail 
Network Rail interacts mainly with the TOCs, which operate rail services using infrastructure 
owned by Railtrack. Both the conditions under which Network Rail is obliged to grant access to its 
infrastructure, and the access prices which it can charge are controlled by the Office of the Rail 
Regulator. The most important segment of Network Rail’s earnings are passenger services: around 
90% of its income is from passenger operators. Thus the Regulator can have a very significant impact 
upon the financial performance of a company. Network Rail has more flexibility in dealing with 
freight traffic because it works with freight operators to schedule trains outside peak periods.   
 
Network Rail operates a track-charging system which was put in place during privatisation, in 
conjunction with the Rail Regulator. Each rail user has to pay Network Rail based on the following 
formula: 
 
(i) A fixed annual charge. 
(ii) A variable track usage charge based on the way maintenance costs vary with vehicle miles, 
speed and axle weight. Overall this component accounts for 3% of costs. 
(iii) A charge for electricity usage, based on vehicle miles, train miles, or gross tonne miles.  
Overall this component accounts for 6% of costs. 
(iv) An adjustment to reflect additional costs incurred and savings made by Network Rail as a 
result of a change of law, for example new environmental legislation. 
(v) An adjustment to reflect the financial consequences for Network Rail of managing or dealing 
in property. 
 
Regulation of Railtrack was originally set up upon the traditional utility regulatory model – the 
ORR would regulate Railtrack through a conventional RPI – X regime, supported by a licence. In the 
initial period following privatisation, the ORR was obliged to discipline Railtrack due to its poor 
performance. However it was somewhat constrained in doing this by the sketchiness of its initial 
licensing agreements with Railtrack. In response to criticism and because volumes turned out higher 
than expected, the early notions of Railtrack managing a static railway network were replaced by a 
more demanding set of infrastructure renewals and enhancements. The absence of information on asset 
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condition, and the lack of much definition in the contracts for maintenance between Railtrack and its 
main contractors, made the job of both the company and the Regulator very difficult in the first period. 
 
Because a large proportion of the Train Access Charges are fixed, Railtrack had an almost 
guaranteed income from the TACs. Put simply, Railtrack’s profits were the difference between that 
income and costs. Volume was not of much interest – indeed, more passengers and freight could 
actually make matters worse by increasing costs. Penalties for non-delivery were trivial in comparison 
to the difficulties of meeting higher levels of demand.   
 
Thus, the incentive regime put in place led Railtrack to concentrate on short run conduct 
variables, essentially on squeezing costs. Thus Railtrack reduced its workforce by contracting out 
maintenance services. 
 
Few long-term investment schemes have been embarked upon, because the incentives for such 
schemes are weak relative to the risks of failure. The few big investment projects which have gone 
ahead have been dogged by delays and cost over-runs. The West Coast Main Line improvement is a 
case in point, and will be discussed further in the ‘Performance’ section. The essential point is that 
while a price-cap regime has worked relatively well for mature networks such as electricity and gas, 
the rail industry is an investment-driven business where tough price regulation may be incompatible 
with attracting funds for investment. Therefore it is unclear that it is appropriate to place tough 
operating cost reduction targets on a company which should be more concerned with performance and 
investment than cutting costs and jobs. 
 
The creation of the SRA was intended as a partial remedy for the lack of long-term investment 
on Railtrack’s part. The SRA has a mandate to consider the long-term development of the rail 
industry. However, given that the SRA does not regulate Railtrack, it is clear that the institutional 
setup is sub-optimal to achieve these objectives. 
 
Less importantly, Network Railtrack also charges for access to stations and depots.  Most 
stations are leased to individual train operators, although some large stations are run separately by 
Network Rail. 
 
 
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) 
The Conservative model of privatisation envisaged that TOCs would only need temporary 
regulation. Access to the rail infrastructure would gradually be opened up, so that TOCs would enter 
into competition on passenger routes. Competition would ensure that TOCs could be left to choose 
their own conduct variables without preying on consumers. 
 
This proved to be unrealistic. Open access to the rail infrastructure remains a distant prospect, 
so most passenger routes are operated by monopolies, thus necessitating regulation. But the 
privatisation plan did not anticipate this need for regulation. As a result, regulation of the TOCs was 
not built into the ORR’s mandate, and instead was deal with by the OPRAF, and then later by the 
SRA. Therefore the regulation of the Rail industry is divided between two entirely separate regulators. 
 
While there is very little on-track competition, there does exist off-track competition, through 
the franchising process. The franchising process assigns monopoly-conferring property rights to 
competing bidders. The terms of the franchise are set subject to several requirements, along the 
dimensions of price and output. The current framework includes: a passenger service requirement, 
stipulating minimum levels of service; a price cap; operating performance measures; payments to 
ensure that TOCs have effective incentives to improve performance. 
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(i) Passenger Service Requirements (PSR) 
The Passenger Service Requirement is to ensure the provision of a minimum service level, 
while allowing the franchise operator to adjust its timetable to passenger requirements, thereby 
improving efficiency. Thus the PSR sets parameters within which each TOC must design a 
timetable.  
 
The PSR specifies service characteristics which are important for passengers including: 
frequency of trains; stations to be served; maximum journey times; first and last trains; week-
end services; through services; and load factors and/or peak train capacity. 
 
(ii) Fares 
Constraints are placed on:   
 
- Unrestricted standard class return fares and certain single fares for short distance 
journeys; 
- ‘Saver’ fares on other journeys; 
- certain standard class season ticket fares including all those tickets for weekly season 
tickets. 
 
For three years from 1st January 1996, increases in capped fares were not permitted to rise by 
more than the Retail Price Index from the 1995 base price. For the four years from 1st January 
1999, the price cap for fares has been RPI - 1. There is some limited scope for individual fares 
to exceed the cap where these are balanced by other controlled fares being held below cap 
levels. The caps on the price of fares in the London area are adjusted to reflect the quality of 
the franchise operator’s performance, in order to ensure that passengers are both compensated 
for poor performance and are made to pay for improved performance through fares. 
 
(iii) Operating performance 
Each franchise operator was required to produce its own Passenger Charter, which must be at 
least as good as that formerly in place for British Rail. In addition, all franchise operators are 
required to conduct regular, independent customer satisfaction surveys. Bad performance 
results in some repayments to the passengers. Breaches of obligations result in the Franchising 
Director setting out the action needed for compliance. Exceptionally poor performance can 
lead to a special kind of breach, an event of default. This gives the Franchising Director the 
option to terminate the franchise. 
 
The Passenger Charter has now been replaced by the “Public Performance Measure”, namely 
the percentage of trains arriving on time. As will be seen below, this measure has deteriorated 
substantially over time. 
 
iv) Franchise payments 
The franchise payments paid by the Franchising Director to the TOC aim to put in place an 
incentive regime whereby operators have a financial incentive to improve performance.  
• The Punctuality Incentive Payment (PIP) measures lateness and cancellations against the 
planned timetable. The results for each four week accounting period are compared with 
the benchmark figure established before franchising. 
• The Short Formation Incentive Payment (SFIP) applies where the Passenger Service 
Requirement specifies a minimum capacity that the operator has to provide. This applies 
for peak services into London and some commuter flows to other major cities. Each 
operator has to have a train plan showing how the capacity will be delivered. If the 
operator fails to meet the train plan, then an SFIP charge, based on a proportion of the 
cancellation charge, is made. 
• The Timetable Change Incentive Payment (TCIP) penalises operators who change the 
timetable from the printed version. Because it substitutes for a higher payment under PIP, 
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the TCIP gives operators an incentive to handle disruption in a planned way, and to give 
passengers advance notice of amended services. 
 
It is clear that the regulatory regime surrounding the franchising process places very many 
constraints on the TOCs. Indeed, one could say that most of their short-term conduct involves trying to 
cut costs while remaining inside the performance guidelines set out above. Cutting costs generally 
involves running the minimum number of trains allowed, while controlling labour costs by employing 
few workers at low wages. They also have some scope to minimise the costs of leasing rolling stock 
through a competitive tendering process with the ROSCOs. 
 
Longer-term conduct variables include the introduction of new services by the TOCs. The 
TOCs have consistently argued that the franchise periods were too short to encourage them to invest in 
new trains and to upgrade services. Uncertainty over whether they would retain their franchise in the 
future led TOCs to concentrate on short-term goals. However, as always with franchising, the relevant 
distinction is between capital costs that are fixed and those which are sunk. Sunk costs cannot be 
recovered on exit. While this may have provided a disincentive to invest in improvements to stations 
(which remain attached to the franchise), TOCs in fact have very few sunk costs. Thus any distortion 
of time horizons away from long-term investment is probably more a fault of the incentive structure 
embodied in the franchise regime – i.e. are TOCs allowed to make appropriate revenues to recoup the 
costs of setting up new services. 
 
 
Freight Operators 
The rights of access to the railway were made available to private freight operators without a 
franchise, but restricted for passenger services up to 2002. 
 
 
ROSCOs  
The ROSCOs were sold by the government in 1996 for around £1.82 billion, and in a period 
of less than two years then had been sold on for around £2.65 billion.   
 
When the TOCs want to lease rolling stock, the ROSCOs compete for the contract. As for new 
rolling stock, the TOCs renew their rolling stock in consultation with the manufacturers and the 
ROSCOs. Contracts between ROSCOs and TOCs are generally of up to 10 years duration. 
 
 
Performance 
 
 
Gross Output 
Gross output levels give an indication of the raw output of the passenger train industry. From a 
low of 349 million train kilometres in 1992/93, the train kilometres increased by 3.2% per annum until 
1996. From 1997-2001, train kilometres increased by over 5% per annum. However, one should 
realise that passenger demand increased substantially in the between 1995-2001 due to rapid economic 
growth in that period, combined with a slowdown in the growth of private car ownership, a significant 
real increase in fuel costs for motorists and increasing congestion in populous parts of the country. 
 
Quality of Outputs 
(i) Punctuality  
Some initial improvements in the punctuality of trains occurred after privatisation, but this 
improvement turned into a marked subsequent deterioration. 89.7% of trains arrived on time in the 
financial year 1997-8, but by 2001-2 this had fallen to 78.0%. 
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(ii) Reliability 
Reliability improved consistently during the 1990s, although like punctuality, most TOCs 
have shown a decline in reliability for 2001, compared with the previous year. Although many of the 
problems concerning punctuality coincide with known infrastructure problems, such as poor track and 
signalling quality, lack of track capacity and lack of terminal capacity, it is reported that the 
percentage of delays attributable to Railtrack has declined from 70% in 1995 to 43% in 2000. 
 
(iii) Congestion 
Due to demand increases, overcrowding has also increased during the last five years. Last 
year, congestion was is in part caused by the disruption of speed restrictions and severe weather, and 
incentive penalties were paid by TOCs as a result. Ideally, the passenger regulator should calculate the 
optimal level of congestion for rail services, and then set overcrowding penalties accordingly. 
However, one suspects that the regulator may err on the side of too little crowding, so it is difficult to 
interpret recent increases in congestion. 
 
As a reflection of the overall quality of outputs, the SRA received net incentive payments of 
£103.3 million from operators in the year ending 31 March 2001. This compares with a total net 
payment made by the SRA to the operators of £0.87 million in the previous year. 
 
New Services 
In the period following privatisation, around 113 key franchise commitments were proposed. 
By 2001, 45 of these had been delivered: 
- Of 35 service commitments, 21 were delivered by 2001, mainly related to maintaining 
the current timetable for a set period, whilst new and upgraded services have largely 
to be delivered. 
- 20 commitments to improving stations. These were normally posited as a rolling 
programme so only two had been completed by 2000. 
- 14 raising of Charter Standards, of which 4 have delivered. Typically this involves 
increasing punctuality and reliability targets, but not necessarily performance. 
- 11 commitments to improving links with buses and other modes, the majority of 
which have been delivered. 
- 12 other miscellaneous commitments, 8 of which have been delivered. 
 
New Trains 
There have also been 22 commitments to new or refurbished trains. 7 of these have been 
delivered. However, several of the plans for introducing new trains also involve the installation of new 
rail capacity, which is the responsibility of Railtrack. The largest of these projects involved 
commitments made by Virgin to introduce high speed tilting trains on the West Coast main line. In 
1998, following negotiations with Virgin, Railtrack committed itself to upgrade the West Coast main 
line to allow trains to run on the fast lines at 125 mph by May 2002 and 140 mph by May 2005. 
However, delays and cost over-runs multiplied, and Railtrack subsequently sought an increase in 
funding through access charges to cover the estimated increase in costs from £2.1 billion to £5.85 
billion. In 2002 the future of the project looks more uncertain than ever. 
 
 
Fares 
Inflation-corrected fares have remained reasonably stable since privatisation. Approximately 
39% of train operators’ ticket revenue comes from fares regulated by the SRA, which since January 
1999 have been limited to RPI - 1.  For the ten London commuter operators, the cap on their fares 
basket is adjusted by up to 2% above, or up to 2% below, the RPI - 1, under the Fares Incentive 
Adjustment Payment. Worsening train service performance in 2000 further reduced the increase in 
London commuter fares in 2001 and in many cases fares were reduced in real terms. On average these 
ten operators were allowed to increase their fares by just 1.3% – a 2% reduction in real terms. 
However, unregulated fares have risen sharply in recent years, as table A6 indicates: 
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Table A6: Fare increases 1999-2002 
 
Fare Percent Change January 1999-January 2002  
First class 23.6 
Standard class unregulated 11.0 
Standard class regulated 0.8 
Average All Fares 8.0 
Retail Price Index (for comparison) 6.1 
Source: Strategic Rail Authority, National Rail Trends. 
 
 
Employment 
Staff numbers decreased sharply during the mid-1990s, until stabilisation in the late 1990s.  
However, thousands of employees have been switched to railway-related industries, rather than being 
fired from the railway industry altogether. The cuts made led to substantial cost reductions, although 
some operators reduced operating staff numbers too much, and faced driver shortages as a result.   
 
As a result of employment cuts, there was a large increase in labour productivity since the 
reforms. However, these figures may be artificially inflated by a statistical, rather than a real decline in 
employment. Thus productivity increases could be substantially smaller.   
 
 
Investments in Infrastructure 
During the years before privatisation, investments in infrastructure were low. Railtrack 
embarked on an extensive modernisation programme, focussing on signalling systems and control 
centres. However, the past two years in the rail industry have seen unparalleled disruption as Railtrack 
imposed hundreds of emergency speed restrictions around the network as it investigated the extent of 
‘gauge corner cracking’. It was this ‘gauge corner cracking’ which was responsible for a fatal high-
speed derailment at Hatfield on October 17th, 2000. Assessment of the situation led to a recovery 
programme, which required the replacement of many hundreds of miles of rail. 
 
The year 2000-2001 showed the beginnings of a fall in the overall numbers of broken rails. As 
at 31 March 2001, results indicated that the annual total would be significantly below the prevailing 
level of the last two years. However, the need to impose such a large number of speed restrictions 
across the network following Hatfield highlights wider questions about Railtrack’s network 
stewardship, the knowledge of its assets, and its renewal and maintenance policies.  
 
 
Safety 
Since privatisation, over fifty people have been killed in railway accidents, and several 
hundred injured. Some have suggested that the vertical disintegration of the rail industry, combined 
with a focus on cutting costs, has led to more fatal accidents. However, there were a similar number of 
accidents in the 1980s, when British Rail controlled the system.  
 
Overall Conclusion 
 
Although there has been an increase in entrepreneurial activity in the rail industry following 
the reforms, the main focus has been on cost-cutting. Greater emphasis may be placed on growing the 
market in the long run, with the development of new services and the ordering of new rolling stock. In 
other words in the future passenger rail companies may be expected to move from strategies based on 
cost leadership to strategies based on differentiation and focus. 
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APPENDIX 6: REGULATORY REGIMES AROUND THE WORLD  
 
IDEI Report # 1 on Passenger Rail Transport 
 
107 
Table A7: Part one 
 
  Ownership type Financial rehabilitation Infrastructure 
Performance criteria 
(for public 
authorities) 
Public Service Obligation 
in the national legal 
context 
Access rights Regional rail transport 
Austria Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
Not realized.   Safety levels.         Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. Uses a 
framework contract and a 
yearly contract where the 
precise service levels and 
financial compensation is 
regulated. 
 
Access rights for 
long periods: 25 
years. 
One or more regional railway 
undertaking other than the incumbent 
operator.      Experience with 
tendering for PSO contracts 
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
Belgium Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
  Construction, 
maintenance and 
management of the rail 
infrastructure: NBMS.   
Infrastructure financing: 
state or NBMS.           
User charges: YES 
 
PassKm,                     
Punctuality,                
Expected financial 
results,                        
Safety levels. 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Unlimited exclusive 
access rights. 
No railway undertakings especially 
for regional passenger transport. 
Denmark Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
    Number of passengers, 
Public opinion 
statements from surveys,  
Financial performance 
of the railway 
undertaking (financial 
results not available on 
PSO contracts),             
Safety levels. 
 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Access rights linked 
to the public 
services contracts, 5 
years. 
Plans to tender out regional rail 
passenger public service obligations 
contracts.   Experience with 
tendering for PSO contracts. Budget 
responsibility at regional level.            
Planning for tendering PSO 
contracts. 
Finland Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
    Number of pass,          
TrainKm,              
Expected financial 
results,                      
Safety levels, 
 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Unlimited exclusive 
access rights 
One or more regional contract with 
regional public authorities carried 
out by the incumbent operator.  
Budget responsability at regional 
level. 
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Table A7: Part one (continued) 
 
  Ownership type Financial rehabilitation Infrastructure 
Performance criteria 
(for public 
authorities) 
PSO in the national legal 
context Access rights Regional rail transport 
France Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
The debt situation 
has been cleared. 
Close relationship 
between RFF and the 
political body.              
Responsibility of political 
bodies for rail 
infrastructure planning 
and financing. 
PassKm,                    
Safety levels,             
Financial results (not 
available on PSO 
contracts).       
Explicitly mentioned 
that regional traffic was 
growing faster in areas 
where this traffic was 
actually decentralized. 
 
Puts PSO in the law or 
secondary legislation and 
compensation is established 
year by year. No public 
service contract does exist. 
  One or more regional contract with 
regional public authorities carried 
out by the incumbent operator.  
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
Germany Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
The DB-AG was 
freed from old 
debt. 
  Safety levels, Puts PSO in the law or 
secondary legislation and 
compensation is established 
year by year. No public 
service contract does exist. 
Unlimited non-
exclusive access 
rights. 
One or more regional railway 
undertaking other than the 
incumbent operator.  Experience 
with tendering for PSO contracts.        
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
 
Greece Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
 
            
Italy Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
  Vertically integrated 
within FS-Spa that in turn 
is owned by the Treasury.  
Allocative inefficiency 
and policy driven 
investment decisions. 
 
  Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Unlimited non-
exclusive access 
rights. 
Plans to tender out regional rail 
passenger public service obligations 
contracts.                Budget 
responsibility at regional level. 
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Table A7: Part one (continued) 
 
  Ownership type Financial rehabilitation Infrastructure 
Performance criteria 
(for public 
authorities) 
PSO in the national legal 
context Access rights Regional rail transport 
Ireland Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
    Management accounts, 
passenger volumes and 
some internal 
performance indicators. 
 
      
Luxembourg Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
  The state has the political 
and financial 
responsibility for the rail 
infrastructure. 
 
PassKm,                    
Safety levels,    
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
  No railway undertakings especially 
for regional passenger transport. 
The 
Netherlands 
Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public + Private 
  The government is 
responsible for policy n 
rail infrastructure 
facilities. The Dutch 
government finances the 
construction of new 
infrastructure.             
User charges: YES 2000? 
 
Punctuality,                  
Safety levels,               
Expected financial 
results, 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Access rights linked 
to the public 
services contracts, 
10 years. 
One or more regional railway 
undertaking other than the 
incumbent operator.  Experience 
with tendering for PSO contracts.        
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
Norway  Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
 
            
Portugal Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
  The REFER is 
responsible for the 
infrastructure area. 
Number of passengers,     
Safety levels          
Expected financial 
results.                     
Statistical procedures in 
Portugal less reliable 
than in some other EU 
countries. 
 
Puts PSO in the law or 
secondary legislation and 
compensation is established 
year by year. No public service 
contract does exist. 
Unlimited exclusive 
access rights 
One or more regional railway 
undertaking other than the 
incumbent operator.  Experience 
with tendering for PSO contracts. 
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Table A7: Part one (continued) 
 
  Ownership type  
Financial 
rehabilitation Infrastructure 
Performance criteria 
(for public 
authorities) 
PSO in the national legal 
context Access rights Regional rail transport 
Spain Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public 
  The infrastructure is 
owned and managed by 
the associated operating 
companies. 
Safety levels,              
Financial results. 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
  One or more regional contract with 
regional public authorities carried 
out by the incumbent operator.  
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
 
Sweden Infrastructure: 
Public Operations: 
Public  
  Managed by a public 
agency (BV). 
Performance of BV is 
monitored by the 
government. 
 
      
Switzerland Infrastructure: 
Public + private         
Operations: Public 
+ private 
in 1998? Infrastructure is owned 
by the railway 
companies.                
User charges: 
 
        
United 
Kingdom 
Infrastructure: 
Private   
Operations: Private 
  Infrastructure providers 
in the UK come under 
pressure from different 
sources: Railtrack must 
balance calls from the 
ORR and and the TOCs 
for new investment, with 
its financial obligations to 
shareholders. 
 
PassKm, Punctuality,      
Expected financial 
results, Safety levels 
Puts much more in multiyear-
contracts with the railway 
undertakings. 
Access rights linked 
to the public 
services contracts, 
7-15 years. 
One or more regional railway 
undertaking other than the 
incumbent operator.  Experience 
with tendering for PSO contracts.  
Budget responsibility at regional 
level. 
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Table A7: Part two 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators 
Quantity of 
services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
Austria NO NO                            
Regular fares can freely be 
set by OBB.                     
The contract foresees 
(minimum) substantial 
general tariff reductions and 
reductions for special groups 
and also for weekly/monthly 
tickets. 
YES                          
How?                          
Four year contract 
regulation between OBB 
and the Federal state, but 
the specific level of quality 
is defined year by year.  
All forms of payment: credit 
cards, cash, checks ).                      
Customer satisfaction survey,         
Travel information (Regional 
transport),                                     
Quality of the Rolling stock, to 
passengers: seat quality, seat 
availability, cleanliness, and to 
environment: diesel, electrical.     
Accessibility of disabled people 
. 
Minimum 
amount of 
TrainKm 
Ticket 
integration with 
services run by 
local 
authorities. 
Extra payment for 
more train-Km. 
Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
Belgium YES                        
How?                       
Rolling stock and 
train personnel 
must be approved 
by the NMBS. 
YES                              
How?                              
Basic prices are regulated by 
contract between the 
government and NMBS. 
NMBS has the right to 
propose other commercial 
formulas (concerning elderly 
or disabled people). 
YES                        
How?                   
Responsibility of the 
Minister of Transport to 
provide railway passenger 
services according to 
contracts between the state 
and the railway operators.    
Safety checks, working 
and operating safeguards 
and guidelines. 
Information to passengers: 
timetables, price, general 
conditions of services, schedules 
services (delays...).           
Maintenance of stations: 
accessibility (especially for 
disabled people), ticket offices, 
platforms. 
Parkings: increase of the number 
of places.   
Comfort of travel: seats, air 
conditioning, facilities for 
disabled people...                            
Punctuality.                              
Customer service.                       
Accessibility of disabled people.  
Complementarity with the other 
means of public transport.          
Complementarity train/bike.       
Customer compensation system. 
 
Minimum 
level of 
services 
expressed in 
the form of 
trains-Km and 
in the form of 
trains per day. 
Duty of 
coordination of 
timetables 
between SNCB 
and other 
public transport 
operators 
(TEC, DE 
LIJN, STIB).      
Ticket 
integration 
(mainly in 
Brussels). 
Management 
contract: minimum 
level of service and 
associated financial 
compensation from 
the government for 
offering these 
services and 
investment in 
infrastructure and 
rolling stock. State 
contributions linked 
to the increase in the 
number of 
passengers. 
Possibility of 
increasing tariffs in 
case of good 
punctuality 
performances    
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Table A7: Part two (continued) 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators 
Quantity of 
services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
Denmark YES YES                             How?  
Decided by DSB (fares 
cannot be increased more 
than the annual inflation). 
DSB must give discounts to 
elderly people, childs… 
YES                       How?     
Safety checks, working 
and operating safeguards 
and guidelines.                  
The performances of the 
Finnish Rail 
Administration are 
monitored.                    
 
Access to information about 
timetables and ticketing. 
Minimum 
amount of 
train stops per 
station. 
Arrangements 
to facilitate the 
use of bus and 
train in 
combination. 
Penalties to be paid 
to the Ministry of 
Transport in case of 
delayed or cancelled 
services. 
Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
Finland YES NO                                    
VR sets all fares (including 
those for special groups). 
YES                       How?     
The types of trains are 
determined in the contract. 
The Ministry has approved 
the quality of the service 
and has found it to be on 
an appropriate level. VR 
has on its own initiative 
developed the rolling stock 
and taken opinions and 
needs of different user 
groups into account.         
 
Punctuality.                               
Customer satisfaction: survey 
Changes must 
be approved 
by the 
Ministry (VR).  
Agreements 
on rolling 
stock used/ 
purchased. 
Bus services 
are integrated 
with rail 
services.              
Integrated 
ticketing by 
agreement. 
For YTV the contract 
includes a quality 
sanction/bonus 
system. 
Railway 
undertaking 
legally liable 
for delays. 
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Table A7: Part two (continued) 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators 
Quantity of 
services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
France YES                        
How?                       
Entry regulation is 
mainly to be 
differentiated 
between 
infrastructure 
(entry barriers) and 
operations (entry 
barriers 
maintained). 
Access rights to 
railway 
undertakings  
engaged in the 
international 
combined transport 
or to international 
groupings when 
one of the 
constituting 
company is 
established in 
France for the 
international 
transport services. 
 
YES                              
How?                              
Fixed by SNCF with the 
agreement of the State. 
Social tariffs for special 
groups of passengers. 
Regions may establish 
special tariffs compatible 
with the general tariffs of 
SNCF. 
YES                        
How?                        
At the national level, 
SNCF must guarantee the 
best conditions of safety, 
accessibility, comfort and 
punctuality.      At the 
regional level, SNCF and 
the Region shall define the 
level of quality (continuity 
of service, information to 
passengers, complaints 
handling) to be reached 
and they will formalize it 
in the agreement. 
Safety,                                          
Comfort,                                  
Punctuality information, 
Accessibility.        
A sufficient 
number of 
seats must be 
guaranteed. 
SNCF shall 
facilitate 
connections 
with other 
means of 
transport.            
The Regions 
shall guarantee 
integrated tariff 
schemes. 
Based on punctuality 
and the quality of 
service. 
Railway 
undertaking 
itself pays 
compensation 
to passengers 
unless force 
majeure. 
Germany   NO                                   
The regular fare levels are 
not regulated.                    
Fare reduction for long 
distance and regional 
transport.                         
 Free transport to severely 
handicapped persons. 
 
NO                              
No regulation at the 
national level. 
  Obligation to 
transport and 
obligation to 
operate 
services. 
    Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
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Table A7: Part two (continued) 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators 
Quantity of 
services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
Greece 
 
  
 
          
 
    
Italy   YES/NO?                        
How?                            
Ticket facilities are granted 
to young people, the elderly 
and disabled persons and to 
figures belonging to special 
administrations. 
 
        Ticket prices are 
linked to the 
achievement of 
quality parameters. 
Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
Ireland                 
Luxembourg   YES                            How?  
Defined by the Ministry of 
Transports. CFL is forced to 
adopt these fares but it can 
propose an adaptation to 
take into account increased 
costs. 
YES                      
How?                          
The Ministry of Transports 
defines the quality of 
service.         
CFL is bound to run the 
services with a particular 
regard to its quality. 
Punctuality,                                  
Access to stations,                     
Comfort of the journey. 
Frequency of 
trains and 
stations to be 
served 
CFL shall take 
into account 
the integration 
between 
railway 
transport and 
other forms of 
public 
transport. 
 
    
The 
Netherlands 
YES                          
How?                         
Access to the 
passenger market is 
conditional upon 
the subsidy 
requirement and the 
desirability of the 
service. 
YES                              
How?                          
General tariff obligation on 
NS not to increase tariffs for 
selected fares (single, return, 
monthly tickets) more than 
2% above the consumer 
price index per year. 
YES       
How?               
In the performance 
contract, quality of the rail 
passengers’ services is 
contracted.             Safety 
checks, working and 
operating safeguards and 
guidelines.   
Punctuality,                        
Accessibility for people with 
reduced mobility,                            
Financial compensation for 
individual passengers with delays 
of more than 30 minutes. 
Minimum 
frequency, 
first and last 
train. 
Integration of 
timetables, 
ticket 
integration and 
information 
integration 
Financial penalty if 
punctuality 
performance is 
below a certain level.  
Financial bonus if 
the number of 
passengers is above a 
certain level.               
Compensation to 
passengers.     
                                
Railway 
undertaking 
obliged in PSO 
contract to pay 
compensation 
to passengers. 
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Table A7: Part two (continued) 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators 
Quantity of 
services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
Norway  YES                         
How?                
NO YES                       
How? 
 
          
Portugal   NO                                           
Fares may be set freely for 
journeys longer than 50 km.   
Reductions for elderly 
people, children, disabled 
persons and pensioners. 
YES                   
How?               
Agreement between 
SNRIPD, REFER and CP 
to promote accessibility on 
the railways.                
Safety checks, working 
and operating safeguards 
and guidelines.                  
 
Environmental characteristics of 
rolling stock,                          
Complaints from passengers,         
Punctuality,                       
Accessibility.     
Minimum 
number of 
trains.                
Agreements 
on rolling 
stock used / 
purchased. 
Agreements 
between 
operators for 
ticket 
integration and 
integration 
between 
different modes 
of transport. 
Based on punctuality 
and regularity of 
services (Fertagus). 
Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
Spain   YES                                 
How?                              
Prices are regulated for 
social routes and deregulated 
for commercial services.    
YES                        
How?                     
RENFE public service 
obligations are mainly 
defined in a pluriannual 
contract between RENFE 
and the state. The quality 
indicators are defined in 
the contract.                     
 
Punctuality,                                  
Quality of tracks,                        
Number of accidents. 
Trains per Km 
and passengers 
per Km are 
defined in the 
contract 
(RENFE). 
Functional 
integration 
between 
RENFE and 
FEVE in the 
Metro/Train of 
the Asturias. 
  Up to 
decentralized 
authorities. 
Sweden YES                         
How?                       
The market is 
opened to foreign 
competition on 
long distance 
transports. 
 
NO YES                        
How?               
Safety checks, working 
and operating safeguards 
and guidelines. 
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Table A7: Part two (continued) 
 
  Entry Regulation Price Regulation Qualitative Regulation Quality indicators Quantity of services 
Integration 
between 
services 
Financial 
compensation and 
Incentives 
Remedies for 
passengers 
Switzerland YES                         
How?                       
Third party access 
will be granted 
after a approval 
procedure at the 
Federal Office of 
transports. 
 
YES                          
How?                           
Prices for passengers 
transport are monitored. 
            
United 
Kingdom 
YES                        
How?                       
The ORR regulates 
Railtrack 
according to RPI-x 
formula, whilst, 
OPRAF monitors 
and enforces the 
franchise contracts 
signed by the 25 
TOCs. 
YES                             
How?                                  
If necessary, the franchising 
director must include in the 
relevant franchise agreement 
a provision for securing that 
the prices or fares are 
reasonable.           
Mandatory Card Schemes 
(Young Persons Railcard, 
Senior Railcard, Disabled 
Persons Railcard) and 
Voluntary Card Schemes 
(Family and HM Forces 
Railcards and Network 
Card). 
YES                            
How?                           
The franchise agreement 
requires a franchisee to 
establish its own 
passenger’s charter which 
must include target for 
some quality indicators.   
Safety checks, working 
and operating safeguards 
and guidelines.                     
Punctuality,         
Reliability,                                   
Queuing times at ticket offices,      
Information,                     
Compensation arrangements,         
Accessibility for disabled people. 
Minimum 
passenger rail 
services, 
frequency of 
trains, stations 
to be served, 
maximum 
journey times, 
first and last 
trains, 
weekend 
services, 
through 
services, seats 
availability, 
peak train 
capacity. 
 
In Northern 
Ireland, 
NITHC is 
introducing an 
integrated 
ticketing/fares 
regime to 
facilitate 
intermodal 
travel (buses 
and trains). 
Compensation to 
passengers. 
Railway 
undertaking 
obliged in PSO 
contract to pay 
compensation 
to passengers. 
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